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A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION: 
A SELF-REFERENTIAL, TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH 
TO CONCEPTUAL PATHOLOGY 
VOLUME II (English) 
A b s t r a c t  
A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION; 
A SELF-REFERENTIAL, TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH TO 
CONCEPTUAL PATHOLOGY 
Steven James Bartlett 
The principal objective of the work is to construct an analytically precise 
methodology which can serve to identify, eliminate, and avoid a certain widespread 
conceptual fault or misconstruction, called a "projective misconstruction" or 
"projection" by the author. 
It is argued that this variety of error in our thinking (i) infects a great number 
of our everyday, scientific, and philosophical concepts, claims, and theories, 
(ii) has largely been undetected, and (iii) when remedied, leads to a less controver­
sial and more rigorous elucidation of the transcendental preconditions of human 
knowledge than has traditionally been possible. 
The dissertation identifies, perhaps for the first time, a projective 
variety of self-referential inconsistency, and proposes an innovative, self-
reflexive approach to transcendental argument in a logical and phenomenological 
context. The strength of the approach lies, it is claimed, in the fact that a 
rejection of the approach is possible only on pain of self-referential inconsistency. 
The argument is developed in the following stages: 
A general introduction identifies the central theme of the work, defines the 
scope of applicability of the results reached, and sketches the direction of the 
studies which follow. The preliminary discussion culminates in a recognition of 
the need for a critique of impure reason. 
The body of  the  work  i s  d iv ided  in to  two par t s ;  Sec t ion  I  seeks  to  develop  a  
methodology,  on  a  pure ly  formal  bas is ,  which  i s ,  on  the  one  hand,  capable  of  
be ing  used  to  s tudy  the  t ranscendenta l  foundat ions  of  the  spec ia l  sc iences ,  inc luding  
i t s  own proper  t ranscendenta l  foundat ion .  On the  o ther  hand,  the  methodology 
proposed  i s  in tended  as  a  d iagnos t ic  and  therapeut ic  too l  for  dea l ing  wi th  pro jec t ive  
uses  of  concepts .  
The approach initiates an analysis of concepts from a perspective which views 
knowledge as coordination. Section I describes formal structures which possess 
the status of preconditions in such a coordinative account of knowledge. Special 
attention is given to the preconditions of identifying reference to logical particulars. 
The first section attempts, then, to provide a self-referential, transcendental 
methodology which is essentially revisionary in that it is motivated by a concern 
for conceptual error-elimination. 
Phenomenology, considered in its unique capacity as a self-referential, 
transcendental discipline, is of special relevance to the study. Section II accordingly 
examines a group of concepts which come into question in connection with the 
central theme of phenomenological constitution. The "de-projective methodology" 
developed in Section I is applied to these concepts which have a foundational 
importance in transcendental phenomenology. A translation is, in effect, 
proposed from the language of consciousness to a language in which preconditions 
of referring are investigated. The result achieved is the elimination of self-
defeating, projective concepts from a rigorous, phenomenological study of the 
constitutive foundations of science. 
The dissertation was presented in a two volume, double-language format for 
the convenience of French and English researchers. Each volume contains an 
analytical index. 
Science is the 
"knowledge of things possible" 
- [Vinci Is 20] 
A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION: 
A SELF-REFERENTIAL, TRANSCENDENTAL APPROACH 
TO CONCEPTUAL PATHOLOGY 
In the honor of Edmund Husserl, who saw 
"the infinite'open country of the' true philosophy, 
the 'promised land1  on which he himself. . .  
never set foot"*, and to those who 
will respect this dedication to the 
tasks of the Glasperlenspiel. 
* [ideas I: 29] 
Es ist schon ein grosser und notiger 
Beweis der Klugheit oder Einsicht, 
zu wissen, was man verntinftigerweise 
fragen solle. Denn wenn die Frage 
an sich ungereimt ist und unnotige 
Antworten verlangt, so Hat sie 
ausser der Beschamung dessen, der 
sie aufwirft, bisweilen noch den 
Nachteil, den unbehutsamen Anhorer 
derselben zu ungereimten Antworten 
zu verleiten und den belachenswerten 
Anblick zu geben. dass einer, (wie 
die Alten sagten)9 den Bock melkt» 
der andre ein Sieb unterhalt. 
-[Kant Is B S3] 
S'il fallait attendre de connaitre 
en tous ses details la question 
etudiee, nul nfoserait ecrire le 
peu qui lui est connu. De temps 
a^autre, quel<jues verites se 
revelent, minimes cubes de l^norme 
mosalque des choses. Divulguons 
la trouvaille, si humble soit-
elle; d*autres viendront qui> 
faisant recolte8 eux aussi, de 
quelques parcelles, assembleront 
le tout en un tableau toujours 
agrandi, mais toujours ebreche 
par l'inconnu. 
-[Fabre li X 119J 
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0-1 The absence of a unitary methodology 
Perhaps the day will 
come when philosophy 
can be discussed in 
terms of investiga­
tion rather than con' 
troversy, and philo­
sophers, like scien­
tists, be known by 
the topics they study 
rather than by the 
[L]a litterature philo-
sophique s'est, en effet, 
accrue d'une maniere 
demesuree tout en man-
quant d'une unite de 
methode au point .qu'il 
y a presque autant de 
philosophies que de 
philosophes. 
- [LFLT Intro 10J 
views they hold. 
[Goodman 2: xiv]* 
Divergence of belief and practice among philosophers 
engaged in theoretical matters is itself strong evidence 
that clear thinking on many fundamental problems has not 
spread very far. An unscientific profusion of incompatible 
philosophical systems obstructs an integrated comprehension 
of the world. For more than two millenia a perspicuous 
grasp of the synthetic nature of the world has been the 
purpose of philosophy. In its ancient sense, philosophy is 
a search inspired by love for the architectonic design of 
things. 
* For an explanation of the reference style used 
in this study, consult the Bibliography, pp. 2#2ff. 
iii 
In times of fragmentation, in a world where great 
values are remote, and a chasm widens between conviction 
and rationality, where "principles and conduct are un­
equally mated", this philosophia. tQ survive, must discover 
anew sound and resilient principles of order and totality. 
Frequently, a translation of mature but forgotten ideas 
into modern form may accomplish this task; occasionally, 
a fresh approach and vision are required to meet the needs 
of novelty and change. Whether through translation or 
creation, a unitary methodology must be developed: hope and 
philosophy point that way. 
0-2 The quandary of the special sciences. 
In the absence of clear knowledge of the 
meanings and relations of the concepts 
that we use, we are certain sooner or 
later to apply them Wrongly or to meet 
with exceptional cases where we are 
puzzled as to how to apply them at all. 
-[Broad 1: 16J 
The individual sciences increasingly are confronted 
with a disturbing ignorance of the nature of objects they 
investigate. It is not unusual that the special sciences 
are unable to say in any final sense what the objects they 
study are, or what a study of such objects itself must 
iv 
presuppose.^" This tendency on the part of the special 
sciences to utilize methods of investigation which are 
not fully explicated, in connection with objects the nature 
of which is not effectively understood, ultimately leads, 
to recall Russellfs words, to disciplines "in which we 
never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we 
are saying is true. 
It is an unimportant question whether the special 
sciences shirk a responsibility of realizing a self-
conscious clarity concerning their own fundamental concepts, 
or" whether such a foundational elucidation is the more 
appropriate subject-matter of philosophy. What i^ important 
1. "[Les sciences positives] sont done incapables de 
dire, au sens propre et dernier, quel sens a l^xistant dont 
elles parlent, quels horizons du sens cet existant pre­
suppose, horizons dont elles ne parlent pas et qui pourtant 
contribuent a determiner ce sens." [LFLT Intro 20] ''[L]es 
sciences en verite sont dans un manque total de clarte a 
l*egard de leur propre sens." [LFLT Intro 24] 
2. His full statement is given here: "We start, in 
pure mathematics, from certain rules of inference, by which 
we can infer that if one proposition is true, then so is 
some other proposition. These rules of inference constitute 
the major part of the principles of formal logic. V/e then 
take any hypothesis that seems amusing, and deduce its 
consequences. If our hypothesis is about anything, and not 
about some one or more particular things, then our deductions 
constitute mathematics. Thus mathematics may be defined as 
the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, 
nor whether what we are saying is true." [Russell 71] 
t 
V 
is that certain unitary methods be developed to contribute 
to the task of determining what these foundations of science 
are, and how the basic structures of the various special 
sciences interrelate. It should matter little to anyone 
under what particular branch of learning insight is gained, 
provided what is learned is made available in the interests 
of a unified effort. 
A concern for this task and for its intrinsic relation 
to the ancient meaning of the philosophical enterprise 
motivates the present study. An attempt to make a fresh 
beginning on the foundational level should arouse both 
doubt as'well as a sense of hope. Doubt, in the light of 
the large number of former, and often unsuccessful, 
undertakings; hope, if the end is not, as is so often 
thought, unshakable conclusions, but rather some.measure 
of enlightenment stemmming from a realization of the 
scope of the great issues, their subtlety, variety, difficulty, 
and richness. 
0-3 ' This study. 
Nous...sommes toujours aux commencements. 
-[RL III vi Intro 12] 
Even the most elementary mistakes have 
yet to be made. -[Goodman 2: 216J 
A philosophical system is a function of the range of 
questions and problems which it can illuminate. Similarly, 
the sense of the present study may be understood in relation 
to the group of questions and problems with which it is 
concerned. The general framework in terms of which this 
study proceeds will be described briefly. 
A. The subjects considered in the subsequent chapters 
serve to open the way for the development of a rigourous 
scientific philosophy having as its final object the 
articulation of a rational theory of science. 
The resolution of philosophical issues is at times 
like solving a puzzle. There may be some parts of the 
pattern which fit easily into a clearly defined order. 
Sometimes, there are a few obstinate portions of the pattern 
that resist onefs efforts. One searches for the missing 
elements, and then, in a flash, sees that the lacking 
pieces can be supplied through a complete change in those 
already accepted. 
The problem of determining the rational foundations 
of science closely resembles the solution of such a 
puzzle. If one is fortunate, it may be possible to locate 
a few hitherto missing elements; occasionally, however, 
previously accepted elements must be rejected. Sometimes 
by addition, sometimes by subtraction, the order of things 
discloses itself. The emerging pattern is the structure of 
experience, the framework of coherent theory. It is the 
purpose of this work to address the pattern and bid it 
show itself. 
B. An elucidation of the rational foundations of science 
involves three interconnected subjects which I shall 
identify under the headings of "epistemology", "formal 
mathesis". and "analysis of primitive concepts". 
Under the first, I understand "reflection on and 
criticism of the very means by which knowledge is obtained". 
In particular here, this means investigating that by 
virtue of which a science is a science. Since the purpose 
of all science is to describe the unitary structure of 
experience"'", a scientific inquiry into the rational 
2 
foundations of science comprises a science of science 
which must comprehend how experience may oome to know its 
own unitary structure. 
The pure formal character of this structure is 
1. "The object of all science...is too coordinate our 
experiences and to bring them into a logical system.... 
The only justification for our concepts is that they serve 
to represent the complex of our experiences; beyond this 
they have no legitimacy." [Einstein 4s 2f] 
2. "...une discipline nouvelle et.. «,complexe, dont 
le propre est d'etre la science de la science et qui, 
precisement pour..cette raison, devrait etne plus stricte-
ment qualifiee pour porter le nom dfepistemologie." [RL I 
§ 5 10] Cf. also [RL I $ 10 25; $ 62 2471. 
viii 
constitutive of a mathesis in the generalized sense of 
Leibniz."'" The essential structure of science studied 
through an analysis of possible forms of theory constitutes 
such a formal mathesis. The rational foundations of 
science express the formal unity of science in general. 
The formal unity of science is essentially dependent 
upon groups of "primitive concepts" which render possible 
p 
the objective-theoretical connections of knowledge. An 
elucidation of these fundamental forms of connectivity 
is part of the tasks .of a formal mathesis. A discussion of 
many of the primitive concepts conditioning the formal 
unity of science provides the subject-matter of various 
later chapters. 
C. Together, the three subjects of epistemology, formal 
mathesis. and analysis of primitive concepts combine under 
the rubric of a science which sets the task for itself 
to investigate the conditions of possibility of science in 
general. The rationale behind this task emerges as a 
1. Cf. [RL I 8 60 23Sff; 56 67-72 263-279], [Leibniz 
passim], [LFLT 6 23(b) 102; 8 35\b) 140; 5 40 148f; 6 52 
l37ff], [S. Bacnelard 1: SO, 103]. 
» 
2. "Qu'elles sont les "possibilites" primitives dont 
est constitute la "possibilite" de la theorie, en dfautres 
termes quels sont les concepts essentiels primitifs dont 
est constitue le concept, lui-meme essentiel, de theorie?" 
[RL I 6 66 261J See also [RL I..8 67 263ff] and [S. Bachelard 
1: 95^ 
ix 
concern to eludicate the conditioning structure"*", the 
constitution, of the plurality of objects studied by the 
special"sciences. The constitution of these objects 
. expresses the nature of the domain of possible experience, 
and forms the basis for a general theory of objects. 
D. The above conception of philosophy owes its original " 
inspiration to Descartes. Descartes observed the need 
to establish a scientific program whereby the foundations of 
the special sciences might be elucidated by means of a uni~ 
o 
. tary and'rigourous methodology. 
To carry out this program, it is first necessary to 
determine guidelines in relation to which inquiry can 
commence with a radical purchase on a given matter. Second, 
a unitary methodology must be developed which can, with 
minimum risk of error, insure the systematic disclosure 
of constitutive structures. Third, there are basic principles 
which this methodology should embody in order to avoid 
1. "...systeme qui confere aux sciences leur sens 
possible en tant que sciences authentiques." [LFLT Intro 
24] Cf. [RL I 70 270f]. 
2. "[T]he Cartesian Idea of a universal science 
beginning from an absolute foundation...is nothing other 
than a necessary and indubitable beginning and an equally 
necessary method - which, at the same time, allows delineating 
a system of problems that may be set up without absurdity." 
[MC Epilogue 6 64 17#; in [Ricoeur 139n] ] "[T]he 
greatness of Descartes...lies in his having produced the 
project of a philosophy which is at the same time a science 
and the ground of all sciences within the system of one 
universal science." [Ricoeur 3! #31 
X 
biased and dogmatic constrictions of scientific inquiry, 
while certain lapses from rigour are prevented. Significant 
among these principles are the following: (i) what I'shall 
term 'the principle of fallibility* which denies the 
possibility of the absolute truth of assertions having 
an unlimited range of application-1-; (ii) an attitude of 
practical indifference which unfetters analysis from a 
concern with immediate, applicable results^; (iii) "the 
principle of minimum assumption" which curtails inessential 
postulations-^; (iv) a principle or, strictly speaking, 
group of principles according to which the truth (or 
falsity) of assertions can be confirmed with a maximum 
reduction in ambiguity.^ 
These principles are pressed into the service of a 
radical philosophical beginning, with respect to which the 
present study forms an introduction. 
1. See £ 1.6. 
2. See below, 0-9. 
3. See pp. 23, 39ff. "Most generally speaking, the 
purpose of constructing a system is to interrelate its 
predicates. The same purpose is served in reducing to a 
minimum the basis required.... [T]he motive for seeking 
economy is not mere concern for superficial neatness. To 
economize and to systematize are the same." [Goodman 2: 59] 
if. See ^  l./f, 2.4* 
xi 
E. Science may be defined as a systematic disclosure 
of the order of things. The end of science is to enlighten 
reason and to convince understanding. The aim of a 
scientific book, then, is to reveal to reason systematic 
features of the world, and to convince understanding of 
the validity of the thoughts it expresses. The first 
task it endeavors to achieve through a simplified expression 
of reality in theory; the second, it can accomplish only 
through accurate description, rigourous analysis, sound 
argumentation, and consistent reasoning. 
Theory and the ways in which theory can be 
evidenced provide the means whereby researches into the 
structure of experience are rendered possible in 
hitherto inaccessible regions. It is thus in large part 
my intention to impart a certain vision of the world 
through a form of philosophical analysis, rather than to 
suggest something along very detailed lines about both a 
narrowly comprehended method of analysis and a correspondingly 
small element of the general pattern. My reason for this 
preference rests in my belief that so long as a rational 
i 
vision of the world is lacking, any method in the final 
analysis remains opaque, while in any position obscurity 
is latent. 
0-4 The normative nature of science 
Methodology should represent, as it 
currently does not, a systematic 
catalogue of...constraints* 
-[Wilkinson 2: #9] 
Methodology of science expresses a system of normative 
prescriptions which generally legislate that rigour is -to 
be preserved, error avoided, and consistency achieved. 
Incompatibles are to be resolved or dismissed, absurdity 
and nonsense are promptly rejected. Whenever possible, 
ambiguity is to be evaded; propositions are analyzed with 
respect to criteria of decidability, provability, or 
verif lability."1" 
Science is normative in that a set of directions 
must be followed if investigations are to claim scientific 
p 
soundness. Such a statement is tautologous m character. 
1. "CTest...11 essence de cette science normative de 
fonder des propositions generales qui nous indiquent des 
criteres fixes par rapport a une norme servant de base -
par exemple a une idee ou a un but supreme - criteres dont 
la possession garantisse 1'adequation a..cette norme ou, au 
contraire, adjoigne une condition indispensable pour cette 
adequation; ou aussi de fonder propositions sfy apparentant 
ou l'on prenne en consideration le cas d*une non-adequation, 
ou bien dans lesquelles l'on affirme la non-existence de ces 
etats de chose." [RL I £ 11 26] 
2. $ 1.4 and passim. 
The normative structure of science reveals the rules which 
must be respected in order to hold a certain end in sight. 
0-5 The structure of theory. 
Die logischen Satze beschreiben • 
das Geriist der Welt, oder viel-
mehr, sie stellen es dar. 
-[Wittgenstein 1: 6.124] 
The theoretical foundations of science entail certain 
ideal guarantee's of the possibility both of the objects 
investigated and of the investigation itself of those 
objects. The constitutive structure of theory represents 
a systematic order of possibilities. Unless those 
possibilities are admissible, theory is impossible. 
The normative structure of theory expresses certain 
ideal restrictions or constraints limiting the range of 
possibilities involved in an investigation of a particular 
class of objects. The ideal restrictions on a range of 
possibilities determine the structure of a-theory. 
0-6 General tradition behind the present work. 
It is a call to reason to undertake anew 
that most difficult of all its tasks, 
xiv 
namely, that of self-knowledge, and to 
institute a tribunal which will assure 
to reason its lawful claims, and dismiss 
all groundless pretensions, not by 
despotic decrees, but in accordance with 
its own eternal and unalterable laws. 
-[Kant 2c: A xi-xiij 
The tradition to which the present study belongs is 
very old indeed. The way this study approaches the central 
problem of that tradition - namely, how to elucidate the 
structure of the world - may contain something of the new. 
There is a tradition in philosophy running from 
Protagoras through Kant according to which mind is 
constitutive of the structure of reality. A second current 
of thought in philosophy views man within the network of 
things and events of the physical universe, and attempts 
to explain his outlook as the effect of the dynamic 
universe of physical things upon his nature and its 
consciousness. Both of these views I shall be concerned 
to combat. Neither the being of consciousness nor the 
being of external things can provide a rational starting-
point for scientific philosophy. In fact, it is my 
contention that the idea that scientific philosophy must 
have a "starting-point" is itself critically mistaken. 
The cantus firmus of this work is the philosophical 
thought of Husserl. In addition, I have benefitted 
particularly from the investigations of Bridgman, Carnap, 
Einstein, Quine, Reichenbach, Russell, and Strawson. 
0-7 Scientific wisdom. 
The price of wisdom is eternal criticism. 
-[Buchanan 1: 1&4] 
The love and search for truth in its systematic 
aspect is science; the self-conscious clarity of 
understanding which may come during this exploration 
(for it is interminable) is wisdom. The comprehension 
of the architectonic structure of the world, within the 
compass of a rational vision, describes the ideal of 
scientific wisdom. 
The task of philosophy as a science is never 
finished, but advances carefully over the terrain of 
insight and error of the past. The discrimination of the 
achievements from the mistakes is the work of criticism. 
Philosophy must therefore elucidate critically the 
systematic structure of things. 
0-6 The limitations of knowledge. 
Si l'on songe combien limites sont les 
moyen intellectuels de l'homme et plus 
XVI 
precisement combien restreinte est la 
sphere a l'interieur de laquelle se 
trouvent des complications encore 
pleinement comprehensibles de concepts 
abstraits, et combien il est deja 
difficile de parvenir a la seule 
comprehension de complications de ce 
genre, realisees selon le mode qui 
leur est propre; si l'on songe en outre 
combien nous sommes limites, d'une 
maniere analogue, dans notre concep­
tion veritable du sens des enchainements • 
de propositions, ne seraient-ils-meme que 
peu compliques, et plus encore dans la 
realisation effective et evidente de 
deductions qui ne sont que moyennement 
compliquees; si l'on songe enfin combien 
restreinte est a fortiori la sphere dans 
laquelle peut se mouvoir originairement 
la recherche active, vue a pleine, ciui 
s'attache partout aux idees elles-memes: 
alors l'on s'etonnera plutot du fait 
qu'il a ete possible, d*une maniere^ 
generale, de mettre sur pied des theories 
et. des sciences rationnelles d'une 
certaine comprehension* —[RL I y 54 214j 
At any one time, a.systematic disclosure of the 
structure of the world can be supplemented. The domain 
of possible experience is, however, unbounded, and thus, 
where there is knowledge, the unknown cannot be far off. 
Science therefore carries with it its own challenge, for 
its vision always possesses a horizon of unfulfilledi 
possibility. 
This recognition is fundamental to the principle 
of fallibility, which recommends that the results of 
scientific investigation maintain a certain self-conscious 
xvii 
"modesty" in the suggested range of their applicability. 
Science is never final; mystery always remains at hand. 
0-9 The intuitive and the useful. 
r 
[0]ne must avoid the error of assuming 
that the sense behind familiar notions 
is obvious. -[Ipsen 1: v] 
[TJhat which is a matter of course for 
common sense must become astonishing for 
reflection. -[Ricoeur 3: 13&J 
[AJny systematization calls for departures 
from the circular ruts worn by common 
sense; ...there is no need to show that 
any proposed system is the most natural 
in all respects. -[Goodman 2: 147f] 
A high degree of sensitivity to the counter-intuitive 
has been one of the major stimulants of dogmatic slumber 
in philosophy. It ought not to occur again that in the 
desire to suppress the counter-intuitive, it should fall 
1. The intimation of what is yet not amenable to 
scientific elucidation is perhaps best accomplished through 
moderate usage of literary style in descriptions of fact. 
"Frenchmen are probably right in insisting, in scientific 
inquiry, on the incorporation of empathetic methods and 
the use of literary language. At any rate, this is part of 
most non-Anglo-Saxon science. V/as sich sagen lasst. lasst 
sich poetisch sagen becomes an important methodological 
principle, entirely apart from the (perhaps debatable) point 
that the categories of a language are not immaterial to what 
is formulated with its help. [Wilkinson 2: lOOn] 
xviii 
under "the tyranny of custom""1", as with the philosophers 
of Padua, to "search after the truth by comparing texts" 
and to refuse to look through the newly invented telescope, 
2 for fear of confusion. 
i 
Similarly, philosophy chained to the practical is 
3 
shortsighted, while theoretic breadth suffers. The 
significance of insight does not,.I believe, lie in 
immediate utility. Wisdom and engineering touch only 
at rare intervals. Critical philosophy is "useful" only 
in the important sense in which any clarification of 
frequently employed concepts can throw light upon the 
nature of their employment and, hopefully, indicate how 
better to employ them. 
1. [Ipsen 1: 162]. 
2. "[I]ntuition is not a safe guide: it cannot 
properly be used as a criterion of either truth or fruit-
fulness of scientific explorations." [Na/gel 1: 14] 
"Reference to a...habit does not supply an epistemological 
argument." [Reichenbach 1+1 &2] 
3. "[I]l sied mal au philosophe, deXenseur par_ 
excellence des interets de la theorie pure, de se laisser 
influencer par la question de l'utilite pratique." [RL II.2 
iv 137] "The rigidity of logical necessity loses its 
romantic and sentimental aura and gets put to work in 
human experience without losing its soul to the pragmatic 
demon." [Buchanan 1: 140] 
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0-10 Empirical objects as ideal possibilities. 
Unsere Probleme sind nicht abstrakt, 
sondern vielleicht die konkretesten, 
die es gibt. -[Wittgenstein 1: 5..5563J 
A scientific philosophy which serves to elucidate 
the general constitutive structure of scientific inves­
tigation thereby also describes certain regulative 
principles of possibility. These regulative principles 
express the formal structure of objects studied by the 
special sciences. Thus, in the framework of a particular 
science, a given object may be studied as an exemplar, 
as an ideal model, of the formal structure of that science."*" 
A description of a science is a function of the 
ensemble of objects in which its interests lie. Ideally, 
a plurality of objects selected from that ensemble -
when considered as exemplars of formal structure - can 
provide a basis for an analysis of the formal constitution 
1. "A model of a phenomenon represents a schematization 
of the true occurrences." [Gukhman 1: 1] 
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of the science in question. In this sense an investigation 
of the formal constitutive structure of a science rests 
upon an analysis of empirical objects as archetypes of 
ideal possibility.'1' 
Similarly, the conditions of possibility of science 
in general may be elucidated through a study of the various 
special sciences as theoretic archetypes of a higher order. 
The essential connections between these archetypes are 
constitutive of the formal unity of science. 
0-11 Towards a critique of impure reason. 
But before building, one must destroy. 
-[G. Bachelard 2: II 572] 
Pour suivre la pensee scientifique, il 
faut reformer les cadres rationnels et 
accepter des realites nouvelles. 
-[G. Bachelard 1: 50] 
Fairly recently, through the work of Gauss, Bolyai, 
Lobachevsky, Riemann, and Godel, attention was called to 
1. Accordingly, "the fact is no longer anything but 
an example of pure possibility." [Ricoeur 3: 103] "Lfidee 
la plus generale d'une theorie des multiplicites est d'etre 
une science qui donne une forme determinee aux types essentiels 
de theories (ou, suivant les cas, de domaines) possibles, et 
qui recherche les relations, conformes a la loi, des unes avec 
les autres. Toutes les theories veritables sont alors des 
specialisations, ou, suivant les ca's, des singularisations de 
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the fact that proofs are possible in mathematics of the 
impossibility of proving certain propositions within a 
given system. In philosophy, in a somewhat similar 
fashion, proofs are possible of the impossibility that 
certain concepts, propositions, or assertions are 
meaningful within a given system."*" Normally, however, 
such proofs involve the application to a plurality of 
cases of a general "criterion of meaning" which itself may 
stand in need of justification. 
It is one of the principal tasks of this study 
to call attention to a widespread fault, or misconstruction, 
p 
in conceptualizations. This misconstruction is such that 
it can be demonstrated meaningless in a given system without 
recourse to a criterion of meaning defined in a manner 
extrinsic to the system in question. In a certain general 
formes de theories qui leur correspondent, de meme que tous 
les domaines de la connaissance elabores theoriquement sont 
des multiplicities isolees." [RL I $ 70 270f] [I]l n'y a 
qu*une philosophie unique. quTune science veritable et 
authentique unique et en elle les sciences particulieres 
authentiques sont justement des membres non-autonomes." 
[LFLT £ 103 362] See also [S. Bachelard 1: 97, 100, 256].  
1. Bridgman observes in this connection: "It constitutes . 
a great advance in our critical attitude...to realize that 
a great many of the questions that we uncritically ask are 
without meaning.... [OJne is making a significant statement 
about his subject in stating that a certain question.is 
meaningless." [Bridgman 4J 29fj 
2. My foremost concern is not to analyze the structure 
of language, but rather, as it were, to reinforce faulty areas 
of a given conceptual structure. 
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sense, this misconstruction involves the assertion of a 
dissociation which in principle is impossible.^ 
It is consequently a major purpose of this study to 
lay the groundwork for a kind of "philosophical pathology" 
which would remove obstructions to a rational understanding 
2 
of reality. The raison d'etre of this task is the 
description of a scientific w&rld view, to which end 
subsequent chapters comprise a propaedeutic. 
0-12 Zu den Sachen selbst.^ 
The true philosophical beginning must 
have been irretrievably lost in begin­
ning with presuppositions of a positive 
kind. Lacking as did the traditional 
schemes of philosophy the enthusiasm 
of a first beginning, they also lacked 
what is first and most important: a 
specifically philosophical groundwork 
acquired through original self-activity, 
ana therewith that firmness of basis, 
that genuineness of root, which alone 
makes real philosophy possible. 
-[Ideas I: Preface to Eng. ed. 28] 
1. In this very loose sense, one may be reminded of 
Laporte, who warned "against the kind of abstraction by which 
we think of as isolated certain things which are not made to 
exist alone." [Stern 1: 2$J 
2. "Philosophy...appears as a criticism and a corrective, 
and - what is now to the purpose - as an additional source of 
evidence in times of fundamental reorganization." [Whitehead 
2: 299J 
3 .  [Log. Unt. II 6 ] .  
5 
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The systematic disclosure of constitutive structures 
therefore involves a radical approach to an investigation of 
objects as archetypes of ideal possibility. The formal, 
structure of a science is manifested in a range of objects 
which express that formal structure. Investigations of 
constitution in general require, in this sense, an 
empirical foundation. A description of the formal 
structure of a particular science may therefore be seen 
to derive from the constitution of the investigated objects. 
These empirical foundations are necessary in order that 
science may have a subject-matter. With the removal of 
obstructions to a rational understanding of reality, these 
empiric-al foundations are disclosed for scientific study* 
To permit the elimination of impediments to scientific 
thought, these foundations must be approached in an 
epistemologically neutral manner.1 For this reason, 
the methodology proposed here may, in a restricted sense, 
be regarded as providing a translation- or transformation-
schema from, for example, the language of consciousness 
and intentionality to the language of logical requirements 
2 for certain sorts of reference. 
1. Cf., e.g., [Carnap 1: lO^ff]. 
2. I owe this characterization of the present study to 
Professor John J. Compton of Vanderbilt University. 
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0-13 This work as a theory. 
The method of Philosophy...resembles 
that of pure mathematics, at least in 
the respect that neither has any use 
for experiment. -[Broad 1: 19] 
We are rapidly reaching a stage when 
experimenting with theoretical 
formulations is becoming a distinct 
discipline in itself. 
-[Bender 1: 116J 
The present study articulates a theory concerning 
the structure of possible experience. It is a theory 
in that it does not purport to express structural 
descriptions having universal application, but rather res­
tricts its own application to a definite range of 
possibilities, where the structure of these possibilities 
is conditioned by certain regulatory principles. If one 
prefers, the investigations which follow, have a theoretical 
content in relation to a possible framework with which they 
are compatible. The theoretical content represents the 
ideal systematic relations which a plurality of objects 
bear to one another. This work does not purport to be a 
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theory in the sense that given the theory its empirical 
foundations can be reproduced. 
The theory proposed is said to be "relativistic", 
but this characterization ought not be construed to 
imply in any way a form of "relativism". The distinction 
which I intend here corresponds to that between reliable 
knowledge, the scope of which' is defined, and purely 
provisional knowledge. 
0-14 On the theory of experience. 
[T]he most fundamental task of Philosophy 
is to take the concepts that we daily use 
in common life and science, to analyse 
them, and thus to determine their precise 
meanings and their mutual relations. 
-[Broad Is 16] 
An investigation of the foundations of science can 
serve as a key to a systematic understanding of the order 
of things. Ultimately, a rational theory of science and 
an integrated comprehension of the world are indistinguishable 
The elucidation of the foundations of science discloses 
the unitary structure of experience, the study of^which 
itself is the task' of science.1 
1'. "[L]a logique a besoin dfune theorie de l'experience 
si elle doit pouvoir donner un eclaircissement scientifique 
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The domain of possibilities has a peculiar 
"recurved structure" which renders possible this 
capacity for experience to interrogate the world and 
find in this its own structure. An inquiry into the 
constitutive structure of the domain of possibilities 
forms a theme of distinctive magnitude in subsequent 
investigations. 
0-15 A note to the reader. 
[T]he temptation to be interesting 
rather than technically effective is 
a dangerous onee -[Russell 9? I 262 J 
One of the main reasons which can be given for the 
rather slow growth of interest in scientific philosophy is 
that, generally, philosophers have not been scientists: 
the scientific framework has been alien to them, and their 
preparation has not provided them with the background 
and tools by means of which to undertake philosophical 
inquiry in a scientific spirit. The success of scientific 
philosophy depends upon the acquisition by philosophers 
(and not by investigators in the special sciences, since 
the task is philosophically inspired) of tthe requisite 
preparation. Of equally great, perhaps greater, importance 
pour les fondements et les limites de la legitimite de son 
a priori et par consequent pour son sens legitime. [LFLT £ B6 
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is the acquisition by philosophers of a disinterested 
i 
intellectual curiousity in their investigation, which is 
common to genuine men of science. But of eminent signi­
ficance is the, at times difficult, responsibility to 
hold fast in a scientific context to the meaning . 
and to retain the broad perspective of philosophia in the 
ancient sense. 
In the study which follows I have, mostly in Section 
One, attempted to supply a few stepping stones to subsequent 
levels of analysis. However, the work progresses in a 
circling, spiral movement, attempting gradually to free 
itself from those initial supports which suggest "entrances" 
to what ultimately is hermetically self-enclosed, not 
admitting the possibility of "entrances" and "exits". 
The hermetic character of the subject-matter itself 
should suggest the extraneousness of employing the device 
of explicit controversy. However, I was persuaded not 
to make use of explicit controversy for several other reasons 
as well, among them: the difficulty of an adequate 
exposition of variant philosophical positions without 
destroying, through undue expansion, the unity of the 
analyses made; the frequent fruitlessness of explicit 
controversy, usually the result of the inability of 
philosophers to understand one another; finally, the simple 
dirth of research which would reflect the same general values 
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and purposes which I have enumerated in connection with the 
tasks of scientific philosophy. As a consequence, this 
essay proceeds in the spirit of independent inquiry. 
Scientific philosophy, in the sense in which I 
propose to develop it, is difficult in that some alteration , 
in attitude and in way of thinking may be called for to 
follow and to continue the analyses described. This difficulty 
is multiplied when departures aire required from what common 
sense holds to be intuitively evident. 
No finality is claimed for the theory developed; 
however, I believe that were modifications or additions 
come to be needed, this discovery will be the result of 
essentially the same methodology as that which establishes 
the foundation of their present possibility. It is on this 
ground that I should ask the reader to be tolerant of 
incompleteness."'' 
I hope the reader, much as he may be desirous of a 
short-cut'to an understanding of the universe, will with 
patience discover in those philosophical microcosms this 
study approaches rich and rewarding overtones of the general 
macrocosm, and will come to see that humble beginnings often 
are of equal, and perhaps of greater, interest than the 
eventual conclusions to which they lead. 
1, On incompleteness, see £ 1.6 and passim. 
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0-16 The place of this study in future work. 
Thanne am ther the vertues of 
feith and hope...to acheve and 
acomplice the gode Werkes in 
whiche he purposeth fermely to 
continue. 
-[Chaucer: ParsonTs Tale0 
par. 61J 
This work forms an introduction to a series of 
investigations. In the present study, a methodology is 
developed and employed with respect to a specific group 
of philosophically significant questions and problems. 
But no worthwhile task is ever finished, and much remains 
to be done. The architectonic design of things is the 
greatest conception to challenge intelligence; there, 
something is said only by virtue of what is omitted. 
Among what I am aware calls for further study are 
the following: To the degree that a rational theory of 
science can be fully developed in relation to the present 
special sciences, a detailed elucidation of the constitutive 
structures peculiar to each of the clearly distinguishable 
sciences must be undertaken, a program which clearly 
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demands a plurality of investigators. The place this 
study occupies in relation to the following investigations 
which I myself would anticipate, is dictated by the. 
bounds of duration, the inclinations of interest in 
terms of the demands of the architectonic structure of 
things, and, to be sure, the subtle restrictions of all 
human endeavor - evidenced in the limitations of 
knowledge, skill, discipline, etc.: 
(i) an elucidation of certain of the 
foundational structures of the formal-
mathematical disciplines, with respect 
to which the formalizable content of 
the methodology developed here can be 
studiedj 
(ii) an investigation of the consti­
tutive structures of the special and 
general theoi'ies of relativity, which 
exhibit constitutional peculiarities 
analogous to those manifested by the. 
domain of possible experience, as the 
latter is described in the present 
work j 
(iii) a systematic description of the 
.principle of complementarity1 in 
connection with the articulation of 
a general theory of experience; 
(iv) a scientific study of methodo- • 
logy in psychiatric theory, particularly 
in the recently established branch of 
phenomenological psychiatry; and 
(v) an elucidation of foundational 
structures of axiology. 
1. P. 233 and passim. 
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0-17 The organization of this study. 
This study has two parts: the first consists 
primarily in formal considerations which provide the basis 
for a group of investigations in the second. Each 
section is preceded by a short introduction which gives 
a'summary of the material dealt with in that section, and 
includes some preliminary discussion of concepts fundamental 
to subsequent analyses. 
Successive chapters rest upon the foundation of 
preceding ones; it is usually not possible adequately 
to understand a chapter out of its given order. 
Sometimes the style is reminiscent of that of a manual 
or handbook. Because this study claims no more than to 
be an introduction to a field of research, my aspiration 
is that it may be of use to other investigators, rather than 
be viewed as a statement ending with a final punctuation of 
its own. 
I have from time to time used more than one term when 
the recurrent use of one would produce terminological 
monotony. The introduction of closely related terms, 
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for example, function*, 'parameter1, 'context', 'framework', 
and so on, has the further justification that by means of 
the associated senses of such terms, various levels of nuance 
and emphasis are possible. 
* 
As already noted, criticism is minimized in part 
to avoid extensive exposition of discrepant positions; 
these positions are frequently mentioned in the notes. It 
is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts I 
have had have been anticipated by someone else. References 
are therefore given simply as an aid in orienting the 
reader in relation to pertinent literature, and to indicate 
clear or ostensible departures from previous thought. An 
explanation of the reference style used in the footnotes 
is given at the beginning of the bibliography.1 
Double quotation marks [ " ] are used for the 
following purposes; to signify the unusual (or inappropriate) 
employment of an expression, to emphasize an occurrence of a 
technical expression, or to show that a passage is a direct 
quotation. Single quotation marks [ 1 J are used to indicate 
that a term is referred to, or mentioned, rather than used. 
Occasionally, single quotation marks may be used to indicate 
a quotation within a .quotation. Brackets [ [] ] are used 
1. P. 2 3 2 ,  
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in citations, and to set off inserted matter as an 
editorial interpolation. 
The bibliography is followed by a terminological 
index which gives an inventory of key expressions, lists 
the pages on which those expressions occur, and draws 
attention to the pages on which a given expression is 
defined or clarified. 
A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION 
A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION 
Section One 
Section 1.0 
INTRODUCTION'TO SECTION ONE 
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION ONE 
.Before the plan of this section is described, it will 
be useful to introduce several concepts fundamental to the 
considerations which follow. 
Generally speaking, the first part of this study is 
dedicated to analyses of pure formal structure, i.e., of what 
shall be called 'logic of structure*. Together, these 
analyses can be regarded as constituting a general system of 
natural deduction for the essential relations studied in 
Section Two. The methodology which these analyses yield 
will be purely scientific in the broad sense that "science 
deals only with the description of structural properties of 
„1 . . . ' 
objects. 
2 
The concept of logic of structure will be defined at 
the outset. The logical, or pure theoretic relational, 
scaffolding of the theoretic content of a system constitutes 
that system's logic of structure. To be more precise, the 
1. [Carnap 1: 19] "...every object of science can be 
uniquely characterized within its object domain through mere 
structure statements. [ThusJ all genuine science is structural 
science. [Carnap ll 1+31 
2. I take 'definition1 in the sense of ' established 
correlation between two or more terms and a relation between them 
of synonymy'. How such a correlation is in fact established in a 
particular case will depend upon circumstances and certain 
empirical correlation procedures. For the foundation of such 
correlations, see £ 2.5. Cf. also [Quine li 24-27 and passimj. 
1 
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logic of structure of any system S consists in the strict 
axiomatic system or group of such systems in which all pri­
mitive relations and functions of S are -implicitly defined 
by the axioms."*" 
Here 'structure* has the familiar sense of "une entitle 
autonome de dependances internes"2, "un tout forme de 
phenomenes solidaires, tels que chacun depend des autres et 
ne" peut etre ce qu'il est que dans et par sa relation avec 
eux"3, "la formule constitutive ou le degre d*organisation 
du [systemeJ...considere"^. That which is common to 
isomorphic relations, the class of these relations, will here 
also be called their structure. 
It follows that the specification of the logic of structure 
of any given system, or context, does not of course require an 
exhibition of all possible contexts similarly constituted, 
but rather involves the determination of the coordination-map 
of that given particular matrix, so that other contexts of 
1. For a description of "implicit definition" see 
[Nagel 1: 12f]. 
2. [Hjemslev Is v; 2: 69ff; 3: 638ffJ. 
3. [Bastide 1: 13; from M.A. Lalande, Vocabulaire de la 
philosophie. ed. 1926, III, s.v. "Structure", pp. 1010-11J. 
!+• [Bastide 1: 146f; quotation of M.D. Lagache]. See also 
the definition of 'structure' in [Saussure 1: 157J. 
3 
the game formal type are, in principle, identifiable.1 Thus, 
a logic of structure is invariant in relation to all structurally 
p 
isomorphic systems. 
It is important to note that the logic of structure of 
a determinate system describes the relations which are ideal 
conditions of the possibility of the system. The relational 
character of logic of structure will frequently be referred 
to in terms of the fundamental functional organization of 
the structure of a given system.3 
This study represents a theory in that it sets out to 
research the world of ideal possibilities.^ Structural analyses 
contained in the present work have as objective correlates 
theoretical multiplicities determined insofar a3 all possible 
objects of each multiplicity are coordinated by certain 
connections and fundamental laws. The objects remain, here, 
completely undetermined.^ 
1. The determination of such a logic of structure will 
include several factors left unmentioned here. Cf. pp. 39ff. 
2. On a similar thought, compare [LG ISO]. 
3. Such a functional organization can be likened to what 
Husserl calls "constituants essentiels de toute science en tant 
qu*unite objective theorique." [RL I § 42 173-3 "Chaque science 
aans son travail theorique a en vue exclusivement des formations 
•logiques1, des formations du logos theorique. En ce sens elle 
est elle-mime une •logique'.. [LFLT § 5 39J 
4. "Nous entendons...par theorie...un certain contenu 
iddal de connaissance possible." [RL I § 66 260] 
5. Compare [LFLT § 28 124f] and [RL I $ 70 270-1]. 
k 
The methodology developed in this section is intended 
to isolate and eradicate certain Procrustean notions of 
theory, and can be appropriately viewed as an application of 
Descartes® maxim to restrict judgment to the sphere of 
adequate understanding# I shall argue that analysis conforming 
to this methodology is epistemologically fundamental* while 
explicit departures from this approach are hyperbolically 
self-defeating# The justification of this methodological 
framework is found in the present section; it will, generally 
speaking, be assumed epistemologically -unobjectionable in 
Section Two. 
Language considerations will enter the analyses which 
follow only idealiter. Various positions have been taken 
respecting the status of language in an analysis of philosophical 
f 
questions. Among these, those positions may be distinguished 
which treat language as a system of signs the analysis of 
which can lead to a clarification of the relation between this 
system of signs and "the world." A second position is 
interested in a clarification of philosophical problems by 
recourse to analyses situated wholly within a (frequently, 
natural"*") system of language. This form of analysis pro cedes 
by inspecting the use of certain problematic words in order 
to clarify the nature of problems which are thought to depend 
1. See [Beth 1] 
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essentially upon the linguistic medium for their possible sense 
and solution. The first position is that of Frege, Russell 
(Logical Atomism), and the young Wittgenstein. The second 
position was developed, in great part, in the later works 
of Wittgenstein, 
Both these approaches are radically distinct and remote 
from the type of analysis to be found here. The subsequent 
studies provide the foundation for a wide variety of structures, 
the designation of the language for the expression of which 
is left arbitrary. It is a fact that these structures are 
characterized in a particular natural language supplemented 
by various particular logical and metamathematical notations. 
But languages are not the subject to be analyzed here, nor do 
I feel that the range of relations expressible in a language 
f 
determines in any interesting or significant manner the 
conclusions reached. The structures described as formally 
constitutive of a given context will provide certain of the 
necessary foundations for the possibility of semeiotic and 
of levels of language; that the medium for the expression 
of these structures is a particular linguistic system need 
not be a cause of distress, since this is simply a contingent 
fact. 
At this point, it will be helpful to distinguish the 
» 
six principal phases of analysis in thi3 section. The first 
phase is an inquiry into the logic of structure necessary 
both for the possibility of making identifying references to 
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logical particulars, and for making recurrent identifying 
references to such particulars® For this purpose, the 
concept of a coordinate system is elaborated as the system 
necessary for the possibility of identifying reference. 
The logic of structure of such a system is analyzed, 
and several forms of logical relativity are described: the 
necessary relativity of coordinate to coordinate system; 
the relativity of the context, within which identifying 
reference is made, to the system allowing for the possibility 
of such reference; the relativity of logical particulars 
to the coordinates Which are determinants of reference 
within the coordinate system, within which the coordinates 
are applicable. These forms of relativity regulate coordinations 
< which are necessary for the possibility of identifying 
t 
reference. A pro .lection is here given a preliminary definition 
as an improper coordination not in accordance with the 
essential relativistics (i.e., with the relativist!cally 
constituted logic of structure) of the system in question. 
De-projection is then introduced as a method for the clarification 
and restoration of the regulation of coordinations in 
accordance with the structuring principles essential to the 
system. 
The second phase consists of an analysis of the referential 
character of coordinates. The notion of vector is introduced 
to focus analysis upon the logic of structure necessary for 
7 
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the possibility of the referential character of coordinates. 
The notion of vector can subsequently be used in the de-
projective analysis of any possible particular. 
The third phase is a development of the concept of a 
logical particular. Particulars are characterizable 
functionally; their logic of structure is consequently 
definable in terms of a calculus of logical functions. The 
conditions necessary for the possibility of particulars 
are delimited. The notion of coordinate family is introduced 
as an analytic means for inquiring into functional unifications -
into particulars or simple or complex contexts constituted 
of particulars. By virtue of the notion of coordinate 
family, it becomes possible to approach the question of 
<* differentiability in continuous functions. Thi3 discussion 
/ 
later becomes the foundation for the theory of the generalized 
field or region. 
The fourth phase is specifically concerned to give a 
more precise definition of ^projectiorf than could be given 
earlier. The nature of de-projective analysis is then 
clarified. De-projection is shown to be a tautological 
formation operation in which a given coordination is required 
to conform to the logic of structure of the coordinate system 
necessary for the possibility of the coordination. De-projec-
tion is shown to satisfy the specific conditions for tautology. 
As a tautological operator, de-projection is not truth-functional, 
8 
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but relies upon a rule of verification. The various stages of 
de-projection are outlined. De-projective methodology is then 
shown to be in accordance with the principle of minimum assump­
tion* 
The fifth phase explores the notion of valence. as the 
structure constitutive of orders of possibility# A general 
foundation for research into conditions of possibility is 
described. 
The sixth phase of this section is an analysis of the 
logic of structure of the space-time manifold. This logic 
of structure i3 articulated in accordance with the forms of 
relativity previously described. The essential relativity 
of spatio-temporal identifying reference is shown. The 
logic of structure of the space-time manifold is considered 
with a view toward indicating possible projections ivhich can 
occur relative to this system of coordination. 
Section 1.1 
THE CONCEPT OF COORDINATE SYSTEM 
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THE CONCEPT OF COORDINATE SYSTEM 
i 
Studies made from the perspective of a discipline are 
conditioned by the total structure of that discipline."*" This 
total structure, taken in general,'will here be called the 
'frame of reference* proper to that discipline. Frames of 
reference can be talked about in a variety of different ways: 
interest here is in the morphology of frames of reference, or 
again,'with what it means for a thing to be a frame of 
reference. 
Skeletal anatomy seeks to describe the supportive 
structures of an organism; similarly, a frame of reference is 
ultimately that which supports propositions articulated from 
that standpoint. Any question or statement ultimately depends 
for its meaning upon the frame of reference from which it is 
made. To ask about the nature of frames of reference is to 
ask about the nature of meaning. 
1. "...no content can be grasped without a formal frame." 
[Schilpp 2:1 2/fOj q. from Bohrj Cf. also [Quine 1: 10]. 
2. "...the total meanings of terms are determined by the 
matrix in which they are embedded." [Bridgman 2: 5#] 
10 
Things which have meaning - for example, symbols - are 
meaningful only in terms of the system(s) of relations 
organized by the patterns of use of these symbols, and 
derivatively, in terms of the specific contexts in which they 
are used."1" 
Each discipline admits of a frame of reference since 
2 
each inquires into the nature of a class of objects. Reference 
to a class of objects involves a frame of reference from the 
standpoint of which the class and its members can be indicated.^ 
Now, if the nature of frames of reference is put into question, 
the frame of reference thereby established is described by 
the notion of a coordinate (system. This, for the following 
reasons: 
A frame of reference is the constitutional system that 
gives to an investigatory enterprise its structure, while 
it both insures the possibility of the enterprise having a 
point, a direction, a sense, and allows for identifying 
references within the total structure of the framework itself. 
An identifying reference is such that an ascription to that 
which can be the subject of an ascription establishes that what 
is ascribed and that that to which ascription is made are 
1. "Any...system*..mu3t have integral components, the 
presence of which are necessary for the maintenance of the 
system state." [Barron 1: 1633 
2. "...une homogeneity mat^rielle des noyaux, quant a 
leur sens...a n^cessairement une relation a une sphere unitaire 
d*experience (a un domaine unitaire de chose)•" [LFLT 9 91 299] 
3 .  Such a reference is later termed 'semanticalf• See pp. lllff 
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coincident. Such an ascription determines the references 
to that which is thereby identified such that the subject 
of the identification is fisted within a structure which allows 
for the possibility that recursive reference"1",, or re-identifi­
cation^, can be made to the same subjectThis possibility 
is essential to the constitution of the structure within 
« 
which an identifying reference can occur. 
t 
The possibility of making identifying references within 
a framework is essential to the constitution of its structure, 
for without a guarantee of the possibility of identifying 
references, stemming from the nature of the structure itself, 
the notion of a frame of reference would not itself be possible. 
Thus, it is upon the possibility of identifying references, 
guaranteed by the logic of structure of a frame of reference, 
that the possibility of any scientific investigation depends. 
There can be no scientific inquiry without the essential 
guarantee that its frame of reference provides for the 
possibility of identifying references within it. That this 
is the case not only for the sciences, but for any framework, 
should be clear 
1. Cf. § 1.6. 
2. "...une determination [qui peut 3tre] identifies 
d'une maniere repetee et evidente." [LFLT..$ 73 2£1J 
3. I.e., "...objet reconnai3sable comme le meme...". 
[RL III § 5 343 
4. Note that 'identifying reference* is so defined that 
it provides the necessary foundation for both determinate 
12 
Now, a coordinate is a determinant of reference to that 
which can be the subject of an identifying reference. A 
coordinate is therefore essentially identifiable within the 
coordinate system which provides for its possibility A 
coordinate is always a coordinate in some system, and a 
coordinate in itself entails a frame of reference having 
a constitution derived from the essential structures of the 
coordinate system to which the coordinate belongs.^ 
ostensive and definite descriptions. It is clear that such 
descriptions are generally possible to the extent to which 
scientific discrimination itself is possible. The notion of 
identifying reference will later be seen to include as 
special cases both Strawsori's unambiguous speaker/hearer 
identification [Strawson Is I] and Husserl's intention 
deictique [RL III § 5, 33, 375 i} 24* 109; Ire ed. 295]. 
1. Akin to this is H. Mehlberg's proposition that 
"chaque systeme de coordonnees effectivement definissable 
suppose lremploi d'un systeme de reference, c'est-a-dire 
d'un certain nombre d8elements individuels servant de points de 
repere." [Mehlberg 1:H, 1&7] 
2. The following distinctions between frame of reference 
and coordinate system will, unless otherwise indicated, be 
observed: The term 'frame of reference* is used more flexibly 
than the term 'coordinate system1; In the main, a frame of 
reference is to be considered such because of its essential rela­
tion to a definite class of objects - for example, the frame 
of reference proper to a material body, from the standpoint 
of which changes in momentum of a second material body can be 
recorded. Unless there are clear indications to the contrary, 
a frame of reference is constituted, the conditions for its 
possibility being provided, by the coordinate system from the 
standpoint of which the possibility of identifying reference 
to those particular objects of the class is insured. In other 
words, a coordinate system is a particular form of constitu­
tional system, a system which insures the possibility of 
certain forms of identifying reference essential to the logic 
of structure of a given frame of reference; a frame of reference, 
on the other hand, is principally a system from the standpoint 
13 
In other words, a coordinate bears the structuring principles 
of its coordinate system; a coordinate i3 a determinate# 
germinal duplication of the overall coordinate system.^-
This latter point should be taken in the following 
2 
sense; insofar as a particular to which reference is made 
(a coordinate being a determinant .of such reference) entails 
the overall coordinate system required for its possibility, 
reference to that particular is an abbreviated reference to 
the system. By the 'germinal duplication of the overall 
coordinate system', the synonymous sense of 'abbreviated 
reference to the system* is intended. The phrase 'abbreviated 
reference to the system' must not be misconstrued to suggest 
more than the complete system entailed by reference to the 
of which certain forms of identifying reference are possible, 
although the se forms of identifying reference may not be those 
forms essential to the possibility of reference to the definite 
class of objects peculiar to the given frame of reference. A 
coordinate system may therefore be termed the 'transcendental 
foundation' for the logic of structure of a given framework. 
It will consequently be possible to use 'frame of reference' 
and 'coordinate sub-system' interchangeably. (See below, p.. 28 n.4) 
To avoid terminological monotony, in those contexts in which 
a constitutional system is unambiguously intended, 'frame of 
reference' and 'coordinate system* may sometimes be used 
synonymously. 
1. Compare: "A proposition can determine only one place 
in logical spaces nevertheless the whole of logical space must 
already be given in it...." [Wittgenstein 1: 3*42] "[EJvery partial 
domain characterizes the total field...." [Reichenbach 1: 103] u[A]ny 
factor [the essential structure of which relates, necessarily, 
to the backdrop of fact, apart from which reference it is not. 
itself] necessarily refers to factors of totality other than 
itself#" [Whitehead 2: 308] See also [Mach 1: 286].  
2. A more precise characterization of this notion follows 
in ^  1*4* 
14 
particular in quest ion. 
For example, a coordinate (x,y,z) of a three-dimensional 
Cartesian coordinate system expresses the structuring principles 
of that system by being itself constituted by specific references 
to the coordinate system, which is entailed by any.of its 
possible coordinates. Consequently, the essential structure 
of the coordinate system is implicit iri any coordinate of that 
system. This fact both permits the use of coordinates 
without explicit mention of the coordinate system they 
implicitly entail, and is constitutive of the complex wherein 
a coordinate has seftse. 
If any particular is Considered in relation to its proper 
coordinate system, the particular must be specifiable by 
certain coordinates. It is evident that there can be no 
2 particular not a particular with specifiable coordinates. 
This is evident because (a) the essential possibility of 
a particular necessarily involves the possibility of identifying 
1. For, from the standpoint of another referential 
system, to say that a reference from the standpoint of the 
initial system to the particular in question was a reference 
in abbreviated form to the second system in its totality as 
well, would constitute a sericus misconstruction. This will be 
considered in detail later. It would be well to note in this 
connection Husserl's proposition: "Des parties secondaires 
sont des parties primaires de parties primaires, des parties 
tertiaires sont des parties primaires de parties secondaires, 
etc. Les concepts de cette serie sont manifestement incompa-
tibles les uns avec les autres." fRL II.2 iii 19 57 i 
2. "It is impossible to represent in language anything 
that 'contradicts logic1 as it is in geometry to...give 
coordinates of a point that does not exist." Wittgenstein 1: 3.035] 
The argument here follows Quine*s dictum: "no entity without 
identity." [Linsky 1: 27] 
Note a similar point in [RL III § 65 240]: "...il 
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reference, (b) the possibility of identifying reference is 
guaranteed only by ths logic of structure of a frame of 
reference, and (c) identifying reference requires coordinate 
specification, A particular is a particular only if it has 
certain specifiable coordinates, for a particular is that 
which can be the subject of an identifying reference. 
Thus, a particular carries with it, as it were, the overall 
structure required for its very possibility. 
The enumeration of the references essential to the 
possibility of a particular constitutes a description of the 
coordinates of that particular, and, similarly, the frame 
of reference established by inquiring into the nature of 
frames of reference is described in describing the nature of 
a coordinate system. There can be no coordinates "unattached" 
to a particular, for a coordinate is "a determinant of reference 
to that which can be the subject of an identifying reference." 
What does not satisfy this requirement is not a coordinate. 
Recapitulating briefly, mention has been made of the 
nature of frames of reference, of the nature of meaning and its 
essential relation to the complex insuring its possibility. 
It ha3 been seen why a desciption of the nature of frames of 
reference is at once a description of the notion of a 
coordinate system, whose constitution provides for the possi­
est absurde d'imaginer dans ia pensee signitive la possibility 
d'un cours du monde contraire a la logique et de pretendre par 
la que cette possibility est legitime, et de supprimer pour ainsi 
dire du meme coup les loi3 qui conferent une validity a cette 
possibility comme a toute possibility en generale." 
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bility of identifying reference within its structureo The 
nature of a coordinate ha3 been characterized simply, in relation 
to its proper coordinate system. Note was made of the manner 
in which a particular depends upon and* in turn, entails the 
i 
coordinate system within which it is meaningful. And, lastly, 
it was seen that an enumeration of the references essential 
to the possibility of a particular is a description of the 
coordinates of the particular. What I should like to do at 
this point is to sketch out a way in which a method for 
improving the accuracy of dealing with frames of reference 
emerges from the nature of the struetuz'es under examination. 
There is a tendency to forget or disregard the coordinate 
systems entailed when reference is made to different kinds 
of particulars.*^ Most frequently, this amounts to a disregard 
of the presuppositions involved in those systems, and, 
derivatively, in any of the various branches of intellectual 
concern. When the presuppositions tasks Involve are overlooked, 
when there is neglect to render explicit the coordinates of 
a particular or class of particulars, reasoning is vulnerable 
to a variety of misconstructions, the most significant of 
which I shall call Projection*. 
1. "II est certain que, d*une part, 1* impossibility 
d'enchainements theoriques entre doraaines heterogenes, et d*autre 
part 1*essence de l^eterogeneite en question* n*ont pas ete 
etudiees au point de vue logique." [RL I £ 43 ltfOn.jJ 
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A projection appears to characterize some or all of the 
coordinates of a particular as independent of the coordinate 
system entailed by these coordinates. 
Projections are to be found in the conceptions of 
virtually all disciplines® If projections are made in 
ignorance, and the nature of projective misconstructions 
is not clarified, analyses can be highly inaccurate. It is 
therefore important to clarify the relation between the 
notion of coordinate system and the notion of projection. 
Any coordinate is meaningful and valid only if applied 
within the limitations prescribed by the logic of structure 
of the coordinate system proper to it. If a coordinate is 
expressed within a coordinate system having structural 
principles different from those of the coordinates the 
result is meaningless and invalid. If an attempt is made 
naively to express the Cartesian coordinate (x9y,z) in a 
Polar coordinate system, without transforming the system of 
reference of the first to that of the second, an absurd, 
illogical task results. 
Particulars consequently are necessarily relative to-
the context"1" which provides for their possibility. This 
relativity, in turn, is essential to the structural 
constitution of any coordinate system. Perhaps this can be 
f 
1. What is meant here by a context•bears strong similarities 
to Husserl's concept of tout or coexistence des contenus. [RL II.2 
iii § 21 61] See n.l, p. 34. 
id 
; 
clarified by the following considerations# 
Particulars frequently involve implicit reference to 
more than one framework: for example, an object moving with 
reference to another object is expressible in terms of the 
coordinate system proper either to the moving or to the 
stationary object. As the Lo rents, transformations testify^, 
these two coordinate systems are not constituted identically# 
Here a projective misconstruction (resulting in inaccurate 
physical predictions) would involve the assumption that the 
two coordinate systems are directly compatible with 
one another, and that a particular with coordinates proper 
to the one is directly understandable„ in terms of those 
coordinates, in the other. A simple understanding of the nature 
of a coordinate system marks this assumption as erroneous. 
When mention is made of the two coordinate systems relevant 
to the moving and to the stationary objects, the resulting frame of 
reference is constituted by a coordinate system allowing 
for the possibility of particulars having coordinates pertaining 
-to the two 'coordinate sub-systems'. For example, the coordinate 
system, which is necessary in order to provide for the 
possibility of the framework within which the Lorentz equations 
are operative, simultaneously bears reference to the differently 
constituted particulars proper to each coordinate sub-system, 
1. A discussion of these equations is set aside for eluci­
dation in another connection. 
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and provides for the possibility of identifying reference to 
those particulars. Similar treatment can be extended to the 
case of multiple sub-systems - an unlimited number of which 
being in principle possible. 
Generally, then, the coordinates of a particular may 
entail any number of possible coordinate sub-systems. From 
what has been said about the essentially necessary relativity 
of a particular to its context, which provides the grounds 
for the possibility of the particular, it can now be seen 
that projection stems from ari insufficient understanding 
of the nature of the coordinates of a particular or class 
of particulars. Put differently, projective misconstructions 
result from ignoring, or from ignorance of, the essential 
relativistic constitution of coordinate systems. 
It i3 possible to avoid these misconstructions by 
applying a procedure which makes explicit in practice 
affirmation of the essential relativistic constitution of 
coordinate systems. This procedure will be called * de-pro .lection*. 
Through a description of the constitutive elements of 
a particular, de-projection retrieves to that particular 
its coordinates which, qua projected, are regarded as-
independent of the coordinate system entailed by these coor­
dinates. Consider the role of de-projection in accurate 
description. 
In describing a particular or class of particulars, an 
attempt is made to enumerate the coordinates proper to that 
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particular or class. As already noted, this involves a 
description of the references essential to the possibility 
of the particular. De-projection specifically relates to 
the referential character of coordinates. .Since the 
referential character of coordinates is essontially a 
relative matter, de-projection i3 a tool for dealing with 
the relativistic nature of coordinate systems. 
The essential references of a particular may entail 
one or more coordinate systems. Clearly, de-projection is 
facilitated in cases where only one coordinate system 
(which may involve two or mora sub-systems - at least two being 
necessary for projection to be possible) is necessary for 
a particular both to have sense and to express validly the 
coordinative structure of its system. That case is taken 
as paradigmatic of the others. 
Consider first a coordinate system whose structural 
principles are known, since it will facilitate the discussion 
here to avoid having to deduce them from a given particular. 
For example, consider again a three-dimensional Cartesian 
coordinate system which allows for the possibility of length, 
width, and height expressed by the four coordinates (x,y,z), 
(xl,yl*zl), ^ x2,y2,z2^' (*3'y3'Z3) which describe a tetra­
hedron whose vertices lie at those four points. Here is a 
framework which permits use of the language of volumes. 
Insofar as volumes are deiscribable in terms of similarly 
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ordered coordinates* volumes so described are limited to this 
particular coordinate system- for their sense and validity.• 
Suppose now that a second coordinate system expresses 
volumes of the first by "projecting" the coordinates limiting 
those volumes upon a concave surface, say a section of a 
sphere. A grid on the surface permits reference to the 
points so formed. Assuming that no two vertices of the 
tetrahedron "project" upon the same point on the surface, 
there are four coordinates (tf,#), («<2 
which correspond respectively to the "projected" vertices 
having the same subscripts in Cartesian notation. 
Now, if it is thought that the coordinate system proper 
to coordinates (d,*3), ^a2>/32^> allows talk of 
"volumes'^ an instance of a projective misconstruction is 
encountered. For the points on the concave surface certainly 
do not describe volumes at all within that coordinate system. 
The concept of volume is restricted.to the original Cartesian 
system which allcws for the possibility of references to 
volumes. Insofar as the coordinates (x,y,z), (x^,y^,z^), 
(x2»y2»z2)» (x^,y^,z^) refer to their correlates on-the 
concave surface, and in so referring result in. the above 
confusion, the Cartesian coordinates are "projective", in the 
strict sense of the word. But the sense in which they refer 
to (<*,<9), ... is not in Itself sufficient to explain 
the above misunderstanding; references^- expressed by 
1. To denote the reference of (x,y,z) to (*,0), the 
former is written f(x,y,z)Pf. 
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(x#y#z)P, (x1*y1>z1)P, •••can be described in a third 
coordinate system, K, in which specific principles express 
relationships between all eight coordinates. Tho projective 
misconstruction here is necessarily founded upon such a 
coordinate system which at once' provides the conditions 
necessary for the initial two coordinate systems. The 
misunderstanding vanishes when it is recognized that the 
coordinates (x,y#z)# (x-^y^z^)# ••• entail a coordinate 
system in which volume is a permissible -concept# and that 
the coordinates (<*#£)# #°* errta:^ a coordinate 
system in which 'volume9 is meaningless and the application 
of this term invalid. 
The system X, then, is the context for a projection# 
But as soon as the constitution of its coordinates is 
understood# once its coordinates have been de-projected# 
the references essential to particulars in system K are 
found to be implicitly relative to that system for their 
validity and sense# and are articulated according to the 
principles governing the respective constitutions of its 
two sub-systems. And once this is recognized# projective 
misconstructions in the system are eliminated. 
The above example is an extremely simple case in 
contrast to cases of projection occurring within the 
disciplines of philosophy# physics# history, etc. The projection 
in the above example is contrived and its error sufficiently 
obvious that projective misconstructions following upon it 
would probably never take place. However, the simplicity 
of the example should not give .way to the idea that much 
more subtle problems do npt underlie the confident approache 
and analyses of the various disciplines. The nature of some 
of these projections and the misconstructions they have led 
* 
to will be the subject of later discussions. 
Essentially, de-projection is an intrument intended 
to clarify the structures necessary for the possibility 
of the referential character of coordinates. As seen, 
the descriptive enumeration of these references at once 
describes the constitution of the coordinate system which 
permits such references. The relativity of a coordinate to 
its proper coordinate system(s) is a relativity constitutive 
of the logic of structure of the coordinate system(s). When 
therefore, the misconstructions implied by disregarding this 
constitutional relativity are circumvented by heeding the 
constitutional principles necessary for the possibility of 
the structures examined, analyses will introduce, as it were 
no supplementary content, presuppositions, or assumptions."^ 
In general, then, de-projection is implicitly in agree­
ment with Occam's principle of minimum assumption, but de-
projection does not adopt this principle as a procedural 
presupposition. Rather, the essential constitution of 
1. See ^  1.4* 
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coordinate systems will be seen to provide the grounds 
necessary to guarantee the validity of the principle of 
minimum assumption. 
De-projection is strictly empirical to the extent that 
its analyses are directed toward empirical subject-matter; 
it is logical to the extent that the logics of structure 
entailed by sets of particulars are explicitly treated; it 
is scientific to the extent that constitutive elements and 
relations are brought to light as essential structures 
necessary for the possibility of the'empirical subject-
matter itself. 
De-projection is further justified by the fact that 
it leads to eventual tautology. This is the tautology 
every accurate description entails - for in making explicit 
the constitutive elements of that which is accurately 
described, de-projection reaches a point where it is clear 
that the affirmation of a particular must at once be an 
affirmation of those constitutive elements guaranteeing 
the possibility of the particular. Consequently, the 
tautological nature of de-projection is never trivial in 
the sense that mere truisms or redundancies are. The 
significance of the constitutive structures of coordinates 
is clarified and, with this clarification, the essential 
meaning of a particular or class of particulars can be 
studied. 
Consequently, a clarification of the coordinate systems 
entailed by the specific object or class of objects with which 
any investigation deals is necessary for the possibility of 
accurate investigation. To reach this clarity, the tendency 
to project must be countered by methodologically rendering 
explicit the coordinate systems entailed by different kinds 
of particulars# 
Section 1.2 
THE CONCEPT.OF VECTOR 
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THE CONCEPT OF VECTOR 
In the previous chapter concerned with the concept of 
coordinate system, the nature of a coordinate as a determi­
nant of reference to that which can be the subject of an 
identifying reference was examined. In this chapter, I will 
be concerned to extend that discussion by specifically 
regarding the referential character of a coordinate. 
r 
The referential character of a coordinate to that which 
is not explicitly specified by the coordinate^ is here called 
a vector. As already indicated, the enumeration of the 
references essential to the possibility of that which can be 
the subject of an identifying reference constitutes a 
description of a set of specific coordinates. This description 
involves those particulars which are necessarily referred 
to by the fundamental structure of the particular specified. 
This description is "open-ended"2 since an exhaustive 
enumeration of the references essential to the possibility 
of a particular ultimately involves an enumeration of an 
1. See below, Hp. 29» 77ff. 
2. It can be described as an "indeterminate set." Cf. 
[Reichenbach 5• 110]. 
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indeterminate number of references constitutive of the set of 
particulars required for the initial description. Reference 
here will therefore be made only to the first-order references 
originating in the structure of the given particular. 
These first-order references can be of two general 
sorts: those pertaining to particulars having the same 
coordinate structure as the given particular, or those 
pertaining to particulars having a coordinate structure 
different from that of the given particular. Either kind of 
reference' is specifiable by a vector.^ To each of these 
kinds of reference corresponds a class of vectors which can 
be similarly distinguished here: the class of vectors 
which are referential characters of coordinates pertaining 
to particulars having the same coordinate structure as the 
given particular, and those which are referential characters 
of coordinates having a coordinate structure different from 
that of the given particular. The former are termed funi-
contextual vectors1, and the latter, 'multi-contextual vectors*. 
Uni-contextual vectors are those referential characters 
of a coordinate which refer to that which is not explicitly 
specified by a coordinate and which implicitly belong to 
the same coordinate system. The vector, which refers from 
a coordinate (x,y,z) on the front face of a cube to any and all 
1. Given a relation R, if & has that relation R. to 
Russell characterizes the b a3 being reached from a by an 
"R-vector." See [Russell ki 4^3* 
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coordinates establishing the plane of the opposing face, is 
a uni-contextual vector, 
A certain type of uni-contextual vector merits comment 
here. A particular is frequently determined in part by 
references to particulars essentially undetermined within a 
given context. The determinant of reference of such a 
particular will bear essential reference to explicitly 
indeterminate functional organizations. These "margins of 
2 ^ indeterminacy" are often termed"'fringes'The vector-
constitution of such fringes is uni-contextual and such 
vectors will be termed 'uni-contextual fringe vectors'. 
Multi-contextual vectors are those referential characters 
of a coordinate which refer to that which is not explicitly 
specified by the coordinate and which implicitly do not belong 
to the same coordinate system. Multi-contextual vectors 
relate, therefore, to two or more coordinate systems^, and a 
1. Something of this was indicated by Husserl. For example, 
"Quand je vois un dessin incomplet, par exeraple celui de ce 
tapis qui est partiellement recouvert dejneubles, le morceau 
que jfai vu est, en quelque sorte, charge d'intentions qui 
renvolent a des complements (nous sentons. pour ainsi dire, que 
les lignes et les formes colorees continuent dans le 'sens' ae 
ce qui a ete vu); mais nous n'attendons rien." [RL III § 10 56] 
2. See below, p. 123. 
3. See [RL II.1 ii § 3d 241], [Ideen I §§ 27, 35. 36, 69, 
79, 32, 113]• "Le marginalle latent, le potentiel, le 
sedimente5 tout cela a un role actif dans la determination du 
sens de l'objet...." [S. Bachelard 1: 270, 301] 
4. To eliminate a possible ambiguity, it should be noted 
that 'sub-systems' is used when there is an explicit description 
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description of a multi-contextual vector involves an enumeration 
of the references essential to a particular, which are 
implicitly given within the structure of that particular and 
which pertain to more than one coordinate system. A thorough 
examination of both vector types will be found in later 
discussions. 
Vectors, then, describe that portion of the structure 
of a particular which necessarily depends upon that which is 
not explicitly specified by the coordinates of that particular. 
The place 'explicitly* plays in this formulation is important. 
When an analysis of the essential referential structure of a 
particular is made, it is frequently the case that these 
references do not terminate in that structure, but tend to 
branch out and to penetrate contexts or areas other than 
the initial context of the particular (the context as it was 
first approached analytically). The key which opens these 
areas to analysis is the concept of vector, as follows. Each 
time a coordinate is found to be essential for reference to 
a particular, that coordinate is to be inspected for signs that 
it refers to contexts having a coordinate structure different 
from that established by the initial coordinate. If such 
vectors are found to be constitutive of the structure of the 
of the coordinate system within which these are sub-systems. 
When reference is made to more than one "coordinate system," 
it is implicitly recognized, unless otherwise specified, that 
these are sub-systems of a coordinate system guaranteeing 
their possibility.. Cf., e.g., [RL II.2 iii § 1 73* 
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particular, it will be the task then to determine whether 
these vectors are uni- or multi-contextual. 
It is intimated that a context is an aggregate of all the 
essential features of a particular (a) their constitution 
being commonly guaranteed by the coordinate system to which 
they belong and (b) all of which having common coordinates. 
It is possible that two particulars may have two different 
sets of coordinates, and yet the possibility for both sets of 
coordinates is guaranteed by one coordinate system. Both 
sets of coordinates still establish but one context. Thus, 
condition (a) must be satisfied for particulars to be grouped 
within one context; (b) must be satisfied, stating as it does 
the principle of identity. 
Condition (b) is of special interest; it is here sub­
divided under several headings, as follows! 
a The coordinates specifying a particular 
have a common "point of attachment": together, 
the coordinates of a particular are responsible 
for the determinability of the particular 
within its coordinate system. Vectors pertaining 
to that particular therefore also form a unity 
insofar as they together allow for the possibility 
of the referential character of the particular 
to other contexts. All that refers explicitly 
to the particular is bound together in what is termed 
a Coordinate family': If A,B,C relate in some 
way to the coordinates of a particular, it is found 
that AdB'B^C-C^A, and/or C^B-BoA-ADC, etc., 
such that A,B,C have common coordinates which specify 
the particular. (See pp. 53ff) 
& A context having only uni-contextual vectors 
is bound together by a "coordinate family." If 
A3B'BdC'CdA:3Pi represents the unity of 
constitutive elements of one particular, then 
the coordinate family of a context of particulars 
may be represented by P-jjD P2"^ where P^ ,P2» 
are the particulars of that context. , 
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therefore, is the special case of a particular-
context which can form a sub-system within a 
single context, of either a uni- of a multi-
vector sort. There may be many "particular-
contexts" upon which the possibility of a context 
of type (* depends. 
It is important to emphasize the fact that vectors are 
fundamentally "attached" to the particulars of which they are 
constitutive elements. The nature of a vector prohibits 
reference t'o a vector without implicit reference to the 
particular of which it is a vector. This is to say that 
vectors do not have coordinates, but are rather referential 
characters &£ coordinates. Vectors*, in the original sense 
of the word, are bearers of certain special kinds of 
references. There cannot be non-contextual vectors, neither 
can there be vectors which do not bear references to 
particulars; a vector is essentially contextual and 
referential.^ 
Due to this essential relativity of a vector to the 
coordinate(s) permitting reference to a particular or group 
of particulars, the notion of a vector-signature will come 
-to-be used in later analysis to emphasize the referential 
character essential to the constitution of a given particular. 
It may be helpful in this connection to take specific care in 
avoiding a possible misunderstanding: It is not as if a 
1* "...a connection does not exist in addition to what 
is connected, supposing the latter does exist." [Meinong 1: 793• 
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particular possesses a vector-signature which points beyond 
that particular in the sense in which an indicator or pointer 
would. Rather, the notion of vector provides the necessary 
foundation for functional organization in general. A vector 
is, as it were, a meta-conception constitutive of any 
organization of particulars as a group or as a plurality of 
groups. As a consequence, for example, any element of a 
continuum is said, as an, element, to have a vector-constitution 
which conditions its relation to the continuum in which it 
has membership. 
It will be useful to foresee the distinction between 
the notion of function-vectors and vector-functions of higher 
order. The notion of vector has so far been limited to 
function-vectors, to vectors of particulars which can be 
arbitrarily unified in the fashions described.^ However, 
this is but one context in which the notion of vector plays 
a significant role. It will later be important to describe 
certain vector-functions of higher order, which include those 
referential systems which provide the foundation necessary for 
identifying references to a plurality of inter-connected 
particular-contexts.^ 
It is because of vectors that there can be wholes, or even, 
for that matter, parts.^ For identity of any sort is ultimately 
1. On the distinction between 'function' and 'particular', 
see below, p. 34, n. 1. 
3. On whole/part relations, cf. [Bolzano 1: § $8  251£] ,  
[RL II.2 iii j 1 7], [Twardowski 1: § 9 49f], [RL II.2 <j> 19]. See 
2. 
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conditioned by vectors which allow for its possibility. The 
self-identity of a particular, of a particular qua particular, 
and the identity by virtue of reference, a "this" in contrast 
to a "that"^, rely upon the vector-constitution of particulars 
and classes of particulars. Summarizing thus far, the notion 
of vector permits a description of the various ways in which 
particulars or classes of particulars entail themselves' and/or 
other particulars or classes of particulars. 
n• 31 P* 4^* 
1. "For a thing to be at all...it must be this rather 
than that, and the 'rather than that* belongs, as truly to its 
essence as the 'this1. [Bosanquet 1: II 47o]« Cf. [Hegel 1: 
I 13d]. 
Section 1.3 
THE CONCEPT OF PARTICULAR 
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THE CONCEPT OP PARTICULAR 
The notion of particular was introduced in previous 
sections and now stands in need o'f clarification. The term 
'particular' denotes a context, determinate functional organi­
zation, or "situation" which can be identifyingly referred to."*" 
It does not refer to structures of the subject-predicate 
type insofar as these structures expressly involve the predica­
tion of attributes of a subject. A particular is the foundation 
for the possibility of such predication; a particular may, 
though not always, provide for the possibility of subject-
predicate structures to the extent that these emerge from a 
given context which is itself functionally characterized as a 
particular. A particular is that which is referred to when an 
identifying reference is made. Identifying reference may be 
made to component elements of the particular^, so that not 
1. In.general and unless otherwise noted, the terms 
'particular', 'function', and 'context' have the following senses 
the term 'particular' is used primarily as interchangeable with 
'uni-contextual function'; 'function' has the' sense of 'matrix 
of one or more possible subjects of identifying reference 
unified as ordered relations in some manner according to rule'; 
'context' refers to a determined summation of adjacent-member 
elements of a functional organization. It is immediately evident 
that the three terms overlap in sense, and are occasionally used 
synonymously in the text. 
2. A system may, from the standpoint of a system of higher 
order, be stratified into elements, each of which is then 
considered a uniaue object of reference. Such stratification is 
not universal: ...tout objet n'a *>«» pas necessairement des 
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all identifying references pertain to fully given particulars. 
The term 'particular* "is accordingly not limited to the 
case in which an individual something is identifyingly 
referred to. TA particular is a functional marker. Different 
particulars distinguish one function from another function. 
In the expression 'fix)1, ff' may be called such a.functional 
marker. The role which it plays, in relation to the 
x-variable, is that of a constant. Where the 'x* occupies 
the place for which an arbitrary individual something can be 
substituted, the ,ft with its associated variable is to be 
regarded as representing a clearly determined function. 
If f(x) and g(x) are both determined functions, *ff and 
lg* signify that two distinct functions, or particulars, are 
considered, x is a functional variable for which certain 
substitutions may be permissible; y i3 a second functional 
variable which allows a second range of possible substitutions 
to be made.^ The two functional markers or particulars, f and g, 
are respectively self-identical and constant.2 
partios, d'ou la division ideelle des objets en objets simples 
et objets composes." [RL II.2 iii §1 7] 
Thus, I do not" limit the term 'particular1 to ultimate 
simples as does Russell. See [Russell 5i 193ff.l* 
The question involved here is how it is possible to 
distinguish "partially" indicated particulars from "fully" 
indicated particulars. This issue will be considered later on. 
1. In f(x), x varies by conditions fixed by f. See 
[Buchanan '1: 39]. 
. 2. "...les noyaux...qui...restent dans une generalite 
indeterminee coinme un quel que chose.. .identi que dans les 
identifications." [LFLT §43 162] On self-identity (genidentity) 
and variation, see [LFLT §42 153 ]> [Reichenbach 1: 53 ]> [Lewin 1], 
[Lewin 2J. 
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What individuals may satisfy the functional variable 
clearly depends upon the particular that is identifyingly 
referred to. In other words, a determined function f(x) 
prescribes precise conditions which permit only specific 
substitutions to be made for the x-variable. If 
x = (xi, x2, x^, ...), then, for example, X]_ can be substituted 
« 
for the original functional variable x, and is a singular 
expression of the function, constituted in an individualized 
sense. This instantiation operation is called the 
individualization of a function. The above individualized 
function is written Tf(xi)f. 
If A, B, and C are constitutive elements of a particular^, 
then A, B, and C are individual elements of a determined 
function without which the function would be impossible. 
The function is said to be essentially individualized by A, B, 
and C. 
A function is essentially formulated in terms of the 
structural principles which allow for its possibility. These 
structural principles permit distinctions to be drawn between 
distinct functions without requiring recourse to the respective 
non-essential individualizations legitimated by each function.^ 
It is by virtue of these structural principles that the precise 
1. 
2.  
See p. 30. 
See below, p. 4$. 
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requirements can be indicated which must be satisfied if 
individualization of the function is to be possible. Given 
that y is a determined function of x (e.g., y = x+1), any 
single value of y defines a corresponding value of x.*1-
Consequently, the structural principles of a function allow 
the constitutive elements of a particular to refer to the one 
T 
determined function. These principles form, as it were, the 
guidelines which unify the contents intrinsic to the 
function. 
Now, it is not only the possibility of the reference of 
each constitutive element to the given function that must be 
explained, but also the possibility of reference to each 
constitutive element. The function itself entails a coordinate 
system, articulated in accordance with its structural principles. 
It is this system of reference that allows for the 
possibility that A, B, and C refer to the one function in 
question. 
This system of reference is included as a sub-system within 
a larger coordinate system which, in turn, allows for the 
possibility of reference to A, B, and C as constitutive 
elementsi each being a possible subject of identifying 
1. This functional relation, between any given value and 
a second specific value,is here termed a Correlation.1 (See, e.g 
[Reichenbach 5: &2].)A function, in its general formal capacity 
to associate fields of variability, will be called 'coordinative. 
Correlational and coordinative functions will therefore be distin 
guished on .the basis of their "material" and "formal" 
3* 
reference. Without this larger coordinating system, it is 
impossible to refer to A, B, or C, since reference to A • 
implies A is identifyingly referred to from a standpoint 
other than that of the particular-context to which A belongs.-'* 
Now, if A, B, and C refer to the same determined function, 
they must possess coordinates of,a type that relates them all 
to-that single context of attachment. The notion of a 
coordinate family is intimately tied to that of a function, and 
permits a determination of the structures necessary for 
A, B> and C to refer to the same function, while each 
constitutive element of that function can be identifyingly 
referred to. The question at hand is consequently that 
concerning the relation between the sub-system, represented 
as a particular-context, and the larger coordinating 
structure. This relation is expressible in terms of the 
notion of coordinate family. 
The sub-system expresses a function which is unified 
by virtue of the common coordinates of all of its elements.^ 
constitution. The explication of a function will involve a 
description of both its formal coordinative and its material 
correlation structures. See below, pp. 139f. 
1. Exception will be made to this proposition in § 1.6. 
2. See (b), p. 3^* 
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The phrase "common coordinates" signifies that this system 
is linked together by "overlapping coordinates" which allow 
for the possibility of a continuous function, a function 
which is essentially identifiable as a single function* A 
function is a continuum which, when broken down into elements, 
requires that each element be essentially constituted by 
reference at least to its adjacent-member elements. If q and 
r are adjacent-member elements, q has an r-directed vector 
constitutive of qTs referential character, and r has a 
q-directed vector constitutive of rTs referential character. 
When an identifiable element of a continuous function 
is such as to satisfy conditioned (p. 30), it is said to 
belong to an object-series"*", more neutrally called a general 
o-series. An element of a given o-series is constituted 
by reference at least to its adjacent-member elements; it has 
the character of representing a part within an organized 
totality, components of which are coincident, i.e., the sum 
total of the elements of the continuous function coincide 
in their coordinate-signatures.^ 
1. This term was suggested by Carnap: "...it is essential 
to each object that it belongs to certain order contexts; other­
wise it could not...exist as an object of cognition." [Carnap 1: 
2633. See also [Carnap 1: 25&.1 _ "...the object of 
science is...a reference structure...constituted by categorieso" f 
[Reichenbach 1: 49] 
2. The term Coordinate-signature1 is used to emphasize 
the essential relativity of the coordinate(s) to the particular!s), 
to which identifying reference is thereby guaranteed. 
An o-series has a uni-contextual vector-constitution, 
a recursive character-*-, thus an order defined in terms of 
relative specific difference of each element in relation to 
other elements of the context2, and is possible only within 
a differentiable context. Thus an o-series is possible where 
limits of the series are defined^, and where the relation 
between the elements of the series follows according to rule. . 
As such, an o-series is parametric, involving as it does the 
specification of one or more identity conditions and a field 
of variability within which possible values are related 
according to one or more regulative principles.^ An identity 
condition is, generally speaking, a relation constitit ive 
of a variation pattern or rule of order, here serial in nature, 
1. See below, pp. 107-S. 
2. See p. 59. 
3. This is a restriction-condition only: it does not 
imply that the series can or cannot continue beyond the 
initially established boundary conditions. Series which can so 
continue will be called 'open series'; those which cannot are 
closed series. 
4. "The central principle [of the notion of parameter] is 
variability limited and controlled by identity conditions. ...Such 
identity conditions have been called conditions of possibility..., 
principles of synthesis for a manifold or multiplicity of 
particulars." [Buchanan 1: 48] In parametric formulae, "one 
can discriminate (1) ...an identity condition or constant, (2) a 
class of particulars...called the field of variability, and (3) 
a rule of order, or set of relations...which holds between the 
particular determinations or members of the classo" [Buchanan l: 
37] 
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and is a differentiation within the range of variation of a 
parameter of higher order. The identity condition restricts 
and regulates the range of variability. The determination of 
the order of a parameter through an identity" condition is 
made in terms of parameters of higher order, as such 
determination requires a coordinate system from the standpoint 
of which differentiability is guaranteed."1" The ordering 
relation of an o-series is established according to the' 
regulative principles of its coordinate system; such a series 
can be described in terms of any continuous function possible 
in that coordinate system. 
There are several interesting consequences. First, an 
o-series expresses an identification schema for any object of 
referenceo Wnen a coordinate system of two or more sub­
systems permits identifying reference to a plurality of objects 
of reference, and when these objects of reference belong to 
the same o-series, they will of course bear relations to one 
another as conditioned by the o-series. It is possible then 
to define^ the objects of reference as features of that o-series 
qua (relative) whole. Two objects of reference are accordingly 
said to be features of the same relative whole if and only if 
they are in the same o-series.^ This constitutes the basis 
l 
1. See below, pp. 5£ff. 
2. See p. 1. 
3. In Russell and R'eichenbach, the principle of abstraction 
is defined in terms of any group of things connected by a definite 
symmetrical relation, e.g., color-similarity. Cf. [Reichenbach 5s 209J. 
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for regarding two things as "the same".-1-
When an object of reference entails an essentially open 
o-series, vit will be termed ?transcendent1. The distinction 
between transcendent and non-transcendent objects of reference 
will thus be correlated with distinct forms in their respective 
o-series. This point will become significant in later analyses. 
I return now to examine in greater detail the larger 
coordinating structure, which permits identifying reference 
to the constitutive elements of a sub-system, a given 
particular-context. It is within this larger system that the 
essential structures of the sub-system can appear as constitutive 
elements of that sub-system, to each of which identifying 
reference is in principle possible. Let this larger system be 
called ^ystem-J', and the sub-system, Tsystem-IT. System-J 
constitutes a single context of elements A, B, and C. Within • 
this system itself, these elements are linked together by a 
family of coordinates which places the various elements within 
a single group. 
However, what is significant is the fact that each element, 
A, B, or C, included within that context essentially refers to 
the particular-context of system-I, the sub-system. 
1. "...the law of identity...means that the limits of 
variation fixed by the parameter shall remain the same in what­
ever relations it is involved." [Buchanan 1: 50J 
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To allow for the possibility that the vectors of systern-J, 
i.e., the referential characters of the family of coordinates of 
system-J, essentially refer to system-I, a larger coordinating 
system is necessary.^ This system-K is of interest structurally 
insofar as it can be of assistance in understanding the notion 
of a coordinate family. For within system-K, references are 
possible between its two sub-systems -- namely, system-J and 
system-I. What is observed is a schema in which system-K 
allows for explicit references from system-J to system-I, and 
system-J allows for the possibility of identifying references 
to those elements constitutive of the "innermost" sub-syscem, 
system-I. 
Each of these systems is unified by a distinct family of 
coordinates. System-I and system-J, from the standpoint of 
system-K, are seen in essential relation to each other.2 
Explicitly, this relation is founded by the multi-contextual 
vectors - for whose possibility system-K allows - which express 
the essential connection obtaining between the two sub-systems 
of system-K. The identifiable relations between such systems 
as I and J are themselves unified, from the standpoint of 
1. The objection might be made that this reasoning invites 
an infinite regress. Later chapters explicitly dealing with 
phenomeriological relativity can be considered a reply to this 
objection. 
2. "Si V est une partie dependante du tout G, il est aUssi 
une partie dependante de n*importe quel autre tout dont G est une 
partie." [RL II.2 iii §14> Theoreme 4» P» 47] System-K may be 
thought of as a "comparative raeta-system" for reference to its two 
sub-systems. On comparative metalanguages, see [Martin 1: 73]. 
4 4 
system-K , by a complex coordinate family which, only by virtue 
of system-K, permits identifying reference to elements of 
systeins I and J, while these elements, in their essential 
interrelations, are themselves identifiable as elements 
functioning in a specific constitutive manner. 
Coordinate families consequently lace together and are 
essentially involved in the representation of constitutive 
elements of functions. The notion of coordinate families 
further elaborates the notion of contexts, and at the same 
time, provides further means to deal with the nature of 
uni- and multi-contextual vectors. 
The individualization of a function therefore requires 
for its possibility a logic of structure like that of the 
I-J-K system above. In dealing with the constitutive elements, 
or the essential individualizations of a function, reference 
to this type of structure will be useful. 
An individual, which is a legitimate functional individuali­
zation, is itself specifiable by a set of coordinates which 
allow for the possibility of identifying reference to that 
individual. For the present, an individual so legitimated 
by the structural principles of a function may be considered a 
1. This may be viewed as a transcendental system insofar 
as its sub-systems are, concerned. A transcendental system will i 
be understood as the system necessary for the possibility of 
its sub-systems. 
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"functional property" - the property of the functional context 
with the specific coordinates in question.^ 
The referential characters of particulars are vectors 
• 
which can consequently be viewed as vectors essential to a 
given function, '•'•'he vectors essential to any function will 
be of two types: those netting together the essential and 
non-essential individualizations of the function, and those 
referring to particulars other than that expressed by the 
given function. The latter reference may be of a sort either 
to those necessarily entailed, or to those contingently 
implied, by the fundamental structure of the function. 
Essential individualizations can be considered those 
pertaining to the formal structure of the function; non­
essential or contingent individualizations can be 
considered those pertaining to non-formal identifiable 
referents.2 This distinction should not be construed as 
saying that the non-formal individualizations are unnecessary 
to the function, per se, for contingency is essential to its 
constitution.^ And, essential to this constitutive contingency 
1. It is immediately evident that the difference between 
a functional property and a particular-context is one of relative 
degree, not of kind. 
2. This can be illustrated in terms of a function f(x) which 
has the essential individualization X]_. A non-essential individua­
lization may refer to a functional property which is purely 
adventitious to x, for example, that fxi' as symbolized i3 printed 
rather than in script. -
3. See, for example, [RL §65 257L where [les]'bonditions de 
la possibility d'une connaissance theorique...sont en partie reelle 
en partie ideales." 
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are the various adventitious functional properties individualizing 
it. 
Since a functional property is essentially a possible 
subject of identifying reference, it might appear at first 
glance that a vector essential to a given function cannot 
itself be looked upon as a functional property. It should be 
recalled1 that vectors do not themselves have coordinates, 
but are rather referential characters of coordinates. If 
vectors do not have coordinates, can a vector be characterized 
as a 'functional property? Clearly/ it is only by virtue 
of the essential bond between vectors and the coordinates of 
which they are referential characters that vectors themselves 
can be identifyingly referred to. Since the essential 
functional properties of a function must be specifiable 
in coordinate-terms, and since vectors are referential 
characters necessary for the possibility of coordinating 
systems, vectors must need be involved in the analysis of 
functional properties. 
From the standpoint of a context functionally constituted 
(i.e., the constitution of the context as regards the particular 
per se — the restriction to first-order references only2 still 
holds) solely by uni-contextual vectors, vectors can be 
considered "functional properties" only insofar as they are 
1. Cf. p. 31. 
2• p• 27• 
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entailed by the essential coordinating structure of that 
context. On the other hand, from the standpoint of a 
context functionally constituted by multi-contextual vectors 
as well, vectors may there be considered functional properties 
in their own right. This can be the case only if the context 
in question involves the relative "diEscalation1' of the various 
vectors from their relations inthe purely uni-contextual 
vector context. 
To be more precise, consider a context-system of the 
I-J-K type. System-J, from the standpoint of system-K, places 
the vectors constitutive of sub-system-I in a dissociated 
relation, such that the vectors can be expressly characterized 
as functional properties, while these same vectors bear 
intrinsic relation to the subordinate system-I. In other words, 
vectors can be characterized in a highly abstract, dissociated 
state to the degree that their membership in subordinate 
systems becomes part of their inherent structure. Their inherent 
structure is opposed to the explicit structure permitted from 
the standpoint of system-K. The degree to which such 
dissociation can occur is inversely proportional to. the extent 
to which essential relatedness to a subordinate context is 
explicitly indicated. 
It will later become mcr e significant that once given 
a system of the I-J-K type, it is possible to describe the 
principles essential to, for example, the vector-structure 
43 
of the system,, The principles necessary for the possibility 
of the subordinate systems always bear an essential relation 
to these systems, since it is only by virtue of these 
systems that the principles can be derived."'" 
Since the principal task of functional analysis is the 
discovery and description of constitutive elements, it will 
be important to return to the subject of the individualization 
of functions. When a particular has been reduced to it.s 
constitutive elements, these comprise component factors 
which are essential individualizations of the function in question 
As already noticed*5, a determined function constitutionally 
prescribes certain conditions which render legitimate 
only certain individualizations.3 When those elements 
which are essential to the constitution of the function are 
considered, it is clear that explicit attention should be 
paid to the matter of the regulation of individualizing 
substitutions. In order to deal with this issue, it will be 
necessary first to consider those factors without which 
particularity would be impossible. 
This investigation will procede as follows: In order 
to arrive at a general formulation of the principles governing 
1. This will later be considered in terms of the empiricism 
basic to the present approach. 
2. Pp. 36ff. 
3. .The field of possible individualizations coincides with 
the range of variability of a function. Such individualizations 
may be regarded as "parts" which are possibilities with respect 
to their corresponding "wholes" which are hierarchical systems 
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individualizations of functions, the nature of particularity-
will first be examined. The conditions necessary for the 
possibility of particularity are those which essentially 
govern functional individualizations. To spell out these 
1 
conditions, again the question arises as to how to distinguish 
"partially" from "fully" indicated particulars. This is an 
issue important both to the formulation of the principles 
governing individualizations of functions and to the nature 
of functional analysis, per se. If a function is to be 
analyzed, there must be standards by means of which to judge 
whether the analysis is complete and adequate, or incomplete 
and inadequate. 
It has been noted that an "exhaustive" enumeration of 
the references essential to any given particular would involve 
&n indeterminable number of distinct particulars and their 
interrelations, which together are required for the possibility 
of the initial particular. Consequently, discussion here will 
remain limited to the first-order references originating in 
the structure of the given particular. The reason for this 
stipulation is based upon the fact that particulars form 
contexts which are differentiable continua insofar as distinct 
coordinate families are essential to each context. In order 
of possibility. Substitutivity will consequently be founded upon ' 
whole-part relations. These relations form the necessary ground 
for distinguishing between valid and invalid substitutions. Cf. 
[Buchanan 1: &L, 853 an(* below, § 1*«5» 
1* See n. 2, p. 34* 
2. Pp. 26f. 
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to indicate the standards by reference to which an analysis 
of a given function can be judged complete, it must be 
discovered what kinds of structures allow for identifying 
reference to one function. And it must further be specified 
that such an identifying reference must not simultaneously 
involve in analysis any adjacent-member functions of the 
context, within which the particular in question is given. 
As noted''*, particulars are such that they link together, 
forming continuous functional contexts. The notion of a 
coordinate family was found useful in considering contexts 
and interrelations between diverse contexts. Coordinate 
families provide a basis for analysis of cases where 
functions have a common context of reference. Y/hat must be 
considered at this point are not structures by virtue of 
which functional linkage is possible, but rather those 
structures providing for the possibility of functional 
differentiation, of particularity. 
The notion of particularity requires the concomitant 
conception of limits, of borders, which can be said to 
establish a determined zone which is that proper to a particular, 
and beyond which pertains to that which is not the particular. 
Without implicit limits, particularity would be impossible. 
By developing the notion of functional limits, it. will be 
possible to consider the structures essential to functional 
!• P t PP* 30-1* 
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' differentiation. 
Particulars, as functional markers, may be identifyingly 
referred to by virtue of the distinct coordinate families 
proper to each particular in question. Given a context providing 
for reference to more than one particular, the coordinate 
family proper to each particular is structurally linked to 
the coordinate families of the other particulars given in 
the context. This linkage takes the form of that between 
adjacent-member elements of a coordinate family. By nature 
of this sort of linkage, the coordinates which are remote 
from the common bond between two adjacent-member elements 
must be essentially distinct.^ 
To illustrate this, the segment of linkages considered 
earlier^ will be expanded: q, r, s, and t are member 
elements belonging to a determined continuous function, q is 
adjacent to r, r is adjacent to s, s is adjacent to t, and 
q and t are not adjacent to each other.3 Take r and s as 
representative adjacent-member elements, adjacent to q and 
t, respectively. From the standpoint of r, then, there is a 
1. Recall that coordinates are determinants of reference 
to possible functional individualizations. 
2. B. 39. 
3. "...A may lie within the threshold of B, and B within 
the threshold of C, even though A does not lie within the 
threshold of C." [Menger, in [Schilpp 2: II 473 3] As Poincare put it 
the relation A = B, B =C, A is less than C, may be regarded as 
a formula for a continuum.. See also [Menger 2], 
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q-directed vector and an s-directed vector, both constitutive of 
rfs referential character; from the standpoint of s, there is an 
r-directed vector and a t-directed vector constitutive of s's 
referential character. The vectors can be spoken of as functional 
properties in their associated state only insofar as they are 
entailed by the essential coordinating structure of the context 
to which they belong. In other words, the connection-between each 
vector and the coordinates of which the vector is a referential 
character, is a necessary, essential relation. 
Since the function is continuous, each element is 
essentially constituted by reference at least to its adjacent-
member elements. It follows that adjacent-member elements, 
having nothing which can be the subject of an identifying 
reference "separating"^ them, are differentiable only by J 
virtue of having as distinct the coordinates remote from 
2 their common bond. An r-directed vector links q to r. As 
a relational character of the coordinates of q, this r-directed 
vector can be specified as T (Xq,X"r)', where Xg and Xr are 
x-coordinates for q and r, respectively. The q-directed 
1. On the relation of "betweenness" see [Goodman 2: 240], 
[Russell 4: 3$ff, [Russell 2: § 203 and passimj. 
2. "If two objects have the same logical form, the only 
distinction between them, apart from their external properties, 
is that they are different." [Wittgenstein 1: 2.0233] For the notion 
of particulars as "carriers of numerical difference", see [Allaire 1 
19ff, 31J and [Martin 1: 162J. 
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vector of element r v/ould be (Xr,X ); the s-directed vector 
— •  •  i .  i•V 
of element r would be (Xr,Xs); the r-directed vector of 
element s: (X3,Xr); the t-directed vector of element s: 
— ^ • 
(Xs,Xt); the s-directed vector of element t: (Xt,Xs). 
As the elements are continuous, Xr and Xs are but different 
1 
ways of representing a common zone. If the x-axis is 
considered to be a determined function, then coordinates of 
that function v/ould specify zones along the axis. (A zone 
is understood to be the limiting case in which continuity is 
preserved. To consider each coordinate here a3 representing a 
point. would defeat the purpose of discussing structures at 
once grounding continuity and particularity.2) Each 
1. And thus at least two coordinates are necessary to 
specify an overlap. 
2. Alternately, a zone can be considered constitutive 
of a serial order of sub-parameters which are regarded as 
equivalent to a parametric totality. (See [Buchanan: Poss 147].) 
This approach is characteristic of those theories which 
similarly avoid starting with given points, and instead 
introduce points as classes of specified entities with given 
relations. Of such theories, that of Hausdorff bears the 
closest relation to the notion of coordinate zones. As a 
neighborhood class or topological space, he denotes "a .set T, 
whose elements are called points, in which certain- distinguished 
subsets are associated with the points. Each distinguished 
subset associated with a point x is called a neighborhood of the 
point x* It is assumed that 
1. Each point x of T is element of at least one 
neighborhood of x, and each neighborhood of x contains 
the point x. 
2. If Ux and Vx are two neighborhoods of x, then 
there exists a neighborhood of x which is a subset both of 
Ux and V^. 
3. If y is a point contained in the neighborhood of 
Ux, then there exists a neighborhood of y which is a 
subset of Ux. 
4. For each pair of distinct points x and y, there 
exist two neighborhoods, Ux and Uy , which have no point 
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coordinate can therefore be regarded as being differentiable 
from the other coordinates in this series by virtue of distinct 
terms in the first-order relations. 
Let T(«..Xq, Xr, X3, X-^, Xu...)f represent a series of 
coordinates representing the function. Each coordinate is 
constituted by references to the coordinates adjacent to it: • 
...Xq<—>Xr, >XS, XS<->X^-... . 
By considering only the first-order relations - that is, from 
the standpoint of r, only Xr<=->Xq and Xr«-^XS (and not, e.g., 
Xq<#-»XS) - differentiability within the continuum of the 
function can be established as follows: 
If fXr«—^*XST represents, as- it were, a zone common to 
mm;  mm.mm V  — -*>  
(Xq,XrJ and (Xs,X-tJ, then from the standpoint of that zone, 
Xq can be said to be differentiable from X^. There is, then, 
a system of three adjacent zones: 
q — r, r — s, s — t 
Any two adjacent coordinates constitute a zone, and given 
three such overlapping zones-1-, the end terms, here q and t, 
can be said to be differentiable while still themselves 
respectively entailing zones, q and t are the distinct terms 
in the f^irst-order relations described in the above series 
in common." [Menger 2: SOf] Cf. [Hausdorff 1, 2"}, . 
For a closely related paper, see [Wald 1]. 
1. "If and only if two individuals x and y overlap is 
there some individual z (i.e., any individual wholly contained 
within x and within y), such that whatever overlaps z also 
overlaps x and y; that is 
x o y. = (3z)(w)(w o zj. w o x.w o y)." 
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constitutive of the multi-particular context in question^ 
Within this context, the group of particulars form a 
continuum in which each particular is constituted at least 
by references to its adjacent-member elements in the context 
(other particulars). Without haying to reformulate the 
o(— case, it is clear that in a like manner it can be concluded 
that each particular belonging to the context can be identifyingly 
referred to by virtue of the coordinating system which expresses 
each-particular as a unique functional zone.^ Recalling that 
a particular is a functional marker will make this clear. 
At this point it may be indicated by virtue of which 
structures it is possible to determine whether in a multi­
functional context, all individualizations proper to one 
function have been gathered together such that the analysis 
of that function can be said to be complete. A description 
has been given of those structures which allow for the possibility 
of determining whether certain individualizations of a multi-
particular context are proper to one function or to another. 
1. The distinction between a series of individuals 
and a single individual is to be found in the distinctly 
established boundary conditions of vectors in the two contexts. 
2. Cf. p. 1+0. Each unique functional zone expresses a 
possible differentiation within the range of variation of 
a higher order parameter. (See p. 39«) Consequently, the 
notion of- parameter serves here as a regulative rule of 
possibility, permitting differentiation between parts in a 
whole. Cf. [Buchanan 1: 95f]• 
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By virtue of the coordinate-signature^" of any given individual, 
it is possible to indicate the function proper to that individual. 
The basis for determining this lies, as indicated, in the 
coordinating system entailed by the essential structure of 
any function or functional individualization. Functions, in 
relation to multi-functional contexts, and functional 
individualizations, in relation to rnulti- or uni-functional 
(particular-) contexts, both are constituted by essential 
references to the contexts to which they belong. Coordinate 
families of different types provide the foundation for 
identifying reference both to unitary functions and to the 
elements which constitute them. 
The problem of determining whether an analytical description 
is complete and adequate can therefore be answered simply, 
in empirical terms. The non-repetitious specification of all 
first-order functional individualizations of1 a particular 
comprises a complete description of that particular. Suppose 
information is desired as to whether a descriptive enumeration 
of the first-order individualizations of a function is complete 
from the standpoint of a given context. It is complete if, 
within the given function, it is not empirically possible to locate 
additional functional individualizations which essentially 
refer to the given function.^ On the other ..hand, if an f 
lo See p. 39, n. 2. 
2. How this observation with a view to locating additional 
essential functional individualizations is carried out will 
depend upon the phenomenological region in question. This 
problem is given explicit treatment in § 2.3• 
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enumeration of the formal constitutive elements of a function 
is wanted, disregarding the contingent elements (which, from 
their own standpoint, still are essentially constituted by 
reference to the function to which they belong), the descriptive 
enumeration of these elements is complete when it is no 
longer necessary to take into consideration additional elements 
in order to explicate the essential coordinating structure of 
the given function. 
The notion of coordinate families permits precise 
indication of the determinate zone which is proper to a 
particular, and beyond which is not the particular. Coordinate 
families therefore provide a means to refer to the limits 
of a function. Implicit functional limits are required, as 
observed, for functional particularity. The structures 
which are implicitly functional limits, while permitting 
identifying reference as it has been described, are those 
structures essential to functional individualization. 
The structures providing for the possibility of 
particularity are the structures required for the possibility 
of identifying reference. Identifying reference is 
impossible not entailing particulars, and, inversely, 
particulars require that they can be identifyingly referred to 
in order to,qualify as particulars. 
The notion of coordinate families is basic to functional 
continuity and differentiability<, This may be regarded as the 
basis for the possibility of unity and difference. A particular-
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context is itself an expression of self-identity. Particulars 
are necessary for the possibility of identity; they are the 
constitutive units of the possibility of identity. Self-
identity without particularity is impossible. On the other 
hand, within a multi-particular context"1", differentiability 
is implied. That context, by virtue of the types of 
coordinate families necessary to its constitution, forms 
the basis for difference. 
A particular can be considered to have a "quantifier-
signature" when that particular is given in a multi-particular 
context. By viewing a particular as having a quantifier-
signature, the essential constitution of a function which 
permits distinctions to be made is pointed to. Insofar as 
a multi-particular context allows for differentiation between 
the elements composing it, each element may be said to have 
a quantifier-signature which expresses the specific difference 
of the element in relation to the other elements of the context. 
On the other hand, to specify the sense of functional 
continuity of the term particular*, a particular can be 
considered to have a "qualifier-signature" wrhen that particular 
is given in a multi-particular context. A particular qua 
1. A context comprising the elements evssential to a 
particular-context may be regarded as a multi-particular context, 
since the elements within the context in question fulfull the 
requirements for particulars in their own rijght. 
See, e.g., [Husserl 225j|. 
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qualifier-signature specifies the essential constitution of 
a function which allows for functional continuity. Insofar 
as a multi-particular context allows for continuity between 
the elements composing it, each element may be said to have 
a qualifier-signature which expresses the qualifying relation 
between an element and the remaining elements. Each element, 
from this standpoint, can be specified in terms of its qualifying 
reference to the others. A qualifying-signature, like a 
quantifying-signature, is a functional vector property. 
A multi-particular context is founded upon the nature of . 
, r 
the coordinate famili es which unify the various particulars 
within that context. Such a context will have particular-
contexts as sub-systems, to meet the conditions of a multi** 
particular context. Inversely, a particular-context requires 
a multi-particular context, in order that it be possible to 
identify the particular-context as singular. There is, therefore, 
a reciprocal implication between the grounds providing for the 
possibility of difference and unity. 
Earlier it was said that the necessary conditions for 
the possibility of particularity are at the same time the condi­
tions which essentially regulate the individualization of 
functions. Once it can be determined whether a descriptive 
enumeration of the first-order individualizations of a function 
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is a complete descriptive enumeration, it is also possible 
to indicate that the conditions such a description must 
fulfill implicate the set of conditions essential to the 
regulation of the individualization of functions. 
It was seen that a descriptive enumeration can be called 
complete only by virtue of the fact that the coordinate 
families of a context supply grounds for the determination 
that no other members of the context need be considered other 
than those already specified in the descriptive enumeration 
in question# The coordinate families of the context may 
be said to "label", as it were, those members of the context 
that essentially are linked to the context. Consequently, 
any possible individualization of a determined function 
must be such as to meet the requirements established by the 
coordinating structure of that context. Any individualization, 
which is in princ iple possible as an individualization of 
a determined function, must be structured in such a fashion 
that it can be identifyingly referred to within the context 
proper to that function. That which regulates the individualiza­
tion of functions is at the same time the structure that is 
responsible for the implicit limits constitutive of a function 
and responsible for the possibility of particularity and 
differentiability. And, once again, this relates to the 
ordering principle of any context, namely its coordinate families. 
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In short, a member element of a function is possible 
only when the element structurally conforms to the structure 
essential to that function."1" For a function to be 
individualized, for a contextual element to be regarded as 
belonging to a function given in the context, the coordinating 
structure of the individual must entail the coordinating 
structure of the function in question. In a sense, this is 
a reformulation of the essential relativity of a particular 
to the context which provides for its possibility.^ 
. This relativity is much more thoroughgoing than it 
may first have appeared. It is a relativity essential 
not only to the possibility of particulars, but also to 
the possibility of continuity and differentiability. 
1 a C f. P. Xif • 
2. Thus, for Skolem, what is meant by 'set1 is always 
relative to a given axiom system in a given interpretation 





Earlier*1", mention was made of the tautological 
character of de-projection. This subject will now be 
treated explicitly. 
'Tautology' may be defined as follows: 
(1) A tautology is true for all possible cases, 
for all possible worlds. 
(2) A tautology remains true no matter 
whether the various cases that comprise 
it are true or false, or have truth-' 
values other than these (logical 
modalities). A tautology is thus 
apodictic. 
I A f.a"t^T ncr\r Hne" rmh qav a1*1 vt.hi ng about 
matters of fact, about actual situations 
or things in the world. A tautology is 
empty of content; it is purely formal. 
(4) A tautology does not depend upon 
experience in order to be validated. 
It is true a priori because true 
necessarily. 
(5) At once formal and a priori, a tautology 
has the character of a logical law. 
Tautologies do suggest something about 
truth, about permissible combinations 
of their constitutive propositions. A 
tautology indicates that this combination 
is equivalent to this other combination, 
or that it implicates it, or that it is 
incompatible with it. 
(6) Since a tautology is a logical law for 
the operation of non-specific cases, it 
permits transition from one formulation 
to another, while guaranteeing their 
equivalence. All sciences require such 
laws. 
1. See p* 2/f. 
64* 
(7) It is precisely because a tautology is empty 
of content that it can authorize these trans­
formations without risking the introduction 
of error. A tautology is useful because 
devoid of content.1 
A few additional comments will be useful for clarity. 
Since tautologies cannot be false, they are absolutely reliable. 
This property of necessary truth is a consequence of the 
structure of the tautology. The truth-value of the tautology is 
truth for all possible truth-values of the constitutive 
propositions. Therefore, a tautology does not stipulate 
restrictions of the truth-values of these propositions. These 
can vary for bll values* 
Although tautologies are empty, they are not devoid of 
meaning* They possess determinate truth-values and are 
meaningful. The truth-value for contradictions is false 
for all possible truth-values of their respective constitutive 
propositions. 
It is impossible for observation to come into conflict 
with a tautology. All possible observations must conform 
to the tautology2; the verification of a tautology is 
not based upon empirical observations of the world, but 
is based upon the structure of the tautology itself. 
In other words, it is impossible that any experience could 
result in the truth of one side of the tautological equivalence 
1. "The logical product of a tautology and a proposition 
says the same thing as the proposition." [ Wittgenstein 1: 4.465] 
2. See ^  2.4* 2.7* 
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and- the falsity of the other side. Since all tautologies 
are empty of content and necessarily have the same truth- . 
value, It is said all tautologies have the same meaning, 
or are "equisignificant." 
A tautology can be called a logical law only if the 
convention is accepted that logical rules are established 
for the purpose of indicating true statements. By 
'logical rule* is understood 'a directive sanctioning or 
prohibiting certain operations in logic.1 If the aim of 
such rules is to find true logical formulas, a .justification 
of a rule is a demonstration that the rule results in 
true formulas. A justification is a proof that the rule 
is true. As such, it can be considered a law. A law is" 
not a directive or a convention as is a rule. A tautology 
can be justified as true for all cases and consequently 
is considered a logical law. 
Two formulas may be called equipollent when each is 
derivable from the other.^ (From (x)f(x)» £(x) can be 
derived, and vice versa.) Formulas which are tautologically 
equivalent are also equipollent; not all equipollent- relations 
are also tautological relations. In the latter case (e.g., 
in 'f(x) = (x)f(x)')> the relation of equipollence becomes 
the logical expression of equisignificance. 
I 
Only when the range of applicability is delimited 
(the logical scope) can formulas be- considered equipollent. 
In other words, the context within which the propositions 
!• After [Reichenbach 5- 107fJ 
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appear must be considered in order to determine their 
equipollenceFrom the standpoint of language structures, 
only assertions can be considered equipollent, since an 
assertion requires a context within which the use of 
the expression is determined. 
Because all tautological equivalences are equipollent, 
an equivalence comprises or entails a context to which its 
meaning is necessarily relative. The demonstration that 
the equivalence holds for all truth-values entails a 
meta-system from the standpoint of which the tautology is 
t  
id'entifyingly referred to. It is this meta-context to which 
the meaning of the justification is essentially relative. 
The relationship between two contexts, where one 
context is a sub-system of the other, cannot be said to 
be one of equivalence. If a particular-context is a 
sub-system within a larger context which permits 
identifying reference to the sub-system, there is a 
coordinate family which coordinates the identity-, similarity-, 
or difference-relations between the two contexts. From the 
standpoint of the framework allowing for reference to these 
relations, the determined meanings of these relations within 
the contexts can be considered. Where the meaning of a 
relation in one system is the same as a corresponding relation 
in the other system, the two relations are said to be 
equisignificant. They are not equivalent, since they entail 




When, from a framework allowing for reference to two 
formulations expressing relation, it is found that both 
entail the same single context, within which they have the 
same usage, they may be said to be tautologically equivalent. 
Equivalence is here taken as a formulation of the 
identity-relation, to be discussed later. 
Equipollence-relations consequently include mutually 
derivable, determined references which may have the same 
range of application (tautological equivalences) or 
overlapping ranges of application. Within the overlap area, 
where references correspond in their ranges of application, 
they may be called equisignificant* 
Equipollence-relations may therefore be found when 
one context is a sub-system of another, or when a single 
context is referred to, as in the respective cases of 
equisignificance and tautological equivalence. 
Systems structured in such a way as to allow reference 
from system to sub-system may be said to have a hetero­
geneous logic of structure. Systems not so structured have 
a homogeneous logic of structure. Equipollence-relations 
may have a logic of structure of either sort; equisignificance-
relations which are not tautologous require a heterogeneous 
logic of structure; tautological equivalences require a 
homogeneous logic of structure. A homogeneous logic of 
6* 
structure may be simple or complext depending upon whether 
one or more than one context is identifyingly referred to. 
If more than one context is referred to, it is understood 
that explicit reference is made only to contexts not 
sub-systems within the other contexts to which reference 
is made. Any heterogeneous logic of structure is complex, 
since more than one context must be identifyingly referred to. 
The relation of tautological equivalence is determined 
by the structure of the tautology itself. A tautological 
expression is definite since it can never be false; its 
truth-value is fixed. The range of application of the 
relations constitutive of the tautology is specified by 
the homogeneous logic of structure which it entails and to 
which it is essentially relative. The logical rule expressed 
by a tautological equivalence is a directive-formulation 
of the range of permissible applications of the 
constitutive relations under which the necessary equivalence 
holds. 
As already noted, it is customary usage that prescribes 
that logical rules are established in order to specify the 
conditions for true cases. There can be no question as to 
whether this practice i3 itself "true" or "false": it is 
purely a matter of convention. 
When a set of conditions fulfills the requirements 
prescribed by the rule, it is permissible to describe this 
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situation as meeting the criteria of a true case. If 
the requirements laid down by the rule are not satisfied# 
it is prohibited to describe the case as true. 
The formal structure of a context specifies a definite 
pattern of coordination of the relations constitutive of 
the context. A function essentially delimits a system of 
coordination acoording to which contextual elements are 
unified by the coordinate families of the context. The 
structural organization of the contextual elements may or 
may not be in accordance with a specific logical rule. 
The relations constitutive of the context may be 
coordinated in a way such thtit a certain combination 
of contextual elements satisfies the conditions of 
acceptability formulated by the rule. These combinations 
can therefore be called "true." Other combinations 
may not follow according to the rule. These are false in 
a bi-valent truth-system. 
If the contextual combinations of elements are 
compared# on the other hand, with a rule stating the 
conditions which a meaningful combination must satisfy, 
certain of the contextual combinations may be described 
as absurd or meaningless and others as meaningful. 
The rules formulating conditions for the possibility 
of meaning are termed 'rules of sense1; those formulating 
conditions for truth are rules of truth.Contextual 
combinations conforming to rules which have been justified 
1. A detailed analysis of these rules lies outside the 
scope of this study. 
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1 4 (laws) are called 'valid.1 
It is important to realize that the designation of any-
contextual combinations according to rules of sense or • 
truth itself requires a coordinating system. Constitutive 
of this system are the given context and the criterial 
organization; both are necessary for the possibility of 
determining the sense- or truth.-value of any contextual 
combination. Insofar as a sense- or truth-value is 
associated with a contextual combination, reference is 
made both to the given context and to the rules by means 
of which the sense- or truth-determination is permissible. 
A context which allows for the possibility of denoting 
certain combinations of its elements as true or,false, 
meaningful or absurd, itself entails a specific formal 
pattern of truth/sense coordination. 
The rules of sense or truth prescribing this pattern • 
of coordination may be said to constitute truth or sense 
functions. A function is a coordinative structure; truth 
and sense functions are therefore coordinative structures which 
have logics of structure explicitly described by their 
respective rules'of sense and truth. 
A coordinate, which is a determinant of reference to 
1. "As long as the parametric system reproduces analytically 
the relations discerned in the actual whole without violating 
the criteria of analysis, the system is valid." (JBuchanan 1: 
94 J. 
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that which is subject to an identifying reference, must 
be expressed within a coordinating structure having a common 
logic of structure. Such an expression of a coordinate 
is valid. An invalid coordination occurs when a particular 
is coordinated in a multi-particular context, and where the 
logic of structure of the particular is in fundamental 
opposition to the logic of structure of the context. 
When a coordination is in opposition to the truth 
rules of the overall context, the coordination is invalid 
in the sense that it is a contradictory formulation and, 
relative to these rules, will be always false. If a. coordina­
tion is in opposition to the rules of sense of the overall 
context, the coordination is meaningless. An absurd 
coordination, then, is devoid of sense and violates the 
logic of structure of the context (here, the contextual 
syntactics).*'" Since a meaningless formulation cannot have 
a truth-value, it will also be considered contradictory in 
the sense of being incompatible^-with' possible truth-determi 
nation. 
^ • 1. "Quand on dit qu'une affirmation f -s'annule elle-
rneme ', qu'elle est logiquement absurde, cela signifie que 
son contenu particulier (son sens, sa signification) ..est ^ en 
contradiction avec ce quTexigent universellement les categories 
de signification qui s y rapportent avec ce qui se fonde 
universellement sur leur signification universelle[RL I §37 
133] 
2. "Inconciliables...sont des contenus quand ils ne 
peuvent s'accorder dans l'unite d'un tout." [RL III §32 134] 
"Un contenu de l'espece 3 n'est jamais incompatible purement 
et simplement avec un contenu de l'espece £, mais, quand on 
parle de leur incompatibility, on se refere toujours a une 
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If the coordination follows according to the rules 
expressed in the logic of structure of the context, the 
coordination can be considered meaningful and true 
relative to the contextual syntax. A demonstration that a 
coordination follows the rules of sense and truth of the 
context constitutes a verification of the coordination. 
A demonstration that the rules of truth lead to true 
coordinations constitutes a justification of these rules. 
A coordination not according to the rules of sense of the 
context can be verified incompatible with these rules.-1-
The chief property of rules of sense and truth is 
that they restrict contextual combinations by excluding 
those combinations which are untrue and meaningless. The 
context within which a valid coordination is made must 
be coherent - that is, it must be possible to depend upon 
the rules of sense and truth of the context such that if a 
coordination follows according to these rules, untrue 
and meaningless contextual coordinations are necessarily 
excluded.^ 
combinaison de contenus dfune espece determinee G(pf,/®,... ;p) 
[ou ' Gf designe Manses'] qui contient p est a laquelle ^  
doit aussi venir s'integrer." [RL III <£32 135] "...des 
contenus £, £ ...sont appeles incompatibles. non pas dans 
lTabsolu, mais en considerant qu'ils ne s' 'accordent' pas 
dans le cadre d*une unite quelconque...[RL III §33 137] 
1. "...possibilites sont, comme les possibilites ideales 
en generale, definies par des lois, en ce sense que certaines 
impossibilites .ideales leur correspondent en vertu de certaines 
lois." [RL III §62 226] Cf. [Wilkinson 2: 39] 
2. This is called 'the problem of consistency' in modern 
logic. 
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Contextual coherence is necessary in order for 
coordination according to rule to be possible. In other 
words, contextual syntactics and contextual coherence must 
go hand in hand. A justification of a rule requires 
reliability of the logic of structure of a context. Clearly, 
this reliability is not demonstrable, since any demonstration 
would of necessity suppose contextual consistency or coherence 
Contextual coherence is made possible only by virtue 
of the nature of contextual syntactic evidence. Tautological 
equivalences are empty; however, the statement that a given 
expression is a tautology is not empty. The demonstration 
that the expression is tautologous may be involved, and must 
depend upon reliable evidence. The verification of the 
tautologous character of the expression is made possible only 
by a rule of verification of the form 'if x belongs to a 
class Y, then x will demonstrate specific characteristics essential to 
any member of class Y. * If an expression is a tautology, its 
tautological character must be evidenced by certain necessary 
characteristics.^ The presence of these characteristics are 
conditions which must be satisfied in order for the expression 
to be considered a tautological equivalence. 
1. Compare the following: "Consistency proofs...seem 
circular in the sense that we allow ourselves the use of...the 
deductive procedures of the very language whose consistency we 
seek to prove." [Martin 1: 274] See j 1.6. 
2. See above, pp. 63-4• 
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Such/rule of verification is possible only when 
contextual coherence is assured. It would not be possible 
as a rule if contextual coherence were not dependable. 
The wish to justify this rule leads to circularity, since 
the justification must itself presuppose the rule. In 
other words, any justification of the justification procedure 
itself is inconsistent, and its formulation necessarily 
absurd. Rules must be relied upon in order that they can 
be questioned. 
I turn now to a discussion of de-projection in the 
light, of the above considerations. The following discussion 
has four principal phases: a definition of projections, 
a definition of de-projection, the formulation of a de-
projective rule, and its replacement by a law of de-
projection, justifying the rule. 
A projection was previously described as "appearing 
to characterize some or all of the coordinates of a particular 
as independent of the coordinate system entailed by these 
coordinates." This notion may now be further explored.^ 
1. It should be noted from the start that my use of 
the term 'projection' has virtually nothing to do with ' 
Wittgenstein1s "method of projection" as a means "to think 
out the sense of a proposition." [Wittgenstein 1: 3»H] Here, he 
compares projection in geometry to expression in language: 
A geometrical figure may be projected in many ways, each 
corresponding to a different "language," yet in each the 
projective properties of the original figure remain unchanged. 
These properties are analogs to what a proposition and a fact 
must, in the Tractatus. have in common if the proposition is 
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A coordinate is valid if and only if it is applied 
according to the restrictions defined by the logic of 
structure of the coordinate system proper to it. This 
follows according to what is meant by the term 'coordinate'. 
If a coordinate is expressed in terms of a 
coordinate system having structural principles incompatible 
with those of the coordinate system proper to the coordinate"**, 
the coordination involved in the expression is invalid. 
Essential to the coordination is the referential character 
of the coordinate, its vector-signature. The coordination 
in question determines a specific reference between-
contextual elements of the coordinate system within which 
the coordination is an invalid expression. 
The rules of truth and sense of the context do not 
regulate this given coordination. The coordination is 
possible only when it does not follow according to all 
restrictions imposed by the contextual syntactics. A 
coordination which does not follow the rules of sense 
to assert the fact. Cf. [Wittgenstein ll 3»12» 3«13» 4.0141J. This 
use of 'projection' by Wittgenstein must be carefully 
distinguished from its wholly different sense here. 
1. "La violation de ces conditions logiques atteint 
manifestement son maximum quand il fait partie du sens de 
la these theorique de nier les lois dont depend la ! 
possibility rationnelle de toute these et de tout fondement 
d'une these en generale. ...une theorie se detruit elle-
meme quand, dans son contenu, elle va a l'encontre des lois 
sans lesquelles le mot de theorie n'aurait absolument aucun 
sens 'rationnel1 (donsistant)[RL I §32 121J 
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and truth of the context coordinates an improper combination 
of contextual elements. A coordination is then made in a 
fashion contradictory to the syntactical directives of the 
context. As such, it permits an invalid combination 
which, when explicitly expressed as such, is observed to 
be meaningless and contradictory.-1-
However, certainly not all meaningless and contradictory 
contextual combinations are projective. A projection is 
a particular kind of coordination which must satisfy 
the following additional conditions: 
(1) A projection requires as a condition of 
i ts possibility that a particular be 
disconnected from certain of i ts essential 
relations to the coordinating: structure 
required for its possibility. In other 
words. there must be a severing of the 
1. "Le plus grave reproche qu'on puisse elever contre 
-une theorie, et surtout contre une theorie de logique, est 
d'aller a l'encontre des conditions evidentes de la 
possibility d'une theorie en general. Poser une theorie et, 
dans son contenu, expressement ou tacitement, contredire les 
propositions qui fondent le sens et la legitimite de toutes 
les theories en general - ce n'est pas seulement faux,, rnais. 
totalement absurde." [RL I §32 119] Husserl calls 'theories 
sceptiques1 - a special case of projection - "toutes les 
theories dont les theses enoncent expressement ou impliquent 
analytiquement que les conditions logiques...de la possibility 
d'une theorie en general sont fausses. [RL I §32 121] "II 
resulte clairement de sa definition qu'il appartient au concept 
de theorie sceptique d'etre absurde. [RL I §32 122] He goes on 
to say of theories sceptiques that they "sont absurdes, ...elle 
constituent un non-sens, au isens le plus propre et le plus 
strict de ce mot. Le contenu de ses affirmations est en 
contradiction avec ce qui fait partie absolument du sens ou du 
contenu de toute affirmation et qui n'est ainsi separable. 
quant au sens, d'aucune affirmation."TRL I §35 125-6, italics 
mine] 
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essential relativity of the 
particular to its context, 
(2) The particular must be asserted to 
be in certain respects autonomous from 
its context. Reference must be made to 
the particular in such a manner that 
denies or ignores one or more essen­
tial determinants of i ts contextual 
relativity. The coordination is 
protective in these respects. 
It must be understood that (l) and (2) are descriptions 
of conditions which must be satisfied by any projection 
from the standpoint of an analysis of its essential 
structure. It is not as if a projective misconstruction 
takes the form of an explicit severing oif essential 
contextual relations (unless in a deliberately constructed 
case). This must in fact be necessary oace the projection 
is expressed in the form of an assertion that specific 
structures are not essentially connected tto the context. 
It will be useful here to note in greater detail the 
place the terms 1 explicit1 or 'express* amd Timplicit1 or 
'tacit1 have in the present analyses. When a particular 
is said to involve "implicit reference" tco more than one 
framework*'-, the following conditions are mecessarily granted: 
From the standpoint of a system K, it is possible 
identifyingly to refer to sub-systems I arnd J, where systems 
I and J have a given common logic of structure. System-J 
is thus isomorphic with system-I, but the former has further 
1. Seepp. 1#» 27-£, and passim. 
7S 
a structure such that a set of elements, A,B,C, are 
given as constitutive of system-J. Since these sub-systems 
have a common logic cf'structure, from the standpoint of 
system-K, A,B,C can be correlated with system-I, even 
though these elements are not essentially characterized 
in relation to system-I. 
Insofar as the correlation holds, A,B,C are said 
to be both explicit constitutive elements of system-J, 
and implicit constitutive elements of syst^em-I. To 
generalise, the implicit has a structure conditioning 
the range of possible explicit structures which can be 
validly correlated with it. In this sense, it can 
readily be affirmed that "to analyze is to explicate the 
implicit.""'" 
System K, then, provides a possible framework within 
which the terms Texplicit* and 1 implicit* have a defined . 
essential relationship. An important projective misconstruction 
results if a particular is characterized both as (a) having 
1. [Ricoeur 3; 99J. 
Husserl admits a related use of these terms: "Dans 
la simple perception, on dit que l'objet tout entier est donne 
Texplicitement' (explizite)« chacune de ses parties (partie au 
sens le plus large de ce mot) 'impliciternent' (implizite). 
La totalite des objets qui peuvent etre donnes explicitement 
ou impliciteraent dan3 de simples perceptions constitue la 
sphere des ob.iets sensibles dans sa plus vaste extension. [RL 
III £47 1#5> his italics] 
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an "implicit" structure of a certain sort, and as (b) 
having such a stricture out of connection to system K. To 
say of a particular that it  has a certain character 
implicitly, while reference to systems J and K, to which 
"implicit-predication" is necessarily relative, is denied or 
implicitly neglected, -  to maintain this, immediately gives . 
way to an inconsistent and absurd misconstruction. Such 
a misconstruction will be termed a projection of the 
implicit.  
Condition (1) above specifies that a particular is to 
be cmsidered as dislocated from its essential contextual 
relativity* Condition (2) specifies that this dislocation 
is to be formulated in the form of an assertion of the 
autonomy of the particular from its context. Condition (1) 
can be seen to deny2  the possibility of the particular 
by separating the particular from the context necessary 
for its possibility.3 This is an outright contradiction. 
Condition (2) asserts the particular while excluding the 
grounds for Its possibility. This formulation is necessarily 
1. For an illustration of this type of misconstruction, 
see [RL III §1+8 136]. 
2. Such a denial has been called "self-referentially 
inconsistent." Cf. [Fitch 1: 217-225J. See also below 
$ 1.6. 
3. This separation is strictly speaking of course 
impossible; from the standpoint of de-projective analysis it 
must consequently be considered a mistaken "separation." 
BO 
meaningless."1" 
It is significant again to note that the character of 
necessary contradiction and meaninglessness of coordinations 
satisfying conditions (1) and (2) is a consequence of the 
ordering system of the logic of structure of the context. The 
fact that the explicit formulation of a projection is 
contradictory and absurd is required by the syntactics of 
•the coordinating system itself. The determination of 
a formulation as being contradictory and absurd is itself 
possible only by virtue of the lcgLc of structure of the 
context within which the formulation is considered.^ Thus 
the inconsistent and absurd character of a misconstruction 
is entirely relative to a given context. A region constituted 
by such, contexts will be said to have a 'projective 
constitution.*3 
1. Hasserl dit que les parties d'un contenu "sont 
inconcevables en dehors de toute connexion.... II...est 
[un] truisme 'analytique' d'apres lequel une partie comme 
telle ne pourrait exister sare un tout dont elle serait la 
partie. Ce serait une 'contradiction1, c'est-a-dire un 
contresens 'formel', Lanalytique', de pretendre qu'une 
chose est une partie quand il manque un tout qui aille avec 
elle." [RL II.2 iii §11 37] 
2. See p. 1^31 n. 3» 
3. It is possible to represent axiomatically the 
foundations of such a region. The present study provides 
the theoretical basis for such an undertaking. It will suffice 
to note here that certain projective misconstructions are 
possible only after one or more projections are assumed. 
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From the standpoint of a group of systems having a 
common logic of structure, a given essential relation 
constituted relative to this logic of structure is said to 
be covariant over the group*'*' The explicit characterization 
of that relation out of connection to the context 
conditioning its possibility (here, the group over which i t  
is covariant) constitutes a type of misconstruction which 
will here be termed 'projection of covariance1 .  
Now, the elimination of projections follows according 
to the rules given in the coordinating structure of the 
context within which the projection occurs.2  There are 
three distinct moments of analysis which are prior to the 
de-projective correction of the misconstruction, (a) The 
constitution of the logic of structure of the context must 
be adequately described. This description must specify 
the essential restrictions imposed by the logic of structure 
upon possible coordinations, (b) The assertion involved 
in the projective misconstruction must be explicitly 
formulated. The formulation will specify the nature of 
the projective demand by designating the asserted autonomy 
of a particular from its context, (c) The opposition of 
the projective demand to the rules of sense and truth of 
1. It is immediately evident that in a projectively 
constituted region, an axiomatically primitive projection is 
covariant over that region. 
2. The elimination of•projections therefore also follows 
rules for coherent parametric analysis. For example, "(1) that 
parameters.. .must be unambiguously defined and (2).the limits 
of their variability, hence their application and extension, 
must not be violated." [Buchanan 1: 176J 
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the context must be verified to result in a contradictory and 
meaningless formulation. 
Together, these preliminary analyses render explicit 
the constitutive structure of the given context and demonstrate 
that reference to the particular in question must at once 
be a necessary reference to those constitutive elements 
guaranteeing the possibility of the particular. The de-
pro jective analysis is completed with (d) a reconciliation 
of the logic of structure described in (a) with the 
coordination which was originally not in accordance with 
this structure. This final phase of de-projection 
therefore .involves a correction of the projective 
coordination, imposing upon the coordination regulation 
according to the contextual syntax, necessary for 
contextual reference. 
It should be clear that this treatment is possible only 
for cases which are but partial deviations from the logic of 
structure of the context. This is, however, a necessary 
restriction, for only cases which yet remain under sufficient 
organization according to rule are identifiable as 
"coordinations"A complete departure from the organizing 
logic of structure would not be so identifiable, and would 
1'. The conditions necessary for a "sufficient 
organization according to rule" cannot be deduced at this 
point, and must be postponed for the treatment of particular 
case-analyses. 
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not therefore qualify as a "projection". 
(a) and (b), respective formulations of the contextual 
syntactics and projective demand"*", will be called the initial 
de-pro.iective phase of analysis, (c) involves a comparison 
between the projective assertion and the restrictions 
prescribed by the logic of structure of the context. It 
may be considered the diagnostic phase of de-projection, 
(d) involves the correction of the projective coordination 
by the imposition of the syntactical restrictions, (d) may 
be called the corrective phase of de-projection. 
The rule according to which de-projection follows 
may now be formulated. When certain definite restrictions 
are prescribed by the context in question and these .. 
restrictions are necessary for the possibility of valid 
references within that context, all valid coordinations 
within the context must be in accordance with these 
restrictions. This statement is tautological; it has the 
formr 
[ k ( x ) i 3 j ( x j j . [ j ( x } 3 i ( x j j 3 [ k ( x ) = > i ( x ) j .  
This expression must be true for all cases. (Logical 
case analysis may be used to demonstrate this fact.) It has 
the character of a logical law, and it therefore legitimates 
the transition from phases (a) and (b) to the diagnostic 
phase of de-projection. Since, as a directive, the above 
1. A full treatment of the nature of the projective 
demand requires the introduction of.certain semantic notions 
necessary for a de-projective analysis of volition. See 6 2.7, 
p. 273. 
2. Recall that a multi-particular context of the I-J-K 
type is necessary for projective coordination. 
Bit. 
rule leads necessarily to true cases, the corrective phase 
of de-projection is justified. 
Consequently, de-projection can be considered to be 
a tautological restrictive formation operation"1' in which 
a given coordination is required to conform to the logic 
of structure of the coordinating system necessary for 
the possibility of the coordination. De-projection can 
be considered a tautological operator only on the basis 
of satisfying specific conditions entailed by the 
character of a tautology. It must rely, therefore, upon 
a rule of verification, which cannot be truth-functional. 
It is reliable, and the wish to justify this basis of 
de-projection must take the form of an inconsistant 
and meaningless demand. (Such a wish exemplifies a 
projective misconstruction.) 
Since the corrective phase of de-projection results in 
a re-affirmation of the logic of structure from the stand­
point of the given coordination, the tautologous character 
of de-projection implies an analytic relation between the . 
syntactical character of the corrected coordination and 
the syntactics of the context proper to that coordination. 
Consequently, de-projection can be considered a tautological 
f 
1. 'Operation* is taken here in the general sense of 
"the expression of a relation between the structure of its 
result and its bases." [Wittgenstein 1: 5.22] Cf. [LFLT 6 13c 74, 
§73 250]. See below, pp. 103, 116. ' 
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operation implicating an analytic relation.^ 
Any given coordination is essentially.relative to'its 
coordinate system. The logic of structure of this system 
may have a range of application greater or the same as 
that of the coordination, the possibility of -whose relational 
character it guarantees. In the former case* the relation 
between coordination and coordinate system is one of logical 
equisignificance; in the latter case in which the ranges of 
application are equalB the relation is one of tautological 
equivalence. It is by virtue of contextual relativity that 
a de-projectively•corrected coordination can be considered 
equipollent to its proper coordinating system. 
It is of interest here to note that de-projective analysis 
provides the foundation for certain features of "dimensional 
2 
analysis." Given a set of elements which are to be 
functionally related* dimensional analysis can be characterised 
as a method of analysis which yields certain information 
about the necessary properties of relations deducible from 
formal manipulations with the elements. It is not. necessary 
to express the functional relation in great detail, but only 
in sufficient detail to enumerate the elements which enter 
into the relation. 
1. This is reminiscent of the fact that the statement 
"the Forms of Sensibility and the Categories together provide 
the necessary foundation for the objective determination of 
possible experience* is analytic. Cf. [Kant 1: B 526ff]. 
2. A brief and purely formal description of dimensional 
analysis is given here. For a more detailed account, 3ee [Bridgman 
1 J, [Campbell 1], [G.N. Lewis 1], [Lodge 1], [Ipsen 1J, and 
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In dimensional analysis, these elements are usually 
measurable quantities on which depend certain significant 
relations, for example, the relation between mass and 
acceleration. Once all the quantities have been listed which 
are thought to be essential to the indicated relation, 
they are combined into a functional relation so that the 
. » 
relation in question obtains irrespective of variation in 
the size (although not in the character) of the units of 
measurement. A function of such a form is called a 
'complete equation1 
Dimensional analysis applies only to functions of this 
form. A complete equation will comprise a definite number 
of measurable quantities, certain factors (dimensional constants) 
invariant in form (although not in magnitude) relative to 
variability in the measurable quantities, and a prescribed 
system of fundamental units within which the equation is 
valid. A dimensional constant expresses a relation which 
obtains over the entire domain of the function - a relation 
which i3, in other words, sufficiently universal as to 
characterize all instantiations of variables of the function. 
A dimensional constant shows itself in an equation as a 
[Huntley 1J. 
For the mathematical foundations of dimensional analysis, 
see [Quade 1] and [Saint-Guilhem 1]. 
For a detailed treatment of dimensional analysis and 
similarity theory, cf. [Sedov 1] and [Gukhman 1J. The latter 
contains a good investigation of dimensional analysis in terms 
of the theory of parameters. 
1. See [Buckingham 1: 3453* 
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factor of proportionality constituting an explicit statement 
of the invariant relation. 
The advantage of dimensional analysis is that it is 
able to give certain information about the functional 
relatedness of a system which can be so complicated that 
detailed methods of analysis are not applicable. 
Now, a complete equation which holds for all changes 
in the size of the fundamental units so long as these units 
are units of a certain kindj> does no longer hold, and is 
absurd# in another system of units in which units of another 
sort are primitive. Such a meaningless formulation^ might 
be called a 'dimensional projection1. 
The cuapieto equation of dimensional aaalyoia can be 
compared to the logic of structure of a context by noting the 
following: The general coordinative functional relations of a 
context, including, in particular, the various o-series 
of the context, constitute the logic of structure of the 
context. When this general structure is taken in relation 
to possible contexts similar in logic of structure to the 
first, there results a complete and adequate expression of 
the necessary constitutive structure of those contexts, which 
provide for the possibility of identifying .reference to 
o-series of similar organization. An o-seraes of a certain 
I 
1. Bridgman's assertion of the meaninjlessness of auch 
a formulation is undemonstrated. See [Bridiman 1:_ 37]. 
aa 
type, appearing within two contextual sub-systems, may be 
said to represent analogously what is meant by the terra 
'dimensional constant'. 
It has been noted that de-projective analysis renders 
an incomplete and incorrect formulation complete (the de-
projected formulation is true over the range of variability 
of the function) and correct (the de-projected formulation 
accords with the restrictive, regulative rules of the given 
context, and is thus valid). Dimensional analysis, on the 
other hand, is largely concerned with the study of completely 
and correctly formulated expressions, with particular care 
paid to the nature of the dimensional constants, where the 
1 ^ 1 ^ "r"» -*r r%vi r\ cf «"» *1 /"\ V"» i* a vi n t.rn A -f* 
-ncivlso* uoUculj.jr clj. u gua Ksjl ulij.vux octo. a-cir»o OX 
nature. 
Dimensional analysis, then, is in the nature of 
a theory of analysis of functional relations which have 
the character of laws over a defined range of application. 
It seeks first to enumerate the elements constitutive 
of a certain functional organization, and, second, to give 
information concerning formally invariant relations 
essential to that organization. As such, it bears strong 
similarities to the first phase of de-projection. It further 
takes note of the necessary relativity of complete equations 
to their respective systems of fundamental units, and 
1. [Bridgman 1: 91fJ. 
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consequently limits the validity of a complete equation 
to its proper system. Although this restriction is 
suggested rather than shown, it is basic to the corrective 
phase of de-projection. 
The similarity of portions of de-projective 
methodology with that of dimensional analysis indicates 
that dimensional analysis, in its most general form, finds 
its necessary foundation in the relations of essential 
relativity upon which depends the approach basic to 
de-projection. 
1 
It wa3 stated earlier that de-projection follows 
2 
according to the principle of minimum assumption. This 
is true in two senses: (l) a description of the constitutive 
structures of a context is a description of those and only 
those particular constitutive elements without which the 
context would be'impossible. The description is necessarily 
limited to the specific constitutive elements, satisfying 
this condition, and thus only the minimum number of elements 
1. Cf. p. 23. 
2. After [Kapp 1J. This principle has been known by 
many names: 'Occam's razor1 ("Pluritas non est ponenda sine 
necessitate"; "frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per 
pauciora"). See [Occam 1: xxfj 'The principle of the 
economy of thought'. [Mach 1J, [RL I <£ 52 203; § 54 219; y 56 
224 J 'The hypothesis of simplicity' in Quine, Reichenbach, and 
others. 
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necessary for the possibility of the context are considered. 
When a group of elements that do not condition the 
possibility of the context is included among those described-
as constitutive in a de-projective analysis of that context, 
2 
an incorrect analysis results. It will be recalled that a 
de-projective description is verified correct when it is 
% 
shown to accord with the males of sense and truth of the 
3  
context. 
(2) The tautological character of de-projection 
guarantees against the possible introduction of error.^ 
Since it is empty of content, it assumes no content, and 
1. Such a "i/iiiiiiiial ue-projective description" 
corresponds to a kind of "maximal model" in Hilbert's sense. 
Cf. [Hilbert 1: Anhang VIj See also [S. Bachelard 1: 121ffJ. 
2. 'Occam*s maxim is, of course, not an arbitrary 
rule, nor one that is justified by its success in practice: 
its point is that unnecessary units in a sign-language mean 
nothing." [Wittgenstein 1: 5.47321J "If a sign is useless, 
it is meaningless. That is the point of Occam*s maxim." 
[Wittgenstein 1: 3*32&J "We are...told something about the 
world by the fact that it can be described more simply with 
one system...than with another." [Wittgenstein 1: 6.342] 
3. See above, p. 72. Occam argues that "[w]e must 
not affirm that something is necessarily required for the 
explanation of an effect, if we are not led by a reason 
proceeding either from a truth known by itself, or from 
an experience that is certain." [Occam 1: xxj 
4. Cf. (7)» p. 64. 
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is literally a minimal postulation. 
It might therefore be suggested that de-projectioh is, 
in some sense, "presuppositionless", since it essentially 
restricts analyses in the manner of minimum assumption and 
does not introduce a positive content. To this, the 
following can be replied: 
T 
First, valid de-projective analysis is purely 
descriptive in that there can be no hypothetical inference 
or a fictitious pohalation of something not given, but, 
from the standpoint of the functional organization of a 
defined context, its relativistic constitution is explicated. 
The constitution of the context, its logic of structure, 
etc., consists in a.matrix of basic relations which show 
a certain behavior.If desired, the constitution of the 
context may be taken as-"given" or "presupposed." However,, 
it will be convenient here to say of the constitution of 
a context that it is "given", while Tpresupposition will 
be defined as having the sense of a structure so constituted 
as to entail a projection when its denial is asserted in 
a given system.2 
1. On the elimination of the basic relations of a 
system, see [Carnap 1: § 153 235] 
2. In the main, this definition follows [Fitch I: 
221]: IMpresupposition' often seems to mean some hypothesis 
that cannot be systematically denied without in some sense 
being already assumed. The very denial itself, or some 
important aspect of it, or some assumption or method involved 
in presenting it and defending it, constitutes an exception to 
the denial. A presupposition might be defined as an assumption 
whose denial is self-referentially inconsistent." 
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Consequently, de-projection is empirical (it affirms 
a given, and is constituted in relation to that given) and 
is purely descriptive, while its presuppositions are to be 
found in the essentially relativistic character of the given. 
The following chapter is an exploration which continues 





A number of different structures have so far been 
considered - systems permitting reference to a particular or 
group of particulars, systems made up of a group of such 
systems, systems which under analysis are characterized by a 
logic of structure of the first order, or of the second order, 
etc. These structures have been inspected with a view toward 
rendering explicit their corresponding constitutive logics 
of structure. For instance,, a particular is found to require 
for its possibility that of a certain structure. It is 
impossible, in other words, for the partiuular to be possible 
while that structure is note^ Once the possibility of the 
structure is established, so is that of the particular in 
question. It is impossible for this structure to be possible 
\tfhile the particular is impossible. This type of analysis 
immediately raises the question concerning what shall here 
be called Tthe limits of the possible.1 These limits are 
said to be determined once a complete description has been t 
made of the structures necessary for the possibility of a-
given particular. 
1. "...if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the 
possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the 
thing itself." [Wittgenstein 1: 2.012] See also [Wittgenstein 
Is 2.014, 3.13]. 
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What is characterized as possible from the standpoint of 
the context of a particular will be limited by the structures 
which condition the possibility of the particular itself. 
These limits of possibility will vary according to the 
particular in question. Put differently, the constitution 
of a particular is at once the constitution of a set of 
possibilities. The logic of structure constitutive of a given 
context prescribes a certain range of coordinative possibilities. 
As already noted^, identifying reference to a particular 
is achieved through coordinate-specification, this specification 
of the determinants of reference to a particular may take the 
form of an explicit description of the first-order references 
originating in the structure of the given particular® Whether 
or not these first-order references have a uni- or multi-
vector constitution, an enumeration of the references 
essential to the first-order context they comprise will 
ultimately involve an indeterminate number of references 
which in principle range over, contexts of ascending orders. 
It is important to note that each of the orders of reference 
admits of a defined range of possible correlations. 
For example, an initial group of three particulars 
establishes a defined range of possible relations between one 
2 particular and the remaining pair. There are three such 
possible correlations, each of which will be analyzable in terms 
1. $> 1.3. 
2. See [RL II.2 iii § 16 49J. 
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of the distinct vector-con£.itution of each triad so formed. 
These three possible correlations are consequently said to be 
essential to a description of first-order vector-constitution. 
Should each of the abovementioned particulars bear a se>cond-
order reference to a fourth, an analysis in terms of triad-
formations will indicate twelve possible correlations between 
a single particular and a remaining pair. These twelve 
possible correlations are thus essential to a description of 
the second-order vector-constitution of the initial context. 
The peculiar kind of functional constitution relating 
to the necessary foundation for possible correlations will be 
termed 'valence-constitution.* A valence«, as a result, is 
to be considered a coordinate-structure prescribing a range of 
possible correlations for the particular identifyingly 
referred to by means of specification of the coordinate(s) 
in question. 
It should be clear that a particular can have a 
valence-constitution only if it can also have a vector-
constitution. The reason for this is quite simple: both 
self-identity.of a particular as well as aggregation of' 
particulars in groups have a vector-constitution. A valence 
prescribes the limits of the set of possible correlations 
which a particular or set of particulars bears to other 
particulars or sets of particulars. The notion of valence is, 
as a result, essentially bound to, and, in some sense, can be 
subsumed under, the concept of vector. 
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Thus, there will be some occasions when it will be useful 
to speak of function-valences and of valence-functions of 
higher order. The distinction between these is similar to 
that between function-vectors and vector-functions of higher 
order. 'Function-valences* will apply specifically to 
the (institutive referential character of a particular to 
the set of possible correlations between that particular 
and other particulars. The term 'valence* has so far been 
used in this sense. It is important also to take note of 
coordinate-systems which provide the foundation necessary 
for identifying reference to sets of possibilities involved 
in a multiplicity of particular-contexts. Such referential 
systems will be called 'vaj.ence-functi.ons of higher order.* 
The range of possibilities constitutive of a particular 
includes (1) those which are actually involved in the first-
order functional organization of the particular, as opposed 
to (2) those which are "empty possibilities" - namely, those 
for which explicit foundation is lacking from the standpoint 
of the system entailed by a given particularThe latter can 
be called "possibilities" strictly speaking only in relation 
to another coordinating system which allows for identifying 
reference to them in terms similar to (l) above. The term 
'valence* is further restricted so as to include (l) while 
excluding the case of "empty possibilities." 
1. Cf. [MC 31-82], 
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A valence is consequently definite^ in that it delimits, 
for a given particular, a set of correlations, all of which 
meet the conditions for valid coordination. A group of valences 
of a particular forms a sort of "halo of possibilities"^, 
which constitutes a constellation of values of combination 
and correlation which hold for that particular. 
The sense in which a set of possibilities is essentially 
tied to a particular can be further defined by noting that 
the term Tpossible* refers to the logical conditions of 
valid coordination^, or again, to the ideal conditions of 
a given particular or set of particulars.^- Still more-generally, 
possibility may be taken to determine the sense of consistency 
which obtains for a system; a given group of elements 
belonging to a certain system may be, or fail to be, consistent 
with another group. The consistency boundary conditions are 
1. Following [Carn'ap 1] and [Curry 1]. 
I call a character definite if and only if a finite process is . 
given whereby, in any specific case, it may be determined whether 
that character obtains in its range of significance. 
2. After Husserl, who speaks of "halos" or "horizons" 
as "potentialites pre-tracees«" See [MC S2£] and [PCIT <^>29 Si]. 
3 . See [Reichenbach 1: 47]. 
4. "La possibility (ou realite) originaire est la 
validite, l1existence ideale dTune espece; du moins est-elle 
ainsi pleinement garantie." [RL III §31 133} 
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those which delimit the set of combinations possible within that 
system.^ The valence-constitution of a particular can there­
fore be regarded as establishing such "consistency boundary 
conditions" for the logic of structure of that particular. 
Thus, research into the grounds of possibility of any 
systematic organization will be .specifically oriented so as 
to describe those structures which provide the foundation 
for consistent identifying reference, for valid coordination. 
Transcendental analysis of this kind has in the past lacked 
a general theory of possibility, and ha3 consequently remained 
obscure in its foundations. In the main, studies of 
conditions of possibility have been restricted to descriptions 
of constitutive structures of the first-order. That is to say, 
a given system is considered with a view toward determining 
the structures which are necessary in order for the system 
itself to be possible, but the foundation necessary for the 
(second-order) possibility of these structures remains 
unclarified. 
As a result, transcendental analysis is distinguished 
according to the modal order of its framework, i.e., according 
to the order of possibility, the foundation for which is to 
be determined. The general case is expressed in the idea 
1. [Fitch 1; 75] defines E o ^ = 0[£A.q], where *0* 
here reads '...is consistent with...' and the symbol for 
possibility is *0T. Cf. also [Lewis and Langford 1: 123}. 
Husserl [RL III §31 133] similarly refers to validite as 
"conciliabilite avec elle-meme." 
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of an n-valent modal foundation, where each successive order 
of possibility is the essential foundation for its predecessors. 1 
A series of ascending modal orders then permits a kind of map 
of the sense of consistency which obtains for the corresponding 
series of transcendental systems. 
If, for a given system S0, certain structures are 
•found to condition the consistency (possibility) of SQ, then 
there is a system Si permitting reference to those consistency 
conditions. Similarly, S2 allows for identifying reference 
to the constitutive structure of S^. Sn, an n-valent modal 
system, provides the respective foundations for the logics 
of structure of systems Sn_i, ... , S£, S-j_, SQ. The valence-
constitution of Sn establishes the logical conditions of 
valid coordination for systems ..., S2, S^, SQ in the 
sense of articulating the ideal conditions for consistency 
in these syston s. 
It should be evident that the gamut of possibilities 
indissociable from a given particular, expressed in its 
valence-constitution, may be of a sort which 'is either bi-
or pluri-valent in its logic of structure. That is to say, 
two or more distinct modal values are correspondingly 
possible in the context of that particular. For example, a 
system may be bi-valent as to truth-value (where only the two 
1. Such a series forms of a kind of "nested sequence." 
Cf. [Menger 2: 32 fj. See above, p. 53n; [S. Bachelard 1: 103j. 
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values of "true" or "false" are possible), or plurivalent 
(in which case, the law of the excluded middle is inapplicable, 
and values other than "true" and "false" are admissible, e.g., 
"probability of such-and-such degree," "necessity," "possible 
Such "mixed modal chains" as "the possibility of the 
necessity of "the necessity of the possibility of,...", 
"the possibility of the possibility of the necessity of ...", 
etc., deserve some comment at this point.^ The claim (i) that 
X might be at Y (it is possible that X is at Y) is falsifiable 
in the case where X is in fact at Z, not Y. It makes no "sense" 
then to assert, unqualified, the truth of the claim that it 
is possible that X 'is at Y. On the other hand, the claim 
(ii) that it is possible that X might be (or might rather have 
been) at Y is not falsified by the mere fact that X is not at 
Y. The two assertions have the following forms: 
The lengthened modal chain in (ii) results in a restriction 
of the conditions under which the proposition can be falsified. 
The general thesis can now be put forth, that (a) the proposition 
formed through an extension of a homogeneous.chain of possibility 
1. See [Von Wright 1] and [Feys 1J. 
2. Only a brief account is permitted here. A full 
development of the problem of extended mixed and unmixed modal 
chains and foundational analysis will have to be put aside for 
later studies. Such chains are also termed "multiple modalities'. 





modifiers which prefix it, is not in contradiction with 
propositions prefixed by shorter chains of the same sort', and 
(b) such an extension of the chain of possibility-modifiers 
results in a proportionally increased restriction-of the 
conditions of falsifiability of the proposition so modified. 
In the most general case, expressed by a proposition preceded 
by' a (nested) sequence of n possibility-modifiers, the 
conditions of falsifiability of the proposition tend toward 
maximum restriction. It is interesting to note that in the 
limit, a non-falsifiable proposition results according to this 
argument 
A similar argument can be developed for necessity-
modifiers, in reverse:- the addition of necessity- modifiers 
before a given proposition entails the assertion of further 
claims which require stronger support than does the unmodified 
proposition. A proposition prefixed by n necessity-
modifiers asserts a claim weaker than that asserted by the 
same proposition prefixed by n+1 necessity-modifiers. 
1. It would be significant to show whether it can be 
argued that a chain of n possibility-modifiers is synonymous with 
the initial, unmodified proposition. (Where n cannot be reached in 
a finite number of steps.) 
2. Both arguments above can be formulated in terms of the 
following modal rules: 
(a) It is permissible when given a series 
[a a a op] (1) 
n n-1 n-2 1 
to conclude 
[ d o  D p ]  
n-1 n-2 ..... 1 
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In summary, the task of transcendental analysis is 
clarified by noting its essential relation to studies of the 
valence-constitution of the structures whose foundation is , 
to be described. The framework within which a certain kind of . 
T 
transcendental analysis is situated may have a simple or a 
very complex constitution as the orders of possibility which 
are investigated are simple or complex. It is the' goal 
of this type of analysis to render explicit the structures 
upon which consistency, and thus validity of coordination, 
depends. 
(b) It is not permissible when given a series 
of formTl) to conclude 
[o d d  cp], 
• n+1 n n-1 . o«. o.. 1 
(c) It is permissible when given a series 
W O O  « P 3  ( 2 )  
n n-1 n-2 1 
to conclude 
[0 0 0 Op]. 
n+-l n n-1 1 
(d) It is not permissible when given a series . 
. of form (2) to conclude 
C O  0  O p ] .  
n-1 n-2 1 
Both (a) and (b) follow Lewis and Langford's system S2 [Lewis 
and Langfordl:500]. Both (c) and (d) follow Fitch's rule of 
possibility introduction [Fitchl?71]» (b) and (d) respectively 
deny Lewis and Langford's system S4 [Lewis and Langfordi:501]» and 
Fitch's a.ssertion that 00p=»0p, since this requires the hypothesis 
of OP v ~0P> which is inadmissible in a plurivalent system. 
See [Fitchl=77]. 
A partial discu33ion of extended modal chains will be found 
in [Von Wright 1: esp. 6lff], 
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It will be the object of the following chapter to 
investigate how a system can provide the explic it foundation 
for its own possibility. 
Section 1.6 
THE LOGIC OF STRUCTURE OF THE SPACE 
TIME MANIFOLD 
104 
THE LOGIC OF STRUCTURE OF 
THE SPACE-TIME MANIFOLD 
The development of the notion of a system which provides 
its own transcendental foundation will involve the discussion 
of various issues: first, the logic of structure of a field 
or region of generalized form will be described. Seconds the 
notion of "relativity" will be treated in greater detail 
than was possible in previous analyses. The two problems 
of the generalized field and of the nature of relativity will 
lead into the sequence of ideas pertaining to relativistic 
recurvature, completeness, indeterminacy and complementarity, 
and continuity and discontinuity., 
By 'the logic of structure of a field of generalized form' 
is meant the formal constitutive structure of an arbitrary 
collection of particulars. For reasons given later, the 
generalized field, the necessary foundation of which is here 
to be investigated, will be called the 'space-time manifold. '•*• 
1. In this chapter, 'space', 'time', 'space-time', and 
similar terras refer to certain formal patterns of order, and 
should be taken here only in a purely logical sense. Any ( 
association of these terms with 'physical space', 'physical time', 
'physical space-time' will result in confusion. The latter will 
be discussed in § 2.1. 
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The structure of a given particular (or group of parti­
culars) involves the constitution of a set of possibilities. 
The context of the particular is determined by the aggregate 
of its features, where the necessary foundation for 
identifying reference to this aggregate is provided by the 
coordinate system from the standpoint of which identifying 
reference is made to the particular. It will further be 
recalled that all the members of this aggregate have common 
coordinates! there is a coordinate family which unifies 
the totality of explicit references to the given particular.' 
Consequently, any member of the aggregate is essentially 
constituted by reference at least to its adjacent-members, 
and belongs to a general o-series, characterized by a 
2 
sequential rule of order. 
An o-series will be said to express temporal order when 
(i) the rule of order constitutive of the o-series involves 
one successor-function-^ (ii) restricted to a single range of 
variability^' over values all of which (iii) bear similarity-
1. Pp. 30, 3Sff. 
2 .  P. 3 9 .  
3. See [Russell 4: 23f, 35], [Halmos 1: 43f, 55], 
[Kleene 1: §6 6, 7, 12, 43, 44], [Stoll 1: 57, 298f]. This 
function, in connection with temporal order, can be taken 
as based upon the operation of '...less than...', or, what 
is closely related, that of .earlier than.. Cf. 
[Goodman 2: 132, 2&4f] and[Carnap 1: 7&, 108]. 
4 .  40f. 
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relations to one another. When these conditions are met, it 
is possible to describe certain members of the series as members 
which "come before" other members which "come after®" It is 
clear from the definition of an o-serie3 that it is essentially 
temporal# 
An o-series will be said to express spatial order when 
(if) the o-series expresses implicitly or explictly temporal 
order"*" and (iil) involves one or more successor-functions 
in addition to and other than that included under (i')» where 
each successor-function is restricted to a range of variability 
over values which'(iiiJ) bear similarity-relations to one 
another, and which satisfy the further condition (iv?) that 
with each additional successor-function under (ii*) is 
associated a different range of variability such that no 
value in one range of variability is also a value in another 
range of variability. 
It follows that both (logical) space and (logical) time 
are order schemata.2 
A particular or group of particulars belonging to a given 
o-series "inherits" the order-structure of the o-series* It is 
clear that a particular is possible if and only if the o-series 
1. The view that spatial order involves temporal order has 
been held by many authors, and in particular those of the Kantian 
tradition. For a more recent example, see [Whitehead 2: 336 j 
and [Mehlberg 1J. 
2. "...space and time become what is called in modern 
logistics special instances of serial order which are generated 
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to which it belongs is also possible. Thus, all particulars 
are temporally ordered (all o-series have a temporal order), 
It follows that the structure of time is one with the 
structure of any group of particulars. The structure of space 
is one with the structure of any group of particulars the 
constitution of which involves valences of various distinct 
kinds (i.e., a plurality of sets of possibilities such that 
for any two sets there is no common modal value).^ 
The order-structure of a particular is expressed in 
the form of the o-series to which the particular belongs® 
Whether or not the nature of the o-series is temporal, or 
spatialj as well, the form of the o-series is in part 
dependent upon the successor-function which determines the 
series. The role which the successor-function play3 in 
the determination of the form of an o-series can be thought 
of in the following manner: the successor-function guarantees 
the successive applicability of a rule which describes the 
character of the "next" element in the series. As already 
indicated, an o-series is recursively defined, that is, an 
by successive applications of relation forms to a manifold of 
parts." [Buchanan 1: 124] Of. [Reichenbach 1: S], [Garnap 1: 
§$ 67, 1073. 
1. The argument here is reminiscent of Wittgenstein®s 
proposition that "we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects 
outside space or temporal objects outside time...." [Wittgenstein 1: 
2.0121] MEach thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states 
of affairs. ...I cannot imagine the thing without the space." 
[Wittgenstein 1: 2.013], 
I take the opportunity here to point out that the sets of 
possibilities mentioned above provide the foundation for what 
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element or set of elements of the series is given, together 
with a procedure which determines the next term out of 
its predecessor."*" An o-series is termed 'recursive' when a 
recursive defition is constitutive of the series. 
* 
Now, 'relativity', as already indicated, is to 
be interpreted in the sense of 'relative to a certain 
framework or definitional system'. In this sense, 
a given logic of structure is said to be relative 
3 to the group of particulars over which it i.s covariant. 
are otherwise known as "forms of dimensional order". A 
2-dimensional 'spatial manifold will have two such sets, a 
3-dimensional spatial manifold will have three such sets, etc. 
1. "The definition is first given for the simplest 
cases..., and then, assumig it to be given for cases of a 
certain complexity, the definition is given for cases of 
greater complexity which in some sense presuppose the 
definition or definitions for the less complex ones. The 
definitions for the more complex cases presuppose or refer 
back to or recur to the definitions for the simpler ones. 
In this way all possible cases are covered." [Martin 1: 4J 
On recursive definition, see [Curry 1: 11, 57]> 
[Wittgenstein 1: 4»1273.]» [Tarski 2: 63], [Kleene 1: § 43]* 
It is evident that recursion, iteration, and re-identifiability 
are closely linked. For several remarks on this and 
related matters, cf. [Strawson 1], [LFLT 6 11 59; £ 13c 75; 
£ 74 254; Appendice II y 1 407J* [S. Bachelard.1: o9j. 
2. See [Reichenbach 3b: 29 5 J -
3. Cf. p. 81. Similarly, notions of serniotic are 
contextually relative. See [Ajdukiewicz 1: lj. 
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Accordingly, the phrase 'is relative tof refers to an essential 
functional dependence-relation, such that if two particulars 
are so related» a projection results when an identifying 
reference is made to either out of essential connection to 
the other.Particulars related in this vray are essentially 
relative to one another®'2 
appelons 
i-.» °U 
1. Iiusserl [RL II.2 iii 6§ 3-4 12ff] speaks of "une 
dependance fonctionelle,1" but he does not bring the notion to 
precision» In a somewhat different context, he speaks of 
"parties dependentes": "Quand une partie se trouve dans un 
ensemble regi par une loi ideale et non simplement do fait9 elle 
est dependentel cars, dire qu'un tel ensemble est r&gi par une 
loi si^nifie seulement qu'une partie de telle ou telle espece„ 
quant a son essence pure3 en vertu d'une loi0 ne peut exister 
qu'en connexion avec certaines parties de telles ou telles 
©spaces correspondantes*" [RL II«2 iii & 10 34] "Nous ] 
dependant dans I a tout Gfeln Ganses] et. relativement a lu. , 
relativement a 1"ensemble total de contenus determine par Gs 
chacun de ses contenus partiels qui ne peut exister que cornme 
partie9 et cela seulement en tant que partie d?une espece de 
tout qui soit representee dans cet ensemble." [EL II.1 ii § 41 
254f]0 [RL II.2 iii 6 1, 8$ 6 3» 11J § 4* 15; § l6f, 16; 
§ 7» 23? § 13. 42; $ 14, 45; $ 22 (I**6 ed.) 334], and [RL II.2 
iv,§ 7.104]-. Cf. [ Stumpf 1: 113]. 
Note should be made that relativity^ in the context of 
the present researchs has nothing to do with a provisional 
character of analysis. There is nothing provisional in analyses 
of relativistic constitution. The opposite use of.the term 
'relativity' is to be found* e.g.* in [RL I 6 34 1243 and 
[LFLT § 102 360]. 
2. Husserl likewise speaks of "le conditionnement reciproque 
des correlatifs en general." [RL II.2 iii 9 11 3&] Related is 
his concept of "un tout": "Par tout nous entendons un ensemble 
de contenus qui admettent une fondation unitaireo et cela sans 
le secours d*autres contenus." [RL II.2 iii ^21 61] 
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Insofar as a system contains the necessary grounds for 
its possibility, the system has a relativistic constitution. 
The question which claims a direct path to an investigation 
of relativistic constitution is the question, 'What structures 
provide for the possibility of self-reference, or again, for 
the possibility of self-evidence .or auto-justification?'•*" In 
particular, the formal basis for both self-identity and evidence 
in the formal mathematical disciplines is to be found in 
2 
relativistic constitution. 
.It will be recalled that earlier^ the condition was set 
down that "reference to A implies that A is identifyingly 
referred to from a standpoint other than that of the particular-
context to which A belongs®" The point has been reached where 
1. In [LFLT (e.go;, Intro. 4)]» Husserl speaks of "1*esprit 
de 1' au.t o .i u st if i c at ion critique." He views logic as "l'auto 
explication .de la raison pure elie-memo» ou pour parler idealement, 
la science dans laquelle la raison pure theorique accomplit une 
prise de•conscience de soi parfaite et s'objective pnrfaitement 
dans un systeme de principes. Dans cette prise de conscience, la 
raison pure, et done la logique, est renvoyee a elle-meme; l'auto 
explicitation de la raison pure est elle-merne manifestation 
rationnelle et est justement sous la d^pentfance des principes qui 
trouvent la leur explicitation." [LFLT § 6 43-443 
2. The justification of this statement relies, in part, 
upon the discussions of self-identify and of truth and evidence 
in §§ 1.3 and 2«4» 
3. See p. 3S. 
Ill 
this condition will no longer apply. Unlike the I-J system • 
which requires a more extensive system K for explicit reference 
to relations obtaining between elements of system-I and system-J, 
self-reference is possible only in a system for which the 
above condition does not hold. 
From the standpoint of an I-J-IC system, the sub-systems 
* 
are said to be embedded in & system (or systems) of higher order. 
Self-reference or reflexivity is therefore studied from an 
intrinsic point of view,, without reference to an embedment-
system. When a nested sequence of elements of a particular 
are given in an intrinsically determined system, reflexive 
references can be associated with these elements. 
The logic of structure of a reflexive system consequently 
does not in any sense entail a meta-contextual constitution.3 
, i . . i 
However, due to various paradoxes which can be derived in 
self-referent systems, considerable research has gone into 
formulating ways whereby these forms of inconsistency can be 
avoided. The theory of types and semantic metatheory are the 
1. Although a reflexive system can itself be included as 
a relatively independent sub-system of a more extensive system. 
This case will not be significant in the discussion which 
follows. 
2. This is akin to Gauss7 studies of surfaces without 
reference to a higher dimensional embedment-system. See [Schilpp 
2 : II 461J and [Tietze 1: 322], 
3. Again, in analogy to Gauss' ;work, the application of the 
concept of (space) metric does not require an embedment in a 
higher order dimensional space.. 
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strongest examples. The conclusions of both areas of investi­
gation has been to establish criteria by means of which a 
hierarchy of systems of varying referential richness can be 
defined. 
The restrictive effect of both theories has been noted 
by many researchers in the field. The theory of types would 
exclude important fields of research in higher mathematics, 
while the theory itself has had its share of criticism. Studies 
in semantic metatheory point toward the possible inconsistency 
of any system^ which is semantically self-referent.^ 
• Attempts to avoid the restrictive effects of the'theory 
of types have not as yet reached a clear and effective solution.^" 
1. With regard to the theory of types, cf. [Russell 10: 
I, IIJ. On semantic metatheory, see [Tarski 1] and [Carnap 4, 
5,  6] .  
2. Within which arithmetic can be formulated. 
3. The argument [Tarski 1: l64f], [Kemeny 1: 202J, [Suppes 
1: 11J shows for a variety of languages that if they permit 
semantic self-reference (unconditionally and without qualification 
by restrictive rules in the language - and this, I believe, is a 
condition which deserves more than the slight attention given it), 
then a (semantic) paradox can be formulated in the. language, 
rendering the language inconsistent. Thus the expected result: 
"[IJn order to formulate a comprehensive semantic theory for 
a given language we must employ a second, stronger (or richer) 
language." [Kemeny 1: 202] Note the way this is expressed in 
[Suppes 1: 11; my italicsj: The semantic paradoxes arise "from 
having available in the language expressions for referring to 
other expressions in the language. Any language with such 
unlimited means of expression is perforce inconsistent." 
4. On the improvement of type theory, see [Ramsey 1] and, 
more recently, [Fitch 1J. 
To my knowledge, little attempt has yet been made to further 
investigate Tarski's results described in the preceding note. See' 
n. 3> P» 113* 
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Yet there ha3 been no convincing argument against the notion of 
a theory about the general nature of theories, or against the 
idea of a science of the general nature of sciences.-*- Such 
a theory of theory or science of science is self-referent 
2 insofar as it is part of its own subject-matter. 
Now, of necessity such a theory concerning the essential 
structure of all theories will be capable of referring to 
its own semantic concepts (those constitutive of any theory) 
and is to that extent semantically self-referent. The 
suggestion may then be made that when certain aeraantic principle 
are established which, conjoined to this sytem of maximum 
theoretic generality* successfully avoid the (semantic) paradoxe 
a consistent system will resuit.3 
1. In this connection, the following objection to the 
theory of types is of interest; "...the theory of types requires 
for its own statement the sort of inclusive generality that it 
treats as meaningless. It is therefore self-referentially 
inconsistent." [Fitch 1: 225]_ 
2. In this, I follow [Fitch 1: 228]; "...a theory about 
the general nature of theories can have no ordinal-level.... 
Theories having no ordinal level will be said to be 'vertical' 
or 'non-ordinal' theories® 
"If a theory is included in its own subject matter* we say 
that it is a self-referential theory." Such a theory concerning 
theories in general i3 articulated on the "level of maximum 
theoretical generality." [Fitch 1: 223] 
Husserl expresses the same idea, in a slightly different 
fashion: "Que la science qui se rapporte a toute les sciences 
en ce qui concerne leur forme, s'applique aussi eo ipso a elle-
m©me, voilli qui sonne d'une maniere paradoxaie, mais qui ne 
recele aucune espece d'incompatibility. ...II en est ae m&me, 
d'une maniere generale9 de la regulation de la logique pure par 
rapport a elle-meme." [RL I § 42 174] 
3» My reasons for considering this suggestion sound are 
here very briefly outlined! According to [Tarski 1: 402] 
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The logic of structure of such a reflexive system is 
therefore of a totally intrinsic kind# i.e., self-reference in 
(1) if a completely formalizable language is made to contain 
its own semantics, within which the usual logical laws hold, 
an inconsistent system results. He further maintains that 
(2) .fry en with respect to formalized l^npiuaffes of infinite 
order, the consistent and correct use of the concept of truth 
fTa semantic concept ) ]'is rendered possible by including this 
concept in the system of primitive concepts of the metalanguage 
find determining its fundamental properties by means of the 
axiomatic motb.od('Tthe question whether the theory of truth 
established in this way contains no contradiction remains for the 
present undecided)[Tarski 1: 266j his italics] 
(3) are in a position to define the concept of 
truth for any [formalized] language of finite or infinite order, 
provided w© take as the basis for our investigations a meta­
language of an order which is at least greater by 1 than 
that of the language studied (an essential part is played here 
by the presence of variables of indefinite order in the 
metalanguage)." [Tarski 1: 272] 
Three points may be made in response to Tarski5s claim 
(1); (A) If, in analogy to (2), certain well-known semantic 
principles, constructed in order to avoid derivation of semantic 
paradoxesj, are included in the system of primitive operations 
of the metalanguage® it seems possible that a seraantically 
self-referent system may result which preserves consistency. 
(What I have in mind here is this; just as the construction of 
Godel's proof suggests the possibility of "mirroring" meta-
mathematical statements about a sufficiently comprehensive 
formal system in the system itself, so it may prove possible to 
mirror or map the seraantically restrictive principles in a 
sufficiently comprehensive, self-referent formal meta-system.) 
Cf. [Nagel & Newman 1: 63].) 
(B) If, in analogy to (3)» variables of indefinite order, 
which, as it were, "run through" all possible'orders, are used 
in conjunction with a seraantically self-referent system of the 
sort described in (A), it is possible that a seraantically self-
referent system will result which preserves consistency. (It 
is interesting to note in passing that it is possible to 
construct the theory of sets and the whole of classical mathematics 
on the basis provided by such a language of variables of indefinite 
order. See [Skolem 3]> [Zermelo 1], and [Tarski 1: 271nJ.) 
(C) Tarski1s claim (1) holds only if the following 
conditions are metz (i) the language or system must be capable 
of complete formalization (see [Tarski 1: 166],for a characteri­
zation of this concept), (ii) the usual logical laws must hold in 
the language, (iii) the claim (1) holds over the entire group of 
languages within which arithmetic can be expressed. Now, it is 
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the system necessitates recourse to no higher order embedment-
system(s). 
at present known that it is impossible to give a complete 
formalization of advanced branches of logic.'(Cf. [Kemeny 
1: 204]).)_ Second* it is possible that the usual 
logical laws (e.g., of the system of Principia) hold over 
only parts of the languages while they do not hold over 
the language, considered generally. (This point I hope to treat 
at some length in connection with a complex field of research 
to which, for want of an available terra, I refer to by the 
name 'dimensionology.1) Third, condition (iii) has, to my 
knowledge, not yet been given rigorous proof. 
By way of further support for the suggestion considered 
here, I take the opportunity to note at this point the work 
undertaken in [Martin 1 ]. In connection with Tarski*s 
claims (1), (2), and (3) above, Martin remarks: "Nothing that has 
been said here rules out the possibility that a semantical 
meta-language of another kind could be constructed in which 
the semantical paradoxes would not arise but which could be 
interpreted in such a way as to contain its own truth-concept." 
[Martin 1: I3S] To this endp Martin develops the idea of 
"non-translational semantics": "Because of its generality 
the method of constructing [a non-translational semantical 
meta-language] ...can even provide in a certain sense a 
consistent semantics of itself. [A3 ...non-translational 
semantical meta-language .i.can be formulated so as to 
contain its own semantical truth-concept." [Martin 1: 223] 
"That the truth-concept [for this language] ...is definable 
within itself might appear to contradict the results of 
Tar ski. ...that, roughly speaking, the semantical truth-concept 
of a language is not definable within that language, if the 
language is consistent. But Tarski®s result is concerned 
exclusively with systems of translational semantics.... 
Within non-translational semantics ...an essential step in 
Tarski*s argument cannot be carried out. Hence there is no real 
conflict here with Tarski's result." [Martin 1: 225-26] For 
further details on non-translational semantics and related 
problems, cf. [Martin 1? 179-212 and 254-262], [Fitch 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 6], [ Myhill 1], 
For a brief account of the history and literature of 
semantic self-referent antinomies, see [ Schaff 1: 
Chap. II]. 
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It should be noted that self-reference can be recursively 
defined in a reflexive system so that a hierarchy of 
reflexive references of ascending ordors can be determined. 
A given function f(x) is reflexively referred to, in 
symbols *REFLX^(f(x))?• A reflexive sequence will have the 
form1 
« 
REFLX-^fU)), REFLX2[REFLX1(f(x))], ... . 
A sequence of this kind is capable of indefinite reflexive 
iteration. The prefix 'REFLX* is termed a 'recursive-reflexive 
operator*. Particulars instances in a reflexive sequence are 
said to have a reflexive signature.2 
1. An alternate reflexive notation is given in 
- [ Reichenbach 5: i£6ff]. See also [Wittgenstein Is 3 *3333• 
2. Husserl refers to sequences of similar forms as' 
parts, parts of parts, etc., he establishes first-, second-, 
..., parts, as follows [RL II.2 iii 68 1&-19, pp. 53» 57ff» § 
- <,#8, 
He symbolizes "1'operation d'objectivation representative" 
ass 
0,  V(0) ,  V[V(0)] ,  . . .  ,  
where *0* [Objekt] is an arbitrary object,r*V(0)' [Vorstellung], 
the representation of 0, etc. [RL II.2 v 9 39 300] 
A series of representations is likewise expressed in the 
form [RL III §19 92fl: 
ViCVg),  V1 [V2 (V3 ) ] ,  . . .  .  
"Toute loi opsratoire porte...en soi tine loi d'iteration. 
Cette legalite d'operation iterable traverse tout le domaine. du 
jugement et rend possible la construction par iteration de 
l'infinite des formes possibles en general et cela au moyen de 
formes fondamentales et d'operations fondamentales qu'il faut 
etablir." [LFLT 9 13c 75] See also [LFLT § 74 254; Appendice II 
117 
It will be recalled that the vector-structure of a 
particular-context is such that if A#B,C relate to the coordinates 
of the particular* A^> B.BdC.CZ>A«^ Now, th© particular-context 
is said to be relativisticallv self-enclosed only if the context 
is so structured as to permit completely intrinsic recursive 
self-reference. Consequently, relativistic self-enclosure# 
or relativistic recurvature, can readily be characterized as 
a property of groups which are closed in the fundamental 
topological sense. 
Since the valence-structure of a particular expresses 
the set of possibilities indissociable from that particular, 
it is at once evident that this "halo of possibilities" must 
also meet the condition of relativistic recurvature if the 
given particular comprises or belongs to a relativistically 
6 1 4073 and [S. Bachelard 1: 46]. 
By way of illustration, he gives the following: " D*abord, 
je per90is quelque chose9 ensuite, je me represent© que je 
percois quelque chosej, troisiemement, je me represente de 
nouveau que je me represente que je percois, etc, [Notes] 
Naturellement, tout cela ne doit pas etre compris dans un 
sens empirico-psychologique. II sTp,git.«»de possib'ilites ^  
aprloriques. fondees dans I1essence pure et que nous apprahendons 
comme telles dans une evidence apodictinue. [RL II.2 v § 39 301; 
ray italicsj The strict subject-matter in this passage will .later 
be dealt with explicitly, § 2.4# 
1* See p« 30* 
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recurved system. A relativistically recurved valence-structure 
involves a modal organization wherein the orders of possibility 
constitutive of the system form a nested sequence - where each 
order of possibility is the necessary foundation for the pre­
ceding orders. Such a sequence is consequently relativistically 
constituted and will be termed a 'modal convergence sequence' 
An n-valent modal^ convergence sequence is essential to the 
logic of structure of a general relativistically self-6nclosed 
system. 
-The present discussion set out to investigate the 
foundation of a field or region of generalized form. To this 
end* temporal and spatial order schemata wem described.. 
The recursive nature of o-series was indicated. Finally, 
the relativistic and intrinsic constitution of a reflexive 
recurved system was noted. ' It is now possible to define the 
space-time manifold as follows? The space-tijroe manifold 
constitutes a general system which has the properties of 
1. A topological model of a convergence sequence is 
found in a series of circles concentric about the center-point 
of a torus and which freely traverse its suirfkces -If each 
circle bears similarity-relations to its adjacent circles, 
the series of circles may be regarded as "reoarving" over 
the torus-surface; any one circle which "expands" and "contracts 
in its passage over the surface eventually reaurns to its 
starting point. Another illustration is provided by the 
generation of a linear function on the surface of a moebius 
strip? the linear series is to.pologically clssed, returning 
upon itself. Series of this kind are called ^cyclic series' 
after Russell-[Russell 2: 3^-41 J and [Russell 2: 205f and 
passim,]. 
2. Cf. p. 99. 
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re3.afrivAsfr.ig fipnafriifrutftpn» recuEs;i.<?n» rft£lmv.1.fry and 
re3-at4y;llgfrlg self-gflglpgure, providing that its logic of 
structure permits identifying reference to spatial and 
temporal particulars a to which logic of structure such 
particulars are essentially relative. 
Thus, the valence-structure<of an arbitrary spatial 
or temporal particular establishes a matrix of possibilities 
which is such as to situate the particular within a system 
the modal structure of which is recursive and reflexive. 
This.gives the result that for a system I, the possibility 
of an I-J system is necessarily guaranteed; for an I-J system, 
the possibility of an I-J-K system is necessarily guaranteed® 
and so on indefinitely.x The vector-valence structure of the 
space-time manifold is, then, such that every particular 
of a given context has a referential constitution which 
intimates and recapitulates the constitutive structure 
common to all particulars isomorphic v/ith the first. As has 
already been noted, the set of possibilities established by 
the valence-structure of a particular is relativistically 
self-enclosed: the collection of correlations and combinations, 
consistent with the logic of structure of the coordinate-system 
1. Seepp. 9#ff. 
2. This is a somewhat more precise formulation of the 
analogous case where a coordinate is said to involve a "germinal 
duplication" of the overall coordinate system essential to 
the coordinate's possibility. See p. 13* 
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proper to that particular, is essentially relative to the' 
functional organization of-that particular,3. Put differently, 
the essential nature of the space-time manifold is expressed 
O 
in the manner whereby systems of possibilities are organized. 
It is once again evident that a projection can be deemed 
a misconstruction only relative to a context which, as has 
been indicated, has a relativistically recurved logic of 
structure. Thus, a projective misconstruction can be said 
to involve self-referential inconsistency^, in the fullest 
sense of the term. 
1. "...il y a une sphere^idealement fermee de transformations 
possibles de chaque forme donnee en formes toujours nouvelles. La 
possibility ideal'e des formes nouvelles sur la base du meme 
materiau est garantie par les lois "analytiques", sous cette 
condition a prioria dont nous venons de parler." [RL III 9 62 
229, there italicized] 
"Zuerst ist folgender Satz klar und ungezweifelt gev/isss 
dass, wenn das Bedingte gegeben ist, uns eben dadurch ein 
Regressus in der Reihe aller Bedingungen zu demselben aufgegeb.en 
sei; denn dieses bringt schon der Begriff des Bedingten so mit 
sich, dass dadurch etwas auf eine.Bedingung und, wenn diese 
wiederum bedingt ist, auf eine entferntere Bedingung und so 
durch alle Glieder der Reihe bezogen vjird. Dieser Satz ist also 
analytisch und erhebt sich Qber alle Furcht vor einer transzenden-
talen Kritik. Er ist ein logisches Postulat der Vernunft: 
diejenige VerknQpfung eines Begriffs mit seinen Bedingungen durch 
den Verstand zu verfolgen und so v/sit als mSglich fortzusetzen, 
die schon dem Begriffe selbst anhangt." [Kant: Kritik, ed. B, 526-7] 
2. "Da3 gesamte raumliche-zeitliche Weltall [ist] der 
Gesamtbereich mSglicher Erfahrung."[Husserl, q. in Ricoeur 3: 40n] 
3. Cf. [Fitch l: 219]. 
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Since the order-schemata of space and time are essentially 
relative to the logic of structure of the space-time manifold, 
it is clear that to "disconnect" these schemata from that 
logic of structure will entail a projective misconstruction. 
Thus, it is impossible (inconsistent) to call into question 
either the temporal or the spatial character of the space-time 
manifold from a non-intrinsic standpoint. To inquire either 
into what came (tenseless) "before" (a time-order relative 
concept), or into what is "outside" (a space-order relative 
concept) the space-time manifold, is essentially projective. 
Therefore, there can be no sense to any proposition concerning 
space-order "outside" the space-time manifold, nor can there 
be sense to any proposition to the effect that the space-time 
manifold is "inside" (again, a space-order relative concept) 
another system. The projective nature of such propositions 
is a manifestation of the relativistic self-enclosure of the 
space-time manifold. 
In the same manner as the space-time manifold provides 
the necessary foundation for possible temporal and spatial 
identifying reference, the relativistic recurvature of the 
manifold provides the necessary foundation, as claimed earlier, 
for self-evidence. The relation fundamental to self-evidence 
is termed "autoconcordance'A. ibr the reason that a truth-
functional string of propositions, when logically interconnected 
1. After Husserl: "tautologies...sont en guelque^sorte 
des systemes de la conseguence qui se suffisent a eux-m^mes, qui 
n'ont besoin d*aucune premisse en dehors de leurs premisses 
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by a given set of proof axioms and operations, forms a kind of 
cyclic structure which, as it were, re-establishes, with self-
evidence, the first proposition(s) of the string.Since the 
structure of the space-time manifold is expressed in the manner -
of organization of systems of possibilities, the space-time 
manifold provides the foundation for possible truth-values. 
Thus the basis not only for self-evidence, but also for the 
other truth-values, is to be found in the logic of structure 
of this manifold.2 
Earlier^, it was shovm that the order-structure of a 
particular has the form of the o-series constitutive of the 
particular. Since o-series are either temporal or temporal 
and spatialf it can also be argued that the structure of 
"space-time" as an order-schema of the space-time manifold is 
one with the structure of any particular or group of particulars. 
posees." [LFLT Appendice III § 4 432] Husserl refers to the 
structure of tautologies with the term ®autoconcordance.* [LFLT 
Appendice IIIJ 
1. "It is always possible to construe logic in such a 
way that every proposition is its own proof." [Wittgenstein i: 
"Every tautology itself shows that it is a tautology." Wittgenstein 1: 
6.127] At the same time, however, self-reference does not 
appear possible in Wittgenstein lj. See [Wittgenstein 1: 3-332, 4«442]« 
2. It should by now be clear that it is essential to the 
possibility of relativistic recurvature, and thus to the possibility 
of transcendental analysis in general, that 0 P and "Op cannot 
both be together. (On the relation * ...is together with...*, see 
[Goodman 1: Chap VI §63, 5; Chap VII $2]. "The principle 
that 0(pA~p) but ~0(0 pa« Op) will be called in later 
analyses 'tho principle of complementarity.f 
The question concerning truth and self-evidence will be 
treated at greater length in § 2.4• 
3* See p. 106. 
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It follows froxa the relativistic constitution of the space-
time manifold that the order-schema of space, time, and space-
time are essentially inseparable from the form of organization 
of particulars. The dissociation of any one or more of these 
order-schemata from the structure of any particular or group 
of particulars leads to projective misconstruction. Thus* 
the space-time manifold is entailed, provided identifying 
reference to a particular or group of particulars is possible.^* 
Time, space, and space-time are simply the expression of 
possible relations between particulars.? 
It would be erroneous to consider the space-time manifold 
an absolutely delimited system in the sense that either (a) there 
are possibilities the foundation of which is not provided by 
the space-time manifold or (b) there are no such possibilities. 
Since the manifold is relativistically recurved, there is 
necessarily entailed the impossibility of identifying reference 
to the manifold where such reference itself would require a 
higher-order embedment system. (Self-reference, as well as 
1. An assertion of V/ittgenstein®s3 although made in a 
different connection, bears some similarities to this statement: 
"A proposition determines a place in logical space. The exis­
tence of this logical space is guaranteed by the mere existence 
of the constituents - by the existence of the proposition with 
sense." [Wittgenstein 1: 3*4] 
2. Similar is Whitehead's argument that "space and time 
are merely the exhibition of relations between events." [White­
head 2: 335] For A. Einstein, the structure of space-time 
is the structure of the scientific object of knowledge. Cf. 
[ S c h i l p p  2 ] ,  
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identifying reference of the kind which requires a higher-
order embedment-system, are valid forms of reference relative 
to the space-time manifold.) It is clear that both (a) and 
(b) must therefore be essentially excluded# 
Thus, relativistic recurvature can only be established 
on an intrinsic basis. The formalization of a relativistically 
recurved system"1* will not have tiro property of "completeness" 
in the sense of (a) above. Neither, however, can a formalization 
of the space-time manifold be considered "incomplete" in the 
1. It is at present open to question whether the space-
time manifold can be completely formalised. 
In this connection, it would be of more than academic 
interest to. investigate the possibility of a formalized 
system of "de-projective logic." Such a system .would be made 
to satisfy the following conditions? First, it must be such 
as to involve the impossibility of deriving projective 
formulations. Second, it must be open to the (intrinsic) 
expansion of systems of possibility„ Third, it must be such 
as to involve recurvature upon the contents of analysis, as 
these contents occur at all stages of development. This 
recurvature formally recapitulates the constitutive structure 
common to all sub-systems at any level of analysis. This 
recapitulation must allow for the deduction of the constitutive, 
coordinative principles from any one sub-system. (This third 
requirement places the proposed formal system of logic in 
close association with foundational research in projective geometry, 
and thus also with the special systems of euclidean and non-
euclidean geometry.) Fourth, its formal structure-will be such 
as to disallow injunctions against possible regress £c| indefinite. 
Nevertheless, these properties of relative formal "openness" will 
be restricted by the heimetical condition of recurvature. Fifth, 
any formulation of recurvature will necessarily be tautologous, 
from the standpoint of bi-valent, as well as, in general, 
n-valent modal logics. Its foundation includes the theoretical / 
basis for systems of modal logic. (See n. 1, p. 120)' 
Sixth, the system requires the use of self-referent symbolism. 
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sense of (b) above. What c^n be maintained is that the manifold 
provides the necessary foundation for a plurality of systems 
which may themselves be arranged in whatever consistent 
hierarchy may be significant. For example, a certain formal 
property, P, is essentially relative to a system S. It may 
be possible to show that for a s§t of propositions, P cannot 
be.shown to obtain. Yet, in a second system, S*, it may be 
possible to show P* for that set of propositions. Insofar 
as in one system the property P cannot be shown to hold, 
where in a second (richer) system a "similar" property P' can 
be shown to hold, the first system has been called incomplete.f 
In the example-*-, what it is important to observe is that a 
1. The example is a caricature of Godelfs proof, where 
S is a system capable of expressing arithmetic, iPt stands 
for 'provable in S*, Ss is a metasystem for discussing S, 
and 1 P® 8 stands for the (semantic) property 1 truth 
For convenience, GSdel's incompleteness theorem is 
informally summarized and commented upon: GSdel demonstrated 
a limitation inherent in axiomatic method. He showed that any 
axiomatic system, of a finite number of axioms, capable of 
containing arithmetic (e.g., the system of [Russell and ANYJs 
Principia]) is incomplete. In other words, given any consistent 
set (a; of arithmetical axioms* or (b) of axioms from which the, 
former enn he derived„ there a. re true nrithrneticrl propositions 
(or true propositions of higher or dor in cas^ (b)~) which cannot 
be derived from the set of axioms. (A theory T has the property 
of absolute (Post) consistency if and only if there is at least 
one proposition S of T which is not a theorem.) In this sense, 
GSdel argued the set of axioms is incomplete. 
I should like to consider for a moment the place "true* 
occupies in the above underscored statement. GSdel argues that 
given a set of consistent axioms of at least the complexity 
level of the system of arithmetic, there are true propositions 
which are undecidable as regards their truth or falsity on 
the basis of the axioms alone. How, then, is the ntruth" 
of such a proposition determined? Although not provable in 
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group of systems of different orders is involved: a system S, 
the given axiomatic system, it is nevertheless called a 
true proposition. How is this to be understood? 
Godel answers as follows: although the proposition is 
undecidable (a proposition S of a theory T is undecidable if 
and only if neither S nor ~S is a theorem) if the axioms of 
the system are consistent, it is possible to show through 
meta-math^.?.tleal reasoning<. that this proposition is true. 
For the force in saying that the system is inoormlote in 
GSdelTs sense rests upon knowing both that the proposition 
is trues and that it cannot be demonstrated true (or false) 
by recourse only to the axioms of the system. 
The force in saying of a system that it is incomplete 
in GSdel's sense is weakened* when the follov/ing condition 
is granted: (i) the truth (or falsity) of a proposition is 
essentially relative to possible moans for deciding its truth 
(or falsity) which belong to the system(s) in which the 
roposition appears. Let p-|_ be a proposition not provable 
undecidable as to truth-value) in system S-j • Then (i) gives 
the result that it is meaningless to bring into question the 
truth (or falsity) of p^ in relation to S^» There may be 
another system S2 from the standpoint of which p-^ may be 
demonstrated to be "a true proposition,." But this establishes 
only the truth of p^ in relation to S2» but is the truth of 
p-j_ in relation to S2 sufficient ground for asserting the 
incompleteness of SThat p^ can have no truth-value in 
does not suggest that S-^ is "incomplete"; rather the truth 
(of falsity) of p-j_ in has no meaning. 
This is to say "true" in the sense of provable-in-S^ (call 
this Tl) is not equivalent to "true" in the sense of "provable-
i n - S 2 "  ( c a l l  t h i s  T 2 ) .  
Consequently, GSdel's incompleteness theorem can be 
translated to read "given any consistent set of arithmetical 
axioms (or axioms of higher order)# there are propositions whose 
truth is undecidable on the basis of these axioms# but which may 
be shown true in a second, but different^ system." S-j_ is there­
fore not incomplete in the sense that there exist propositions 
which cannot be shorn true (Tl). 
(Strictly speaking, this gives the following result: p^ 
is not shown to be unprovable in S-^, but rather to be unprovable 
as a proposition in in So. where S^ is a sub-system, is 
included, can be "mirrored," in meta-system S2» Therefore, there 
are.systems for which 'true® is characterized in various senses, 
such that certain propositions can be demonstrated "true" in 
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a second system Sf, where P is linked to P? by a similarity-
relation, plus a metametasystem, from the standpoint of which 
the relations between the two systems are considered. 
A formalization of the space-time manifold would$ it 
appears* be of an essentially indefinite order."'" The manifold 
provides the necessary foundation for determinations of relative 
formal completeness and relative formal incompleteness, but 
a formalization of the manifold cannot itself be said to be 
either "complete" or "incomplete" in the given senses of the 
terms..2 
A like point can be made concerning the concepts of 
continuity and discontinuity® The logic of structure of the 
one systems according to truth-criteria (provability-criteria) 
outlined for that system, which cannot be demonstrated "true" 
in another system, according to a different set of truth-
criteria. Put in another way, there exist systems in which 
a proposition P can be shown to be unprovable in a less 
inclusive system.) 
On Godel*s incompleteness theorems cf» [Godel 1], 
[Nagel & Newman 1], [Mostowski 1], [Tarski „ 
is. 276 and passim], [LFLT §§.31-33® 131-134]® [Ideen I § "72 134ff] 
[S. Baqhelard Is.109-122, 201], [Ladriere ij. 
1. On the role of variables of indefinite order, see 
n.3, p. 113. 
2. Thus, G5delJs incompleteness theorem holds for 
finite systems capable of expressing arithmetic;, the 
foundation for which is provided by the space-time manifold. 
Strictly speaking, Godel"s theorem has no meaningful 
application to the manifold itself. 
i2a 
space-time manifold provides the basis for continuity and 
differentiability through its zonal structure.-1* Determination 
of zonal continuity or discontinuity^ requires for its 
possibility an embedment-system of higher order from the 
standpoint of which coordinate zone structure can be 
indicated. It results that the space-time manifold cannot 
itself be said to be ''continuous" or "discontinuous*" The 
space-time manifold constitutes the foundation for the 
determination of continuity or discontinuity in the functional 
organization of systems of possibilities,, while the question 
as to whether the manifold is itself "continuous" or 
"discontinuous" is projective.^ 
It should be further noted that the recursive nature of 
the logic of structure of the space-time manifold is such 
that when an element or set of elements of a series is given, 
the series may be continued according to rule«A (1) A given • 
particular may be explicitly determined by a set of such 
elements, E, together with a "fringe" of explicit indeterminacy.^ 
1. See ip. 
2. Which occurs whenever "zonal singularities" are found, 
i.e., whenever an elements although included within a zonal 
series, does not "overlap its neighboring zones. Cf. [Goodman 
21 44] •. 
3. Compare Bridgman's operational!st results in [Bridgman 
4: 191]. 
4. See s>. 107f • 
5. See p. 2d. 11 1' firid£termination ,...n ,a pas la signi­
fication d'une privation, mais devrait designer un caractere 
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On the other hand* (2) a given particular may be explicitly 
determined by a set of elements containing E, and including 
elements not in E, correlated with the undetermined in (1). 
• When the particular in context (1) and the particular in 
context (2) refer to the same particular, the first context 
relative to the second may be termed 'incomplete'.- But 
note should again be made that the use of the term 'incomplete' 
in this sense remains wholly relative to the case where a 
plurality of contexts similar to (1) and (2) are compared 
descriptif, c'est-a-dire un caractere de representation." 
[RL IX.2 v § 15 200] Cf. also .[RL III § 10 55f]® 
In developing his "topology of lumps/5 Menger suggests 
that 'Vi'cli defined boundaries are themselves results cf 
limiting processes rather than objects of direct observation# 
Thus, instead of lumps., we might use at the start something 
still more vague - something which perhaps has various 
degrees of density or at least admits of gradual transition 
to its complement." [Menger 2: 107] 
"...all...experience is surrounded by a twilight zone, 
a penumbra of uncertainty®..." [ BridgmanJ+: 33] Cf„ also 
[Bridgman 4: 6i2». 210] and [Bastide 1: 45]. 
1® This use of the term is to be distinguished from 
its different use in connection with the completeness of 
formalized languages. 
2. The correlation of an explicit description with what, 
in another system, is indeterminate9 is, for de-projective 
analysis, in the spirit of the resolution; "Objectivity must 
be continuously reconquered." [Ricoeur 3; 30] 
It is of interest to note Buchanan's view on a related 
matter: "The identity condition of a given parameter is 
determinate, that is, it is a differentiation within the field 
of variability of a higher parameter. This means that there 
can be no highest parameter in any absolute sense. We can say 
that a given parameter is the highest of those yet discovered, 
but, if it' is fully distinguished and defined, it must be a 
subordinate. In other words, the highest parameter is always 
to be defined, and in this sense is undefined. 
"Lowest parameters have a similar and corresponding 
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Several remarks concerning the space-time manifold are 
in order here. Any science which sets the task for itself 
to study the general nature of all science has a spatio-
• temporal constitution."'" The self-referential and self-
character. They are determinate as differentiations or 
determinations within the field of variability of the next 
higher parameters9 but their own fields of variability are 
as yet undetermined." [Buchanan 1: 78] 
"Any level or stage of analysis contains its own 
limiting rules; completeness and adequacy is relative to 
them." [Buchanan 1: 138] 
1. Several authors have intimated or discussed9 in 
varying degrees of.clarity and profundity, this result. X 
give here a few illustrative quotationss 
"La science est un volume riemannien qui peut etre 
a la fois ferine et sans exterieur a lui." [CavaillQs 1: 243 
"Si les sciences particulieres pouvaient recourir 
precisement a la logique pour les taches de justification* 
la logique9 elle9 n*a d*autre recours quvelle~memeS elle doit 
Stre en mesure de justifier ses propres concepts et ses 
propres theories. 
"A vrai dire cette difficulty de la reference a soi-
mgme se posait d£ja au niveau de la critique analytique? done 
au niveau de la logique formelle. II sernble que la logique soit 
inevitablement soumise a un cercle." [S. Bachelard 1: 180] 
"Our argument is not flatly circular& but something like 
it. It has the formp. figuratively speaking^ of a closed curve 
in space." [Quine 1: 30] 
"...il faut...que soit donne ce qui rend possible... [la] 
reflexion# et ce quia a ce qu'il semble-, la rend - en principe 
au moins - possible in infinitum." [PCIT II Supp vi 153] 
"La fondation phenomenologique de la logique affronte 
aussi la difficulte suivante; elle doit necessairement utiliser 
dans son expose meme presque tous les concepts a l'elucidation 
desquels elle vise." [RL II.1 Appendice 2P § 6 Intros 20^ 
"...il y a la une sorte de retour sur soi de la pensee 
formelle qu'il etait impossible de prevoir avant son accomplisse-
rnent et qui ne prend qu"en lui sa veritable portee." [Cavailles 
l s ' 3 2 3  .  .  •  '  
"Husserl affirme...le pouvoir qu'a la phenomenologie en tant 
que science derniere de se referer a elle-m^me, de se critiquer 
elle-ra&me." [ S. Bachelard 1: 308] See also [LFLT £ 10 54]« 
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enclosed nature of the logic of structure of the space-time 
manifold guarantees that such a science of maximum theoretic 
generality can investigate the transcendental foundations of 
the various scientific disciplines* its own transcendental 
foundation included. 
After other investigators'1"* I shall call this science 
'phenomenology# * 
"Toute theorie de la connaissance transcendental© 
phenornenologiquej, en tant que critique de la connaissance, 
se ramene a la critique de'la connaissance transcendentale 
phenomenologique, et tout d'abord de Inexperience transcen-
dantale elle-meme; en vertu du retonr as.untied de la 
phenomfvnologle.. sur elle-rn^mQ ^  cette critique exige9 elle aussiD 
u n e  c r i t i q u e •  M a i s  l a .  p o s s i b i l i t y  e v i r i m i t e  d e  l a  r e i t e r a t i o n  d a s  
reflexions et do ,s critiques t ransconn al o s ng implicno null Anient 
le danger dvun regressus in infinitum.."  [MC 130, my italics] 
[""si alors cette phenomenologie transcendantale9 comme il 
est a prevoir, est la science derniere,, elle doit se manifester 
comme telle dans le fait que la Question concern.?nt sa possibili te 
doit trouver sa reponse en elle-memep dans le fait.qu*il existe 
done quelque chose cornrae des references a soi-p.ftraea references 
.iterativeessentiellasn dans lesqueBes est impiique dvune 
raaniere evidente le sens essentiel. dvune justification derniere 
par soi-merae et dans le fait que c8est precisement cela qui 
constitue..le caractere fondamental d'une science derniere 
principielle." [LFLT § 101 356] See also [Ideen I §§ 62, 65]. 
1. See the preceding note and § 0.0. 
A RELATIVISTIC THEORY OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION 
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INTRODUCTION TC SECTION TOO 
The preceding section investigated various forms of 
reference systems in order to provide a foundation for 
analyses in which the method of de-projection will be 
employed to correct concepts projective in nature. Such 
analyses will remain constitutional analyses, concerned 
with the essential coordinative structure of particulars, 
to which reference is assured by that structure. This 
section will be specifically directed to inquire into 
the nature of certain classes of particulars taken in 
general and in relation to the framework proper to 
de-projective analysis. 
i 
As already noted, a particular is a functional 
individualization, a context of internal 'unification 
expressed in the form of the coordinate family or 
families with which the order schemata of the context 
can be correlated. This particular-context, when taken 
in relation to the coordinative frame from the standpoint 
of which identifying reference to the particular is 
possible, forms an identifiable individualization in a 
network of possibilities involved in the coordinative frame. 
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These possibilities are themselves entailed by any 
identifying reference to a validly represented particular 
in that system. 
Until now, a particular*has been characterized as a 
general object, subject in principle to identifying 
reference. Objects regarded as particulars have been 
« 
included in purely formal "syntactical" systems of 
organization, which have occasionally been represented 
in a "semantical" manner as well. An explicit and complete 
description of a particular has been seen strictly to 
involve both syntactical and semantical structures. 
Such particulars frequently are constituted in relation 
to certain given "attentional characters", - i.e., the 
possibility for the correlation of such "attentional charac­
ters""1" with a given particular is constitutive of the system 
entailed by reference to the particular. To the analysis 
of syntactical and semantical characters of systems will 
therefore be added an investigation of their "pragmatical" 
2 
character. It is the object of the present chapter to 
introduce certain notions fundamental to this task. 
1. This notion is left uninterpreted for the present. 
It will be clarified in subsequent chapters. 
2. The "syntactical" character of a system S involves 
the purely structural properties of S. The "semantical" 
character of a system S is expressed when reference is made 
to the'relation between S and the sysucm permitting 
identifying reference to and to the properties of S. The 
From the standpoint of a system the logic of structure 
of which insures the.possibility for the correlation of 
"attentional characters" with objects of reference, 
particulars will be termed 'phenomena'. Phenomena are 
thus particulars of a system permitting reference to 
essentially pragmatical structures. A phenomenon is that 
to which identifying reference is possible within such a 
context. In a completely neutral sense - neutral with 
respect to any pre-critical distinctions (as, for example, 
between "subjectivity" and "objectivity") - the class of 
phenomena can be considered coincident with the domain 
of possible experience. However,'the stipulation must be 
rigorously noted that any association of the terras 
'phenomenon' and 'experience' with such notions as "psychic 
act", "object of consciousness", "subjectivity", and polar 
opposites frequently bound to these, is to be unambiguously 
avoided as illegitimate for the present study. The reason 
"pragmatical" character of a system is expressed when 
reference to "attentional characters" is possible. 
Any association of the term 'pragmatics' with 'pragmatism' 
or with a behaviorist doctrine, is to be avoided. Similarly, 
'pragmatical' and 'pragmatic' (where the latter .signifies 
the practical" or "useful") are to be distinguished. Cf. 
[Martin 1: 6ff]. 
For a discussion of the relations between syntax, 
semantics, and pragmatics, see [Carnap 8ff], .[Martin 1: 
1-8], [Reichenbach 5: 15f]. 
1. Cf. [N, Bohr 1: 237'f]. 
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behind this strict qualification will become clear shortly. 
The system, the logic of structure of which is that 
of the space-time manifold, allowing for the description 
of the constitutive, structural principles which provide 
for the possibility of phenomena, - that system is precisely 
that proper to the science phenomenology. It is its task 
of foundational elucidation which is a distinctive and 
essential feature of phenomenology. "*• 
It should be noted that the concept of constitution 
in phenomenology varies qualitatively in relation to the 
modal order of analysis.2 There is a distinction to be 
made between the conditions wit bout which a phenomenon 
itfould not be, and the necessary conditions without which 
a phenomenon would be impossible.3 it is on the latter 
1. In [RL II.1 § 7 Intro 24-5]? Husserl states 
"...la theorie de la connaissance...presentee...comme le 
complement philosophique de la mathesls pure...ne veut 
pas expliquer, au sens psychologique ou psychochysique, 
la connaissance, 11 evenement d_e fait. . ., mais elucider 
(aufklaren) l'idee de la connaissance d'apres ses elements 
constitutifs ou encore d'apres ses lois " 
"L'etude de l'essence de...rapports phenomenologiques 
fournit les fondements indispensables pour effectuer 
1'elucidation, selon la critique de la connaissance, de la 
•possibility de la connaissance'...." [RL II.1 ii 9 6 145] 
"...[C]e qui unit veritablement toute chose, ce sont les 
rapports de fondation." [RL II.2 iii 6 22 65] Cf. also 
[RL II.1 ii £ 6 l44f]. 
2. See 9&ff and below, n. 3. 
3. This is the difference between 
p 6 q 
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modal level that the analyses of this section are developed. 
There is a parallel between the place de-projection 
occupies in the present investigation, and the role of the 
etroxa in Husserl's phenomenology.^ Where "dubitable nature" 
is bracketted in the latter, projective misconstructions are 
eliminated in the former. An "essential residuum" is left: 
in this study, a de-projectively clarified field of 
phenomena; for Husserl, indubitable consciousness. At times, 
these residua overlap^; usually, hov-ever, they do not, and 
there the similarity to phenomenological reduction breaks 
down. 
De-projective phenomenology, i.e., phenomenology to which 
de-projecfcive methodology is fundamental, consists in the 
employment of a strict phenomenological methodology, where 
any explicit deviation from methodologically permissible 
and 
Op => Oq. 
The distinction here is not always made explicit. For 
example, "un contenu de I1 espece est fonde dans un 
contenu de 11 espece ft_, quand un £ par essence {c'est-a-
dire par tine loi, en vertu de son caractere specifiaue), 
ne peut exister sans qu'un P_ n'existe aussi...." [RL II..2 
iii § 21 6l; his italics] Husserl refers^to "une 
'constitution' dans laquelle sont engendres des 'objets' et 
qui est necessaire pour que ces objets aient une 'existence' 
et meme pour qu'il puisse en etre seulement question." 
[Bachelard 1: 138] 
1. Thus it can be asserted that "the only system that 
phenomenology can conceive...is finally...a system of 
possibilities." [Ricoeur 1: 142] 
2. Cf. [Ideen I: §$ 31, 32, 109] and [MC 8, 15]. 
3. This "overlap-area" appears most vividly in § 2.". 
Compare the following with the phases of de-projection 
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forms of reference constitutes a phenomenologically invalid 
formulation. The -formulation is considered "invalid" in the 
sense that the precise description consequent to de-projective 
analysis is necessary in order for valid forms of 
coordination themselves to be possible. De-projection leads, 
in its corrective phase-*-, to a re-formulation of the 
originally invalid misconstruction. The conditions of 
possibility of this re-formulation are, in turn, four;d 
to be those which provide the necessary foundation for the 
phenomenological structure(s) in question. 
De-projective phenomenology is primarily concerned to 
inquire into the essential structure of phenomena taken 
in relation to definite and general classes of phenomena.-5 
(pp. 8lff): "...prendre.originellement conscience signifie 
tout a la fois [i] determiner plus precisement la prefiguration 
simplement vague et indeterminee, [ii] detacher les prejuges 
provenant de superpositions par glissements associatifs, [iii] 
biffer .les prejuges qui sont en opposition avec le remplissement 
effectue par la prise de conscience...." [LFLT Intro 15] 
1. See pp. 82ff. 
2. It is in this sense that Quine's notion of 
explication as elimination can be understood: "We have, to' 
begin with, an expression or form of expression [or, here, 
a concept] that is somehow troublesome.... But it also serves 
certain purposes that are not to be abandoned. Then we find 
a way of accomplishing those same purposes through other 
channels, using other and less troublesome forms of expression. 
The old perplexities are resolved." [Quine 3: 260] 
3. Cf. § 0.0 and passim. 
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From this standpoint, an analysis of a. given phenomenon 
tends to minimize the non-essential, individuating features 
of that phenomenon."'' As such, de-projective phenomenology 
is in the nature of a generalized analysis^, the task of 
which is to elucidate the logic of structure of the group 
of phenomena over which -the essential structure of the 
given phenomenon is covariant. 
The formal structure of such a group of phenomena 
differs from the given phenomenon only in degree of 
specificity, that is, in the degrfee of restriction 
obtaining over a range of possibilities. In the limit 
of maximum restriction, of minimum generality, reference 
may be made to the set of pure non-essential (contingent) 
features of a given phenomenon. And, inversely, in the 
limit of minimum restriction, reference may be made to the 
1. See p. 45. 
2. The notion of "generalized analysis" has been 
developed by A.A. Gukhman. The idea of a generalized 
individual case is fundamental to this method of analysis: 
"One of the main features of generalized analysis as a 
method of investigation is that each phenomenon is 
considered as a representative of a whole multitude of 
phenomena similar to it (all the phenomena contained in one 
generalized case). ...[T]he investigation of some specific 
phenomenon essentially involves the study of the properties 
of the group. of similar phenomena as a whole. Thus a 
knowledge of the properties of some phenomenon which can be 
studied serves as the basis for investigating any other 
phenomenon similar to it. In other words, a phenomenon...can 
be replaced as the object of investigation by any arbitrarily 
chosen phenomenon which is similar to it.1" [Gulchman 1: 197] 
"We can say that the individual generalized case...represents 
a group of phenomena which are all analogous to one another and 
that, within this group, they form smaller groups of 
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set of pure essential structures constitutive of the 
given phenomenon. The latter set expresses the "formal 
constitution" of the given phenomenon, while the former 
set refers.to its "material constitution".1 Consequently, 
formal constitution and material constitution are 
distinguished on the basis of degree of modal restriction 
over possibilities. 
This distinction can be observed in another sense. 
Consider the question: 'From the standpoint of a general 
continuum K, with component structures and elements a, b, 
c, ... , how is an element x to be determined "essential" 
or "contingent" to K?r If no reference can be made to K 
without granting x, then x is essential, or required by 
the formal constitution of K. On the other hand, if 
reference can be made to K without implicitly involving 
x, x is not formally constitutive of K. If K is so 
expressed as to involve reference to x, where x is not 
formally constitutive of K, then x is said to be 
p 
contingent, or entailed by the material constitution of K. 
Because a definite logic of structure is always ~ 
phenomena which are similar to one another. The similarity 
relationships apply within each smaller group, while the 
analogy relationships apply between phenomena belonging 
to different groups. It is very important to note that these 
relationships differ only qualitatively. Quantitatively they 
are completely identical." [Gukhman 1: 214] 
For an earlier treatment along'closely related lines, 
see [Ideen I 4, 70] and [RL III 62], oil Husserl's idea of 
"free variation". 
1. See pp. 37ff. 
2. Note should be made that that which is formally 
i4o 
essentially relative to a range of possible particulars-1-, 
the formal constitutive structures of a particular are 
always implicitly relative to a range of material 
possibilities. It is in this sense that it can-be 
affirmed that de-projective phenomenology is necessarily 
relative to a given, and to this extent is empirically bound.2 
It follows that de-projective methodology is basically 
distinct from a constructional approach to a system of 
concepts.3 The latter is characterized by an attempt to 
develop a system in which a step-by-step derivation or 
construction of all concepts is possible, such that the 
constitutive of a particular need not be materially 
constitutive of it. E.g., from the standpoint of an 
I-J-K system, what is formally constitutive of sub-system-I 
may be neither formally constitutive nor materially 
constitutive of sub-system-J. 
1. See pp. 4l, 99-
2. This resembles Ajdukiewicz's view that insofar 
as a variable of a proposition-is an uninterpreted constant 
in the major term of a tautologous formula, tautologies 
require empirical foundation. His argument [Ajdukiewicz 1] 
makes use of the so-called axiom of definiteness which 
specifies that, for every propositional function, there 
exists a class to which belong all and only those objects 
satisfying that function. It should be evident (see the 
preceding note), however, that the axiom of definiteness 
does not play a fundamental role in my argument above. 
3. What I have in mind here is a system such as 
that outlined in [Carnap 1]. 
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system provides the foundation for a "geneology of concepts" 
in which each concept has a definite place. The methodology 
of de-projection, on the other hand, is directed to the' 
analysis of the constitutive structure of a system 
which is given rather than derived.^ The possibility of 
de-projective analysis has its root in the thoroughgoing 
« 
relativity of formal constitutive structures to material 
constitutive structures.2 In this respect, implicit 
reference to the domain of possible experience is essential 
to the possibility of the present- study.3 
1. This does not mean.that the constitution of a 
system can simply be "read off", for a good deal of analysis 
is usually first necessary. However, it is to be pointed 
out that no matter how much analysis is required, the 
subject-matter for'analysis remains a phenomenological 
given. 
I take the opportunity here to suggest that v/hile 
de-projective phenomenology is intimately and explicitly 
bound to given phenomena, the analysis of a certain logic ' 
of structure may yield structural observations similar to 
those made from a constructional standpoint. Insofar as 
this is the case, the phenomenological given of the former 
provides an empirical basis for the latter. (It is interesting 
to note that Carnap says of his system in [Carnap 1: 9 143] 
that it "is intended to give a rational reconstruction of 
the formal structure of... [the cognition] process." 
This should indicate my, albeit indirect, sympathy for 
constructional systems of concepts. 
2. "Dans le cas de 1'identification, les matieres .sont 
les supports specifiques de la synthese.... Car le terme 
d'identification^se rapporte en effet,^par son sens, aux 
objets represelites au moyen de la matiere." [RL III § 16 
84-85] "...[L]a possibility d'un jugement...prend racine 
non. seulement dans les formes synt.axiques mais aussi dans 
les materiaux syntaxiques." [LFLT $ 89 294] "II y a 
une correlation eidetique entre la constitution et le 
constitue." [Bachelard 1: 261] Cf. [LFLT § 98 332]. 
3. "L'evidence de I'experience est...toujours deja 
presupposee." [LFLT 5 58 213] 
For this reason,J explicit reference to the constitutive 
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Thus, a specification of a set of constitutive 
structures is valid only if their essential relativity 
to a given context of reference is preserved. It is 
this relativity which is expressed when a phenomenon 
is said to be "given". 
At this point, it will be helpful to outline the 
plan which this section will follpw. Seven principal 
T 
phases of analysis may be distinguished. Each will 
proceed by first describing a concept or group of concepts 
fundamental to and frequently regarded as phenomenologically 
constitutive of the various special sciences, and of 
foundational significance to phenomenology itself. This 
description will then be de-pro'jectively analyzed, and any 
projective misconstructions brought to light. Where 
projections are found, a corrective re-formulation of 
the concept in question is given. 
In the first phase, the structure of phenomenological 
space-time is investigated. This structure, the logical 
foundations for which were described in Section 1.6, 
has a leading role in the analysis. An illustration is 
taken from Kant's work in which the forms of time and space 
are of major significance in an inquiry into phenomenological 
constitution. These forms of time and space are, however, 
elements of a given context often depends, in fact, upon 
a large backlog of experience with constitutive analyses. 
(The same holds true for dimensional analyses. See 
[Bridgman Is 50-53]*) 
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bound to the Newtonian model. Kant's framewo'rk makes 
reference to the epistemological correlates of the then 
contemporary physical notions of absolute time and absolute 
space. 
Using the methodology of de-projection, such a space 
and time framework is shown to be essentially grounded 
in projective misconstruction. The notion of phenomenological 
space-time is found to avoid projective misconstruction 
and to provide the constitutional form of space-time, 
which comprises the basis for subsequent analyses. A 
discussion of spatial objects, and of the phenomenological 
past, present, and future is given in this chapter.-
The second phase is a study of phenomenological 
relativity. Two levels of analysis can be distinguished: 
relativity on the level of the single phenomenon, and 
relativity on the level of the multi-particular context. 
Both forms of relativity are found to have the constitution 
of a self-enclosed region of analysis."*• 
The third phase defines 'ontological region', and 
shows that phenomenological relativity is fundamental to 
1. Phenomenological self-enclosure provides the 
foundation for the notion of spatio-temporal recurvature 
in relativistic cosmology. A discussion of this point is 
deferred for elaboration in a different context. 
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the possibility of the being of a phenomenon. 
The fourth phase inquires into the nature of 
truth. A de-projective analysis of the notion of truth 
provides the foundation for a theory of truth involving 
an extension of phenomenological relativity: the truth-
value of a phenomenological structure must be in 
accordance with the principles constitutive of the 
relativity of true identifying reference. 
The fifth phase is an analysis of causality. The 
projection constitutive of a common, notion of causality 
is treated explicitly. To replace this dissatisfactory 
notion, the notion of causality is de-projectively analyzed, 
in the following manner: an itemization is made of 
conditions necessary for causal identifying reference 
constituted in relation to phenomenological space-time. 
The re-formulated notion of causality is found to accord 
with the conditions of phenomenological relativity 
described earlier. 
The sixth phase is an inquiry into the constitution 
of the concept of ego. The projective nature of the 
theory of the metaphysical ego leads to a formulation of 
the concept of ego which is such as to allow for the 
possibility of identifying reference to this structure 
relative to phenomenological space-time. The 
possibility of reference to the ego-structure is shown 
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to be conditioned by the particular-ontological region 
in question. 
The seventh phase of this section stems directly 
from a phenomenological analysis of the ego, and comprises 
a treatment of the notion of activity. A non-projective 
theory of activity is formulated. 
Section 2.1 
> 
THE STRUCTURE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL SPACE-TIME 
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THE STRUCTURE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL SPACE-TIME 
Phenomenology, 'as a science of maximum theoretic 
generality which is capable of investigating the trans­
cendental foundations of the special sciences as well as 
its own, has a spatio-temporal constitutive structure. Its 
formal constitution is, in other words, provided by the 
logic of structure of the space-time manifold. But this 
description of phenomenology needs further elaboration. It 
is the object of this chapter to enlarge upon this characteri­
zation through a more studied consideration of the concepts 
of time, space, and space-time. 
A. Phenomenological Time 
It will be recalled that temporal order is described 
in terms of a rule of order in the form of one successor-
function restricted to a single range of values similar to 
one another.A uni-contextual particular meets, the 
conditions for such restriction, since the totality of explicit 
references to that particular is unified in a manner 
such that two references have common determinants of 
reference. The specifically temporal character of 
phenomenon will be termed its . 'time-signature1. The time-
1. Husserl's formulation: "le mode du * l'un-apres 
1'autre [PCIT § 7 35; § IB 59] 
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signature of a given phenomenon is the expression of the 
form of temporal ordering constitutive of the structure of 
the phenomenon. The term 1 time-signature' is used to 
emphasize the essential relativity of a rule of time-order 
to a given context.^ 
It follows from the definition of 'time-signature' that 
a context the logic of structure of which is heterogeneous 
determines at least two distinct (non-overlapping) ranges 
of values, each of which expresses in its form the 
ordering principle of a homogeneous logic of structure of 
a particular or group of particulars. A distinct time-
signature can be correlated with each particular or group 
of particulars described by such a homogeneous logic of 
structure. Time-signatures are distinguished on the basis 
of the distinct temporal o-series.with which they are 
correlated. 
Now, a context may be referred to in terms of the 
number of distinct temporal o-series which organize it. 
This reference does not usually comprise, however, an 
unambiguous identification of the context, but serves 
rather to denote the set of contexts which are similar 
insofar as each context in the set has a definite number 
of temporal o-series which organize it, and any two contexts 
have the identical number of such o-series. Time-signatures 
can be arranged in ascending (or descending) order according 
1. See p. 31> and p.-39, n. 2. 
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to the number of temporal o-series of the respective contexts 
of which they are time-signatures. 
A plurality of phenomena can therefore be described 
in terms of the number of distinct temporal o-series 
ordering the phenomena. Groups of phenomena arranged 
according to ascending numbers of temporal o-series are 
• said to be temporally successive, where a context of a 
greater number of temporal o-series is said to succeed one 
of a lesser number.1 
It is evident that specification of the time-signature 
of a phenomenon requires an embedment-system of higher order 
from the standpoint of which reference is possible to the 
constitution of that phenomenon. For example, from the 
standpoint of a system K of an I-J-K system, it is possible 
to designate:-.-the time-signatures of sub-systems I and J. 
If the number of temporal o-series of system-I is identical 
to that of system-J, systems I and J are simultaneous; 
if not, the system of the lesser number is said temporally 
to precede the other. It should be clear that in either 
case, a reference from the standpoint of system-K may 
1. Clearly, temporal succession is relative to 
groups of phenomena arranged according to ascending or 
descending numbers of temporal o-series. That a context 
of a greater number of temporal d-series is said to 
succeed one of a lesser number is a matter of convention. 
See, e«g., [Bridgman 2: 31]. Thus it is wholly arbitary• 
that inductive generalization is restricted to application 
in one direction. Cf. [Nicod 1], 
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simultaneously be made to sub-systems I and J. 
The designation of the time-signature of a phenomenon 
does not in itself serve in any "absolute" or other sense 
to characterize that phenomenon as "earlier," "simultaneous," 
or "later" in time. Such a characterization is essentially 
V 
relative to comparative distinctions made between time-
signatures of at least two phenomena. Consequently, 
characterization of time-order is essentially relative to 
systems to which reference can be made from a system of 
higher order, and which have a heterogeneous logic of structure 
The notion of phenomenological time can here be 
described as the constitution of any given group of 
phenomena which are temporally successive. It is to be 
noted that phenomenological time is a constitutive principle 
of organization, and is therefore essentially relative to 
phenomena so constituted. 
Two distinct time-signatures which establish two or 
more phenomena as temporally continuous^" and successive 
determine the limits of a duration.. A duration consists 
in a finite field of variability over a range of temporally 
successive particulars. A phenomenon the time-signature of 
which determines that phenomenon within the above limits 
comprises a possible instantiation in the given field of 
variability.2 The set of possible instantiations all of which 
1. See p. 128. 
2. Hu3serlfs view is related: "•..un instant^ponctuel 
comrae tel est dependant...a une duree." [RL II.2 iii } 13 
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have the same time-signature constitutes a context with 
that time-signature.1 
p As already indicated , o-series have a uni-contextual 
vector-constitution. The temporal determinants of reference 
of a duration may consequently bear essential reference to 
explicitly indeterminate temporal structures, such that 
the "limits" determining the duration may only be 
approximated relative to the given indeterminacy.3 Temporal 
indeterminacy, and the temporal fringes with which it is 
often correlated, has its root in the vectorial .nature of' 
phenomenological time. 
A system permitting identifying reference to particulars 
provides the necessary foundation for the re-identifiability 
of those particulars.^ The recursive nature of recurrent 
44] "...les intervalles de temps qui, eu regard a toute 
extension temporelle qui les embrasse, possedaient in 
abstracto le caractere de fragments, perdent aussi, avec ce 
caractere, leur independance reciproque quand nous les 
considerons en relation avec une unite temporelle remplie 
concretement, a laquelle ils sont inherents en tant que 
moments dependants." [RL II.2 iii § 25 79^] Cf. [PCIT § 3 
19 J • 
1. Compare Carnap's definition of an "erleb" in [Carnap 
1: So 67, 109]. For further discussion, cf. [Carnap 1: 09 
78, 108] and [Goodman 2: 116, 132]. For the related notion 
of an "instantaneous configuration", see [Whitehead 2: 300]. 
2. P. 40. 
3. See pp. 28, 128. 
4. Pp. 11, 107f. 
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identifying reference to a given particular must allow for 
explicit reference to two or more conjoined functional 
individualizations identical as to their essential 
coordinative structure. The temporal nature of such 
reference is evident in that reference to conjoined 
particulars comprises reference to serially related coor­
dinate families, each of which, as a single family, is 
serially bound together as a unit. 
Consider two contexts which are such that (a) a given 
re'ference to a certain particular in the first context is 
earlier than a second reference to the same particular 
in the other context, and (b) this distinction between the 
time-signatures of the two contexts is the only, other than 
purely quantitative, difference between them. Prom the 
standpoint of the system permitting reference to these 
contexts, the second reference is termed a 're-identifying 
reference' to the given particular. Since the logic of 
structure of a particular entails a range of possibilities, 
including that of re-identifiability, the temporal 
constitution of particulars is re-affirmed in noting the 
temporal character essential to re-identifying reference. 
If two objects of reference are in the same o-series 
as above, they may, in relation to that o-series, be taken 
as features of the o-series qua (relative) whole.^ Objects 
1. See pp. 4 If. 
I 
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of reference essentially relative to a common o-series, 
when given in temporal succession, are said to comprise 
individual variations of that o-series over a duration.^ 
Now, a system permitting comparative references to 
a plurality of contexts of varying time-signatures provides 
the standpoint necessary for the determination of what is 
termed the 1 relative phenomenological present'. In relation 
to an organization of contexts in temporal succession, the 
relative phenomenological present is determined, in the 
limit, as that context with the greatest relative number 
p 
of temporal o-series. It should be noted that these 
comparative references to a plurality of contexts which are 
simultaneous, where such references are not given in 
relation to o-ther comparative references which are 
relatively earlier or later, are here included in the 
relative phenomenological present. If there is temporal 
indeterminacy in the given context, the relative phenomenolo­
gical present is indeterminate in at least the same 
1. Compare [PCIT § 43 119] on the notion of an object 
given in "perspective variation" over a period of time. See 
also below, pp. 
2. Husserl also speaks of this "dernier terme" as 
"une limite ideale." [PCIT § 16 56; $ 31 89] 
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measure."'" . . 
The relative phenomenological past consequently includes 
those contexts with less than, in the limit, the greatest 
i ' 
relative number of temporal o-series. For any context 
given in temporal succession with other contexts, its 
relative phenomenological past includes those contexts 
with a relatively lesser number of temporal o-series. 
The essential re-identifiability of a context implies 
the possibility that a context given with a time-signature 
of the relative phenomenological past can be included in a 
context with a time-signature of the relative phenomenological 
present.2 
A context given as relative phenomenological present 
may have a valence-constitution in that the vector-structure 
of the temporal o-series of that context may be such as to 
define a set of possible correlations which a particular or 
set of particulars bears to other particulars or sets of 
particulars.^ The "halo of possibilities" determined by the 
valence-structure of a context given as relative phenomenolo-
1. A rigorous- description of the principles governing 
the relation between temporal indeterminacy and determination 
of the relative phenomenological present will lie outside the 
compass of the present discussion. 
2. Such inclusion has been characterized by the term 
Jretention'. Cf. [PCIT 6 3 20; 6 11 44], [LFLT Appendice II 
6 3 413]j [Russell 5: 174], [Carnap 1: §§ 78, 85, 108, 114, 
1153, [Goodman 2: 132ffj. See n. 1 and n. 2, p. 154. 
3. Cf. § 1.5. 
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gical present comprises the relative phenomenological future. 
The network of possibilities determining the relative 
phenomenological future of a context is to be distinguished 
from the halo of possibilities constitutive of a context C',. 
the time-signature of which, in relation to other contexts 
in relations of temporal succession with C', determines that 
C1 is a context in the relative phenomenological past of C. 
The valence-structoire of C' determines, as it were, a 
phenomenological future relative to C', or, equivalently, 
this valence-structure simply maps out past possibilities. 
When reference is made "to -the xelative phenomenological 
future, unless otherwise indicated, the valence-constitution 
of a context given as relative phenomenological present is 
denoted. 
The determinations of relative phenomenological present, 
past, and future refer variously to constitutive structures 
p 
of phenomena organized in temporally successive contexts. 
It is to be emphasized that these temporal determinations are 
essentially relative to phenomena so organized; such 
1. 11 L'instant present a...un halo temporel."/[PCIT 
o l4 51] Husserl describes this "halo" as being "retentionnel 
and "protentionnel." Cf. [PCIT 6 24 71J II Supp. Ill 138], 
[RL II.2 iii 6 13 43], [LFLT 8 58 212], [Ideen I 66 77, 7o, 
81, 113]. 
2. In a somewhat different connection, Husserl argues 
that "[l]es contenus immanents ne sont ce qu'ils sont que 
dans la mesure ou...ils annoncent du futur et renvoient a 
du passe." [PCIT o 40 110] Note should be made of the 
difference in modal level of Husserl1s proposition and of 
the disscussion in the text. See n. 3* P- 135. 
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phenomena provide the basis for these determinations, while 
the explicit severing of the relativity of temporal 
determinations to temporally ordered phenomena defines a 
projective misconstruction, 
A distinction is to be drawn between (a) the time-
signature (s) of references to temporal determinations of 
temporally successive contexts and (b) the time-signatures 
of those contexts. The latter require an embedment-system 
from the standpoint of which references are possible to 
their constitutive temporal o-series. This embedment-
system itself requires an embedment-system of higher order 
so that the time-signature(s) of references to the temporal 
determinations of the given temporally successive contexts 
may be explicitly characterized. A distinction is therefore 
made between temporal determinations which can be explicitly 
indicated, and those which are indicated implicitly."'" If 
one or more embedment-systems of the above sort are not in 
principle provided, analysis of temporal determinations is 
impossible. 
Correspondingly as a greater number of such embedment-
systems is required for the possibility of reference to the 
temporal determinations of temporally successive contexts, 
a plurality of levels of temporal reference is defined. 
1. See pp. 14, 77ff 
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A hierarchy accordingly is determined of senses of the notion 
of phenomenological time.-1- It is to be noted that a 
projective misconstruction is entailed if reference is made 
to a temporal determination of a context while one or more, 
essentially necessary embedment-systems of higher order 
are.explicitly disallowed. 
Now, the domain of possible experience relative to 
phenomena the time-signatures of which express their 
inclusion in the relative phenomenological past is that 
proper to "remembered" or "recollected" phenomena.? The 
domain of possible experience relative to phenomena • 
included in the relative phenomenological future is that 
O  
proper to "anticipated" or "possible" phenomena.w> 
It has been noted that the possibility of de-projective ' 
phenomenology is conditioned by the essential and implicit 
relation between this form of analysis and the domain of 
possible experience. This was seen in the sense that 
analysis .begins with a phenomenological given. This given 
1. With this clarification, problems of the "grasping 
of time within time" find a simple solution. Cf. [CM 8l 
2. See above, pp. 133ff. "...la donneedu passe, c'est 
le souvenir." [PCIT 9 13 50] 
3. Husserl's description is given in terms of the notion 
of "horizon d1 anticipations." [PCIT § 24 71f] 
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of analysis may have a structure of whatever degree of 
complexity, including a plurality of contexts of differing 
time-signatures. Yet it should "be observed that the time-
signature of references involved in studying this given is 
% 
that of the relative phenomenological present. This is the 
• 
case even though analysis may- develop through a succession 
of stages: Insofar as the analysis can be characterized at 
all, the possibility must always be guaranteed that an 
earlier phase of analysis can be identifyingly referred to 
from the standpoint of subsequent phases. In this manner, 
each phase of analysis can be the subject of identifying 
reference only if each phase involved implicit reference 
to those preceding it. This "recapitulation" or "retention" 
of past phases of analysis must be such as to be itself 
the subject of possible references which comprise a context. 
•with a single and common time-signature.-1-
The discussion to this point has been predominantly 
descriptive; I turn now to consider a variety of projective 
misconstructions which have their base in the notion of time-
order. Four such projective misconstructions will be described. 
First, consider the view that every relative phenomenolo-
gical present has both a relative phenomenological past and 
a relative phenomenological future. In one sense this is 
simply-false, while in another sense, it is projective; .It 
1. "Tout temps per?u est percu comme passe qui a le 
present pour terme." [PCIT. <$> 31 89J 
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should be clear that when reference is made to a group of 
contexts each of which is characterized as relative 
phenomenological present, what is denoted is a plurality 
of temporally^successive contexts such that from the 
standpoint of a context in the given group, a relative 
phenomenological past and/or future is determined in relation 
to that context as limit.*®" There is no simple, necessary, 
implicit relation between a context the temporal determina­
tion of which is relative phenomenological present and a 
relative phenomenological past. Neither is there an essential 
and implicit simple relation to a relative phenomenological 
future. This is to say, a given context the time-signature 
of which is relative phenomenological present does not 
implicitly entail a valence-structure as well as .reference to 
contexts the number of temporal o-series of which rank them 
as comprising a relative phenomenological past of the given 
context. 
However, it is clear that the given context must bear 
implicit relation either to a relative phenomenological past 
or to a relative phenomenological future. The reason for this 
is found in the conditions which must be satisfied in order 
1. This essential qualification is not often made 
explicit. For example, in^[PCIT ^ 11 45]> when reference is 
made to a pluralite de presents anterieurs et futurs, 
whether the above qualification is to be assumed is not clear. 
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for relative temporal characterization of a context to be 
possible, it has been noted that temporal determinations 
are essentially relative to temporally successive contexts. 
The minimal requirement for a context to be given in 
temporal succession is that the context be characterized 
in comparative relation to oth'er contexts the numbers of 
o-series of which are greater or less than that of the 
given context. 
For this reason, a context may or may not be given 
in relation to relative past contexts or in relation to 
a certain valence-structure. Consequently, it would 
simply be erroneous to claim that every context is given 
as having both a relative phenomenological past and a 
relative phenomenological future. 
In another sense, this claim entails a projective 
misconstruction if, by reference to a plurality of contexts 
each of which is characterized'as relative phenomenological 
present, the following is implied; First, these contexts 
are affirmed to be organized in temporal succession. Second, 
acknowledgement is made of a higher-order embedment-system 
from the standpoint of which references are made to the 
given temporally successive contexts, where these references 
can comprise a .homogeneous context with a single and common 
time-signature. Third, each context characterized as relative 
phenomenological present is regarded as a temporally 
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independent context, i.e., as having no essential relation 
to the above embedment-system. The "severing" of the 
essential relativity between the embedment-system and 
i 
contexts characterized as temporally successive from the 
standpoint of that system.determines a projective misconstruc­
tion."1* 
There is, then, an inconsistency entailed in affirming 
of a given context (a) that it is a member of a group of 
temporally successive contexts and (b) that it is temporally 
independent in the above sense. For example, if from the 
standpoint of an embedment-system _S, a context _c is ..given 
in relation to a relative past £, while a second context _c' 
is given such that c_ and c_' are similar in all c&her respects 
except that (i) they are quantitatively different, (ii) c.' 
bears no explicit or implicit reference to jd, and (ili) £ 
comes before c'. Thus, the logic of structure of context c 
is such as to permit identifying reference to a relative past 
j3, while the logic of structure of context c_' makes no 
provision for such reference. Consequently, to say of c_' 
that a relative past £ has "disappeared" or "can be 
p 
revived" constitutes a projective misconstruction. 
1. See p. 15b. 
2. This projection is sometimes found, e.g., in notions 
which would characterize memory by .saying of the past that it 
"does not return to nothing, but can be revived in memory." 
Cf. [LG 184], 
l6l 
• •» 
• An analogous projection relating to a relative 
phenomenological future can be mentioned in passing. Such 
a; projection obtains if, from the standpoint of an 
embedment-system permitting reference to temporally ' 
successive contexts, the range of possibilities determined 
by the valence-structure of a given context is characterized 
as temporally autonomous."1-
A second and closely related projective misconstruction 
which has its base in the notion of time-order concerns the 
View that the relative phenomenological present "becomes" a 
relative phenomenological past. This "process of the present 
becoming past"^ provides the basis for the notion of "passage 
of time" or "time-flow." These interconnected conceptions 
will be briefly considered here. 
The view in question has the following structure: From 
the standpoint of an embedment-system, reference to temporally 
successive contexts is possible. A context c_ is given with 
a time-signature of the relative present, while a second 
context Id is given as included in'the relative past of c_, 
and a third context a is given as included in the relative 
past of b. Furthermore, a, b_, and _c are similar, except 
they differ quantitatively and in the number of their 
1.' An example can be had in those views which consider 
"the future" has having a status- essartially predictable or 
probable to a certain degree - independent of the relative 
present. For several remarks concerning this misconstruction, 
see [Bridgman 2: 32]. 
2, For example: "...le, present...change en un passe." 
[PCIT $ 7 37] "...le phenomene tombe dans le passe...." [PCIT 
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temporal o-series. 
In conformity with earlier conventions, contexts a and 
b are called 'recollections' relative to context £. Context 
a may include qua "recollection" a temporal determination 
of relative present in relation to contexts temporally 
earlier than it. The same may be the case for context b. t " 
Now, in what sense can the view be upheld that context £ 
will "become" past, in analogy to the relation between a, 
and b? 
It is clear that according to this view, a "change" 
is to be noted when comparison is made between the above 
contexts. Granting the possibility of a context d. temporally 
later than context £ (and there is, it has been noted, no 
simple, essential, implicit relation between a context 
given as relative present and a relative future context), 
where £ is included in d.'s relative past, the following 
assertions can validly be made: (i) a valence-structure of 
context £ includes d as a possibility, (ii) context £ 
" rjatentionally" includes contexts a and b, (iii) in relation 
to their respective relative pasts, contexts a,,"b_, and £ may 
be characterized with the temporal determination of relative 
present. 
Now, the succession of such contexts permits the 
following partial description of the notion of change1: 
{> 31 86] Cf. also [PCIT $ 5 24]. 
1. This description will be elaborated in J 2.5. 
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A temporal succession of contexts which bear similarity-
relations to one another such that a definite particular . 
is given in a corresponding succession of related phases, -
that succession of contexts permits reference to the 
particular as changing with respect to a certain value in 
relation to any two or more distinct and successive phases. 
Note should be made that determination of a particular 
is essentially relative to contexts over which the o-series 
constitutive of the particular is covariant.-1- Thus, in the 
earlier example above, contexts a and b may be considered 
as "changing" with respect to time-signature in relation 
to context £. All that this terminology suggests, however, 
is thatigiven a temporal succession of similar contexts, in 
relation to a certain constant value, any two contexts may 
determine values which differ from that of the constant. It 
is this difference, in relation to the constant, which is 
expressed when reference is made to a change with respect 
to a given value. 
It follows that the time-signature of context _c can 
be said to "become" or "change" to past, in analogy to the 
relation between contexts a and b_, only if such a difference 
can be indicated when the time-signatures of £ and a possible 
future context d are compared. Thus, a given temporal 
1. Pp. 39-42, 81. 
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determination can "be said to precede or succeed another 
temporal determination if and. only if reference is possible 
to a succession of the kind indicated in the preceding 
paragraph. 
A projective misconstruction occurs if, from the 
standpoint of a context •which makes no provision for 
reference to a relative phenomenological past-1-, it is 
affirmed that "the present becomes past." On the other 
hand, it should be noted that, strictly speaking, aitime-
» t 
signature does not change, but represents a definite value 
in a succession of related values. A time-signature comprises 
no more than an expression of a value which a particular has 
relative to other temporally connected particulars. Since 
this is all a time-signature is, nothing about a time-
signature as a temporal determination can be held constant 
in a succession of temporal determinations. Because such 
a succession does not provide a basis- for possible reference 
to a change with respect to temporal determination, it is 
projective to suggest that a time-signature of relative 
present may "change" to relative past. 
Furthermore, the notion of change is here understood as 
change over a duration. A projection obtains if a given 
temporal determination is considered to change over a duration 
Temporal determinations provide the basis for assessing 
1. See pp. 159f 
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change; to represent a temporal determination as "changing" 
constitutes a projective misconstruction. 
Thus, it is to be understood clearly that the view 
in question constitutes an acknowledgement that, in . 
general, with respect to a constant value, temporally 
successive contexts may differ in the degree that 
deviations from the constant value are exhibited. In 
particular, temporally successive contexts may, in large 
measure, be similar, while their respective time-signatures 
express variations over a given duration. 
Thirdly, it should be indicated that, in a like- manner, 
the notion of "passage of time" or "time-flow" may entail 
one or more projective misconstructions with respect to 
time-order, if one or more of the above projections are 
essential to the notion of "passage of time." From the 
standpoint of de-projective analysis, this notion is 
unobjectionable so long as it comprises an affirmation 
of temporally successive contexts. However,- if the notion 
of "passage of time" or "time-flow" represents the above 
view that temporal determinations themselves comprise a 
process of changing or becoming, then that notion is 
logically reprehensible. If, moreover, the notion:.of "time-
flow" is taken out of essential connection to temporally 
successive contexts, the misconstruction which obtains 
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is still more confused. In a like manner, a particular 
represented as changing with respect to a certain value in 
a succession of contexts covariant as to o-series, cannot 
be considered out of essential relation to that succession.- ' 
The structure of the given particular is relative to the 
temporally successive contexts -which represent that 
particular. 
A fourth projective misconstruction regarding the 
notion of time-order is closely linked with a set of 
distinctions between "objective" and "subjective" time. 
These distinctions provide the basis for characterizations 
of time-order as "the result of a constituting activity."2 
The projective nature of these distinctions and'of the 
latter more complex view, cannot be shown here, but is set 
aside for later examination, ^ 
1. E.g., Husserl makes a distinction between "le temps 
du monde objectif" and "le temps qui apparait avec le flux 
m§me de la conscience, le temps dans lequel ce flux s'ecoule." 
[RL II.2 v j) 7 158] See also [Ricoeur 3: 1^-93.. 
2. Examples are found in the work of Kant and Husserl: 
Cf. Kant's treatment of the Forms of Sensibility, particularly 
in Edition A of the Critique, where an active imposition of 
the form of time upon a chaotic manifold of representations 
is alluded to. [Kant 2c: A 95, 97-106, 109, 118ff, B 160, 211f] 
Husserl refers to "les actes constitutifs de temps" 
[PCIT 6 16 55]> the constitution of time by "la conscience 
originelle du temps" [LFLT 6 6l 222], etc. Cf. [PCIT 6 15 53.] > 
[liFLT Appendice II <*> 36 415J, [LG 176, 178]. 
3. $$2.6 and 2.7 will be crucial in this demonstration. 
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B. Phenomenological Space 
It has been noted that an o-series expresses spatial 
> 
order only if that series expresses temporal order, involves 
at least one successor-function in addition to that fundamental 
to the temporal order expressed, and is restricted to a range 
of values distinct from those included in the range of 
variability of the temporal successor-function.^ The structure 
of space is one with the structure of any given group of 
particulars the constitution of which involves disjunct sets 
of possibilities, where each such set can be placed in a 
one-one relation with each successor-function, exclusive of 
the temporal successor-function.^ 
A temporally ordered context may have a logic of structure 
which provides a foundation for one or more sets of values 
in terms of which spatial order is expressed. Temporally 
successive spatial phenomena may be characterized, for example, 
in terms of a group of uni-contextual particulars which are 
sequentially related and ordered according to a given 
temporal successor-function. Each particular has a logic 
i 
of structure which provides the basis for order-patterns of 
1. P. 106. 
2. Pp.. 107f. Since an arbitrarily large number of such 
disjunct sets can be characterized as conditioning the possi­
bility of a given group of phenomena, the minimum number 
necessary for this purpose will be said to establish the spatial 
logic of structure of that group. One space-coordinate axis 
is usually correlated with each set. 
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values in the range of variability of each spatial successor-
function.^" A spatial particular given in temporal succession 
"with other particulars can be described in terms of the spatial 
successor-function(s) providing the basis for structural 
organization of that uni-contextual particular having a 
certain single temporal determination. 
Both temporal and spatial forms of order constitutive of 
particulars are serial in nature, and are distinguished on the 
basis of relative degrees of complexity in their respective 
structures. The fundamental serial order-form has been 
termed 'temporal*, while more complex order-forms have been 
called 'spatial1.2 Spatial order in a context is no more 
than a complex "translation" of temporal order onto a higher 
level, that of the structure of a context at a particular time.3 
The elements of an o-series may therefore be represented as 
temporally successive, as temporally simultaneous (i.e., having 
a spatial character), and in the less simple form of a 
temporally successive o-series, each member of which is 
constituted spatially as temporally simultaneous with other 
members. 
1. See n. 1, p. 107. 
2. See n. 1, p. 106. "...'lea choses sont [des unites]... 
en tant que fonctions du temps...." [RL II.2 iii 9 12 Ire ed. .330] 
"...la question de la constitution de la chose spatiale... 
presuppose...celle du temps." [PCIT 9 43 122J 
3 .  It is in this sense that it can be affirmed that "order 
in space is merely the reflexion into space of one time-system of 
the time-orders of alternative time-systems." [Whitehead Xi 301] 
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The specifically spatial character of a phenomenon is 
termed its 1 space-signatureT• The space-signature of a given 
phenomenon is the expression of the form of spatial order 
constitutive of the structure of the phenomenon. Like 'time-
signature*, 1 space-signature1 is used to emphasize the 
essential relativity of a rule of space-order to a given 
context. 
The space-signature of a phenomenon expresses the form 
of spatial determination of that phenomenon. This determina­
tion may be simple or complex, in that the form of spatial 
order constitutive of the phenomenon may involve one or; more 
spatial successor-functions. A space-signature of a phenomenon 
i3 said to have one or more components, as one or more spatial 
successor-functions condition the possibility of the spatial 
nature of the phenomenon.^ 
1. The number of components of a phenomenon's space-
signature determines the "space-dimensional order" of the 
phenomenon. A phenomenon determines a space-dimensional order 
in terms of an (in principle) open range of space-dimensional 
order values 1 to n, according to whether 1 to n successor-
functions are involved. 
Somewhat metaphorically, the space-signatures of three 
phenomena belonging to the same space-dimensional order express 
the relative (spatial) positions of the phenomena along a single 
topological "isobar", where one phenomenon may be in such 
relations to one or both of the others as "between", "above", 
"below", "alongside", etc. (Compare a similar formulation in 
[PCIT § 1 8].) 
It should be clear, therefore, that the designation of 
the space-signature (or time-signature) of a phenomenon does not 
in itself serve to characterize the phenomenon in anything more 
than a purely relative sense. (Cf. p. 149») 
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The notion of phenomenological space is consequently 
to be described as the constitution of any given group of 
phenomena which are spatially ordered. Like phenomenological 
time, phenomenological space is a constitutive principle 
of organization, and is therefore'essentially relative to 
phenomena so constituted.-*-
Two distinct space-signatures which express two 
phenomena in the same o-series as spatially related determine 
the limits of an extension. An extension consists in a 
finite field of variability over a range of particulars 
which are spatially related and which belong to the. same 
o-series. A phenomenon the space-signature of which 
determines that phenomenon within the above limits comprises 
a possible instantiation in the given field of variability. 
A set of such instantiations all of which are spatially 
related over a continuous range of values defined by the 
limits of a given extension, comprises a series of zones 
of a spatially extended whole.2 
A characterization of the limits of an extension is 
essentially relative to comparative distinctions made between 
the spatial determinations of at least two phenomena. As 
1. "...we do not speak of spaces apart from the...entities, 
which themselves define the spaces." [Bender 1: 115] 
2. See £> 1.3 for a discussion of the relation between 
the concept of zone and that of a totality. 
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already noted"*", an embedment-system of higher order is 
required for possible reference to the constitution of a 
given phenomenon. From the standpoint of such a system of 
higher order, the spatial determinants of reference of an 
extension may bear essential reference to explicitly 
indeterminate spatial structures, such that the "limits" 
defining the extension may only be. approximated relative to 
the given indeterminacy.^ Since o-series have a uni-contextual 
vector-constitution^, spatial indeterminacy, and the,spatial 
fringes with which it frequently is correlated, has its root 
in- the vectorial nature of phenomenologicafl space. 
It has been indicated that if two objects of reference 
are in the same o-series, they may, relative to that o-series, 
be considered features of the o-series qua (relative) whole.^ 
Objects of reference essentially relative to a single* o-series 
are then said to comprise individual variations of that o-series 
where these variations may be given either in temporal 
succession over a duration^, or simultaneously, with a common 
1. Ifr HSf. 
2. Cf. pp. 28, 128, 150. _ - . 
3. P. 40. 
4. Pp. 41f» 151. 
5. P. 152. 
i 
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time-signature. When the above objects of reference are 
spatially extended, they may be regarded as spatial variations 
which together, as variations with respect to a given constant 
value, express in spatial or "perspective" variation a single 
spatial object. 
Given, then, are a group of spatial variations which 
together express a spatial totality. It has been noted that 
an o-series is parametric, involving at least one identity 
condition or constant, as well as a field of variability 
within which possible values are related according to a rule 
of order, and thus to which possible values the identity 
condition is set in essential relation.^ Insofar as a given 
group of spatial variations belonging to a single o-series 
expresses"in perspectives" a spatial object, the constitution 
of the object is essentially relative to the given group of 
variations.^ A certain constant value expressed in 
variations relative to a group of particulars covariant as 
to o-series, cannot be considered out of essential relation 
to such variations. The structure of a spatially extended 
object is essentially relative to possible spatial variations 
1. Pp. 40ff, 56. 
2. "...lfobjet lui-meme...tire son sens en tant qu*il 
est dans ce variations [pepspectivalesl lfelement identique 
d'autoformations possibles." [LFLT § 61 244] 
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which may express that object. 
Such a group of possible spatial variations may entail 
an essentially open o-series, where an indeterminate number 
of instantiations covariant as to o-series are possible.-1' An 
object expressed in spatial variations which entail an essentially 
open o-series is termed a ' spatially transcendent object', 
in conformity with earlier conventions.2 
A sequence of spatial variations given over a duration 
thus has a logic of structure involving a series of zones 
which provide the basis for the extension of the spatial 
object expressed through the variations.^ A phenomenon 
1. See p. /fO, n. 3* 
2. P. 42. Husserl observes that "...la perception... 
[d'un telj objet possede un horizon qui embrasse d'autres 
possibilites perceptives. Et ces possibilites sont impliques 
dans le sens de l'objet perju." [S. Bachelard 1: 251] 
" L'objet... [est] le pole d'identite immanent aux 
vecus particuliers et pourtant transcendant dans l'identite 
qui surpasse ces vecus particuliers." [L£l]T~^61^23l Gf. also 
[S. Bachelard 1: 177]. 
3. In the notation of the calculus of inviduals 
described in [Goodman 1 and 2], a specified space-region could 
be defined as 
ds (3y)(Sy.Ku y,x).(z)(Ku y,z^>z<x), _ 
where ' S' abbreviates '...is an order-form of space', 'Ku' 
abbreviates '...uniformly qualifies...' (or, '...is constitutive 
of...'), and '<' stands for '...is part of...' (or, '...is 
included in the range of variation of...'). A space region is 
consequently defined such that there is a Xt where % is an 
order-form of space, and % uniformly qualifies x, and, .for all f 
2, if x uniformly qualifies 3, then & is part of 
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spatially determined within the limits of that extension 
may be said to portend certain variational possibilities. 
In this manner, a single phenomenon or a group of phenomena, 
as expressions of possible instantiations in the field of t 
variability of the given extension, may implicitly intimate, 
or' portend, the possibility of further extension of the group 
of variations. This possibility of further, extension of 
a sequence of variations is constitutive of many spatial 
objects. 
It is clear that there are three principal ways in 
which a group of spatial variations can be related to a 
spatial object. First, the constitution of the spatial object 
can, as above, be characterized as essentially relative to 
possible spatial variations. Second, the spatial object can, 
through excess reductionism, be equated with the group of 
spatial variations.^ Finally, the group of spatial 
variations may be considered projectively to express, in a 
variety of ways, an "object" autonomous of the system 
conditioning reference to the variations.^ Since the last 
two modes of relation are thus unsuited f©r serious 
reflection, only the first will be considered here. 
1. Such a spatial object would consist of a chance 
collection of variations. Relations such as resemblance, 
similarity, or sameness could not be admiitted to hold between t 
the phenomena expressed in variation. To do so would involve 
a recognition of some kind of principle or criterion conditioning 
reference to the unitary structure of the variations. Such a 
move is made in the first alternative in she text, but is 
disallowed in the view in question. 
For Husserlfs view-on this matter, see, e.g., [PCIT § 1 132* 
2. See below, pp. 179f. 
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A spatial object consists, then, in a unity of spatial 
variations given over a duration. For example, a variation 
or group of variations (si» 82,33} is given with a time-
signature t^.1 Similarly, {32,33,3/^ and jsjjs^js^j are given 
at t2 and t^, respectively, where t^ is earlier than t2> t2 . 
is earlier than t^, and t^» t2» and t^ are identified from 
the standpoint of a context the time-signature of which is 
that of relative phenomenological present. The set s of 
variations [sijSgjS^s^s^j » relative to the relations 
expressed between [s^»s2>s2j, js2,s3,s4)» anc* (s3»s4,s5]' ^ *s 
then said to be constitutive of a spatial object S given in 
successive perspectives at t-^, t^, and t^. It should be 
added that the possibility of extending the set .s may be 
constitutive of the spatial object S. 
1. If a single variation is given in a.sequence of 
variations, it is found that "neighboring" variations identified 
in analysis "overlap" as regards some value (which may not, of 
course, be the same or even similar value throughout all the 
variations of the sequence). This case, then, will, for the 
present, be treated in analogy to a group of variations 
{si,sj,sk}, since such a set may be thought of as a set of 
adjacent coordinate zones. (Cf. §1.3.) 
I take the opportunity to note that a characterization of 
the serial structure of a phenomenon or group of phenomena as 
"everywhere dense" (i.e., that between any two elements of a set 
there is at least another element) is projective. The misconstruc­
tion here resembles a "projection of the implicit." (See pp. 7&-
79») It is evident that either temporal order or spatial order 
can be characterized as everywhere dense. (On temporal order, cf. 
[Whitrow 1: l60ff].} The projection relates, then, to possible 
illegitimate use of both the concept of phenomenological time ' 
and the concept of phenomenological space. For the present study, 
it is sufficient to consider that every phenomenological duration 
and extension (i) is finite, (ii) comprises a finite number of 
instants or perspectives, yet (iii) may essentially involve one 
or more open o-series. (See pp» 42 > 173*) 
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From the above example, it is evident that the constitution 
of a spatial object is essentially relative to the retentional 
character of phenomenological time. It is this aspect of 
phenomenological time which conditions the possibility of 
reference to groups of variations as unified over a duration. 
Thus, reference to spatial objects is relative to the temporal 
constitution of phenomena."1" 
When reference is made to a plurality of spatial objects, 
these objects may involve one or.more sets of possibilities 
such that for any two sets there is no common modal valu^.2 
Accordingly as one or more of such sets is constitutive 
of a spatial object, a form of dimensional order is determined, 
which is said to be the form of dimensional order of the space 
proper to that object.3 Thus, a plurality of spatial objects 
may express one or more forms of dimensional order. If every 
object in a given plurality has the same fo^m of dimensional 
order as every other object in that plurality, then the plurality 
is said to be dimensionallv homogeneous. If various forms of 
1. Ricoeur observes that "since the appearing of the 
object through "adumbrations" occurs within a flux of appearances, 
the phenomenology of perception implies a phenomenology of time." 
[Ricoeur 3» 96J 
2. See p. 107. 
3. See n. 1, p. 107, and n. 1, p. 169. 
t 
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dimensional order are involved, then the plurality is _ 
dimensionallv heterogeneous* 
Now, for any dimensionally homogeneous spatial plurality, 
it often is possible to rank the spatial objects in a relative 
manner according to comparisons made on the basis of the 
fields of variability of the spatial extensions involved. 
A comparison between these fields of variability is essentially 
relative to an embedment-system of higher order from the 
standpoint of which such comparative reference is possible. 
It is in relation to some constant value(s) that comparison 
of two or more spatial objects may provide a relative 
p 
determination serving to rank those objects. Unless recourse 
is made to a system of yet higher order in relation to which 
another value or set of values may be established as constant, 
the value used in the initial system is invariant^ for the 
1. ^Thus, " [ljes concepts de^grandeur ne sont possibles 
que la ou il existe un concept general qui permette differents 
modes de determination." (q. in [S. Bachelard 1: 116] from 
[Riemann 1: 255],J 
It is in this connection that the problem of measurement 
is to be treated in phenomenology. 
2. There are a multitude of constants or standards used 
in this connection; those, e.g., having to do with assessment 
of relative position, shape, size, surface characteristics, 
mass, etc. For example, a standard for assessing relative 
position might serve to distinguish objects vis-a-vis their 
relative proximity to a specified object. 
3. The invariant nature of a value is at times said to . 
be "a matter of convention," "primitive," "empirically determined," 
etc. Once such characterizations are made, each view 
stands in need of thorough elucidation. 
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purposes of that system, and scepticism cannot question its 
invariant nature without falling victim to projective 
misconstruction.-^ 
The objects of a dimensionally heterogeneous plurality 
can also be ranked in a relative manner provided there is a 
basis for comparison of the fields of variability of the 
spatial extensions involved. -Such a basis is 
provided so long as all or some of the fields of variability 
have either a common form of dimensional order or forms of 
dimensional order interrelated in certain definite ways. 
Reference to these forms of. order is 'then possible from 
the standpoint of a system of higher order establishing 
a value or group of values as invariant. 
It is sometimes the case that application of a constant 
value serving to indicate relative differences among spatial 
objects, will be possible only within certain limits of 
approximation established by the structure of the spatial 
object(s) in question. There is, then, a measure of 
indeterminacy which may obtain in the use of an invariant 
value in relation to some spatial phenomena. It is projective 
to assert that every context must satisfy the absolute condition 
1. Clearly, the choice of the constant can be questioned, 
but always with certain other criteria in view: e.g., relative 
adequacy, simplicity, completeness, decidability, effectiveness, 
etc. 
An exhibition of the projective misconstruction involved 
here when all such criteria are repudiated proceeds along the 
same lines as that involving the view that time-signatures 
themselves can "change." (Cf. pp. l6lff.) 
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of exact determinability; such determination can in principle 
be achieved only where the structureof an object provides 
the basis for assessment of a value to a certain degree of 
exactitude. In other words, the legitimate scope for the 
use of an exact standard does not include essentially 
indeterminate structures. A specification of this scope 
rests upon a sound understanding of the constitution of the 
system from the standpoint of which comparative reference 
can be established between a precise standard and the essential 
structure of a given set of phenomena. Spatial indeterminacy, 
like temporal indeterminacy, has its root in the vector-
constitution of phenomena.Indeterminate spatial objects 
may establish various "thresholds" which express the 
degree to which it is possible for analysis to characterize 
a value within certain margins of exactness. 
At this point, I turn to consider a variety of projective 
misconstructions which have their base in the notion of 
space-order. 
It has already been noted that a certain constant value 
which is expressed in spatial variations relative to a group of 
particulars covariant with respect to o-series, cannot be 
considered out of essential relation to such variations. The 
relativity of a spatial object to a certain group of spatial 
1. See pp. 126, 150, 152 
2. Pp. 171-174. 
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variations is constitutive of that object. The representation 
of an object as spatial, while certain of the conditions 
necessary for possible reference to that spatial object are 
explicitly denied, comprises a projective misconstruction. 
It has also been noted'1' that determination of the 
spatial constitution of a group of phenomena requires for 
its possibility reference from- the standpoint of one or more 
"embedment-systems of higher order. Thus, reference to the 
constitutive spatial structure of a phenomenon or group of 
phenomena, where such reference involves an explicit dis­
allowance of these embedment-systems, comprises a 
projective misconstruction. 
Rather than extend this general description of types of 
spatial projections, it may be of some use to consider two 
specific illustrations of projective use of concepts of space. 
The first illustration is taken from the work of Newton, the 
second from that of Kant. 
I. According to Newton^, "space" is considered to be 
independent of the existence of material bodies.which together 
make up the physical universe. Space is therefore a continuum 
1. Pp. 170-177. 
2. Cf. [Newton 1: 6-12, 639-644n.] and [Newton 2: Book III, 
Queries lSffJ. 
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which can either be empty or occupied, and provides a system 
of reference from the standpoint of which any material body 
can in principle be discretely located, that is, can be 
assigned discrete coordinates which specify in a completely 
determinate manner its position in the continuum. 
Now, an identifying reference to a particular material 
body is by nature spatial. The possibility of such reference 
requires that it be made with respect to a system of 
coordination allowing for such reference. An identifying 
reference to a certain material body determines the 
relation between the individual body and a given system of 
reference. 
To say of a material body that it is spatial is only to 
affirm that the identifiabilxty of a material body requires 
a system of coordination of a particular sort. When the 
Newtonian position affirms the absolute character of space, 
it maintains that (i) identifying reference to material 
bodies is spatial and thus a system of coordination permitting 
reference to spatially constituted objects is necessarily 
involved, and (ii) there is a continuum of space independent 
of what material bodies may or may not exist in -that 
continuum. It is in relation to its affirmation "of (ii) that 
the Newtonian position involves a projective misconstruction. 
When reference is made to material bodies, a system of 
coordination is entailed which insures the possibility of such 
reference. ' The nature of "space" is determined in essential 
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relation to that system. "Space" is therefore constitutive 
of possible reference to material bodies, in relation to a 
system of coordination which permits identifying reference 
to those bodies. 
In (ii) above, space is said to be an absolute continuum, 
autonomous of material bodies which may be spatially related. 
This assertion explicitly denies the relativistic constitution 
essential to the concept of space. Essential' to the 
non-projective use of the concept of space is that reference 
to spatial objects in general, and to material objects in 
particular, is essentially assured. This, the Newtonian 
position denies. Denial of the constitution of spatial 
objects, while spatial objects themselves are investigated, 
is fundamentally projective. 
1 
II. (a) Kant argues that the relation of parts of 
space to each other necessarily presupposes a region towards 
which they are ordered in this•relation, and that ultimately 
this consists not in the relation of one thing in space to 
another thing in space, but in the relation of the system of 
these positions to "the absolute world-space." This world-
space is, he argues, independent of the existence of all matter, 
and provides the first ground for the possibility of the 
compositeness of matter. From this he concludes that real 
1. In The First Ground of the Distinction of Regions of 
Space. [Kant 1: 19-29J. 
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differences can be drawn between individual material bodies 
since these differences are grounded solely in their relation 
to the absolute, primary world-space. 
When Kant affirms the absolute character of space in this 
context, he maintains that (i) identifying reference to material 
bodies necessitates a certain system of coordination which 
provides the foundation both for possible reference to these 
-bodies and for possible compositeness of them, and (ii) this 
system of coordination comprises an absolute world-space 
\ 
which is independent of the existence of all matter. Whether 
KantTs position here entails a projective misconstruction 
will depend upon the interpretation of (ii). Two interpretation 
of (ii) will be distinguished. 
According to the first, (ii) can be re-written to read 
"absolute world-space is independent of all actual material 
bodies." As already noted, identifying reference to material 
bodies necessitates a system of coordination which guarantees 
that such reference is possible. Provided that this is the 
function of Kantrs notion of "worid-space," the notion is 
1 
unobjectionable. 
Alternately, (ii) may be interpreted to maintain that 
1. Kantfs phrase "independent of all matter" stands in 
need of clarification. It can be maintained that "world-space," 
considered as a pure, formal notion, is independent of actual 
material bodies. But. since identifying reference to actual 
material bodies is made possible by the system of coordination 
in question (here termed 1world-space"), "world-space" is 
constitutive of any material body. For this reason, it cannot 
be said that actual material bodies are independent of the 
very system which renders possible identifying reference to them 
1 
"the absolute world-space is independent of all possible 
material bodies." Considered in this sense, the notion 
of "world-space" involves a projective misconstruction. This 
is the case since an explicit denial is made of the relativistic 
constitution of spatial objects, while, at the same time, 
the nature of space is put into question. This is immediately 
evident if "world-space" is considered to provide the 
foundation for the possibility of reference to material bodies. 
But, in the present interpretation, the notion of "world-
space" itself involves a denial of the possibility of 
reference to material bodies, and thus a projective 
misconstruction- results.^ The nature of this projection 
is the same as in the Newtonian case.^ 
II. (b) In a different connection, Kant argues^ that 
1. For this reason, in the preceding note it was 
necessary to limit the relation of independence between "world-
space" and actual material bodies to a strictly formal level, 
so that "world-space" may be regarded.as formally independent 
of actual material bodies. An essentially dependent relation 
exists between "world-space" and reference to possible material 
bodies (i.e., "world-space" is not formally independent of 
reference to possible material bodies). 
2. Leibniz1 s version is less objectionable: "I don't 
say that matter and space are the same thing. I only say, there 
is no space, where there is no matter; and that space itself 
is not an absolute reality. Space and matter differ, as 
time and motion. However, these things, though different, 
are inseparable." [Leibniz 2: Fif-oh Paper. § 62] 
3. In his Dissertation on bhe Form and Principles of 
the Sensible and Intelligible V/orlcTI [Kant 1: 35-85J. It should 
be mentioned that Kant's position here regarding the concept of . 
space involves the introduction of a variety of other problematic 
concepts. Some of these provide the material for subsequent 
analysis in this section. 
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space"*" is a formal principle of human intuition.2 The physical 
world, in its relation to the sensibility of the human mind, 
is "constituted in relation to this subjective principle of its . 
form.^ Further, Kant maintains that the concept or schema 
of space is that according to which the mind actively 
coordinates its "sensa" as prescribed by unchanging laws.^ 
Finally, this concept of space "concerns the laws of sensibility 
of the subject [ratherj. than conditions of the objects themselve 
According to this view, the concept of. "space" functions 
very much like the earlier concept of "world-space": both 
may be considered to condition th'e possibility of spatial 
things — the former applying in an unrestricted sense to 
"material bodies," the latter, only to "spatial things" when 
these are considered the objects presented according to this 
subjective, spatial form of sensibility. In the present case,-
Kant maintains that the mind is active in coordinating its 
sensa according to this law. "Space" pertains to this active 
1. (Along with time.) The argument given here applies, 
mutatis mutandis* to Kant's concept of time, and his later 
critical deduction of the Categories (edition A of the Critique) 
2. "...the condition under which anything can be an 
object of our senses." [Kant 1: Dissertation <£ 10] 
3. I.e., "a law of the mind, on account of which all thing 
can...be objects of the senses, ...presented as belonging to the 
same whole." [Kant 1: Dissertation ^13] 
4. [Kant 1: Dissertation $ 15]« 
5. [Kant 1: Dissertation $ 16]. 
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coordination, not to objects considered independently of the 
subject. In this distinction lies a projective misconstruction 
The projection involved 'can be expressed explicitly as. 
follows: 
Kant argues that the subject actively coordinates or 
imposes upon its sensa. the principle or form of space. Such 
an "imposition" must be made upon a (perhaps chaotic) 
•assemblage of sensa. Consequently, it must therefore be 
possible to distinguish some situation given "prior" to the 
imposition, from the organized manifold given "after" the 
active coordination is made by the subject. It is only on 
the basis of such a distinction that Kant could legitimately 
argue that the concept of space concerns the laws of 
sensibility, and not the conditions of the objects themselves. 
The form of space, he says, is one of the conditions the 
mind imposes upon what it can experience. These conditions, 
the laws of sensibility, concern only the nature of the 
subject - not the nature of.the objects themselves. There is, 
in other words, a basic difference between the organization 
stemming from the coordinative nature of the mind, and the 
assemblage of sensa upon which the mind actively imposes this 
organization. A distinction'is therefore implicit between an 
"assemblage of sensa" given "prior" to the "imposition", and 
the organized manifold given "after" the active coordination is 
made. • 
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• Such a distinction is, however, in principle impossible. 
No context can be given which can provide the subject with 
the possibility of making an identifying reference' to such an 
active "imposition" or "coordination." As already seen, the 
mind, according to Kant, imposes certain conditions upon 
what it can experience; in particular, sensa are required 
to conform to the form of space. 
For the moment, assume that all sense presentations are 
conditioned by the form of space. It will then be impossible 
coherently to refer to any "assemblage of sensa given prior 
to the act of imposition." .To make such a reference, it must 
be possible to "suspend" the condition of spatiality, to 
permit reference to some state of affairs "prior" to the 
"imposition" of the form of space. This "suspension" is 
in principle ruled out by the initial assumption, that all 
sense presentations are necessarily conditioned by the form 
of space. Consequently, no reference can legitimately be 
made to the assemblage of sensa given prior to the imposition. 
And, since such a reference must be possible to refer to the 
"active coordination" itself, it follows that no reference is 
possible to such a "coordination." 
Because the concept of space in question rules out the 
possibility that identifying reference can be made to the 
active, subjective coordination of sensa the ordering of 
which the concept seeks to explain, its explicit characterization 
is projective. 
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C. Phenomenological Space-Time 
Temporal-order is determined by a rule of order in 
the form of a single successor-function restricted to a 
range of possible values. Spatial order is determined by a 
temporal rule of order, in relation to one.or more additional 
successor-functions, where each successor-function is 
restricted to a distinct range of variability. The generalized 
order-schema which includes temporal and spatial order 
as special cases is termed 'spatio-temporal order*.' The 
notion of •phenomenological space-time can consequently be 
described as constitutive of any given group of phenomena. 
Phenomenological space-time is a constitutive principle of 
organization, and is therefore essentially relative to 
phenomena so constituted. 
The notion of phenomenological space-time is, in other 
words, defined as the constitution of any given group of 
phenomena to which reference is possible, where such reference 
may relate to the fundamental order-form(s) of the phenomena, 
whether temporal or spatial in nature. 
Phenomenological time and phenomenological space are 
schemata conditioning possible relations between phenomena.^ 
i. cf. p. 123. 
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Phenomenological space-time may therefore be regarded as a 
general principle constitutive of the possible organization 
/N 
of phenomena.**" The formal constitution of phenomenological 
space-time is provided by the logic of structure of the 
space-time manifold, since the latter is entailed, provided 
identifying reference to a particular or group of particulars 
is possible. 
Phenomenological space-time provides the foundation for 
reference to phenomena involving an arbitrary number,of 
successor-functions respectively restricted to distinct 
ranges of variability. Phenomenological space-time is, 
then, a general and fundamental order-form to which parametric, 
essential structures are relative.^ The order-schema of 
phenomenological space-time is essentially inseparable from 
modes of organizationJo£ phenomena. The dissociation of 
this order-schema from the structure of any phenomenon or 
group of phenomena leads to projective misconstruction. 
Now, characterization of the temporal or the spatial 
structure of a phenomenon involves reference from the standpoint 
of some embedment-system. But, since the relativistically 
1. P. 122f. Cf.•[RL III £ 62 225J, where Husserl 
speaks of "determinations spatio-temporelles." 
2. See p. 120. 
3. Cf. pp. 40ff, 56, 172. I 
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recurved logic of structure of the space-time manifold^ is 
constitutive of phenomenological space-time, phenomenological 
space-time comprises the basis for characterization of temporal 
and spatial forras of order, where reference to phenomenological 
space-time cannot require a higher-order embedment-system. . In 
other words, phenomenological space-time has a relativistically 
recurved logic of structure, permitting self-reference and 
reference of the kind requiring higher-order embedment-
system(s).2 It should be noted once again'that phenomenological 
space-time is constitutive of possible relations between 
phenomena; in no sense can the essential connection between 
this generalized order-schema and the structure of possible 
phenomena be coherently severed. 
It follows that the logic of structure of any given 
group of phenomena provides the basis for the possible 
characterization of its essential structure, thus for self-
reference, for reference from the standpoint of embedment-
systems of indeterminate order^, and for recurrent identifying 
reference.^" Thus, phenomena in general are said to be 
intrinsically determined, since any given group of phenomena 
1. Pp. 117ff. 
2. See pp. 123f. 
• 3. Cf. pp. 119, 127. 
4. Pp. 150f. Cf. [LFLT £ 30 127ff]. 
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satisfies the requirements of an intrinsically determined 
system.^ . 
When phenomenological space-time is said to be 
intrinsically determined what is meant is that this generalized 
order-schema provides the foundation for the possibility of . 
reference to the temporal and spatial constitution of 
phenomena. It is in relation to the general parametric 
nature of an o-series that phenomenological space-time is 
constitutive of the particular notions of phenomenological 
time and phenomenological space. Thus, it is not possible 
to' call into question either the temporal or the spatial 
character of phenomena from a non-intrinsic standpoint, 
that is, from a view-point considered autonomous of possible 
3  experience. 
Because phenomena are temporally constituted and because 
a temporally ordered' phenomenon often is given in terras of a 
specific space-signature^*, phenomenological time and 
1. Cf. p. Ill and passim. A group of phenomena the 
logic of structure of which restricts the possibility of 
reference to certain space-time dimensional-order values, 
establishes, as it were, a relativistically self-enclosed 
region relative to reference to spatio-temporal order. This 
regional manifestation of relativistic self-enclosure comprises 
a significant theme worthy of further study. 
2. Thus, C.D. Broad observes in connection with the 
special theory of relativity that the distinction between space 
and time is not per se prohibited, but that the isolation of 
these concepts from each other is illegitimate. [Broad 1: 4&6] 
3. See pp. 121, 134* 
4. P. 169. 
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phenomeriological space have sometimes been functionally 
expressed.•*" The unitary foundation for relations established 
between temporal and spatial phenomena is provided by 
phenomenological space-time. A characterization of the 
spatio-temporal order of a given context involves an 
enumeration of certain of the constitutive structures of the 
spatio-temporal whole comprising that context.2 
At this point, several projective misconstructions which 
have their base in the notion of space-time order may be 
recalled.3 Certainly, since temporal order and spatial order 
are special instances of generalized spatio-temporal order, 
projections which have their base in the notion of phenomenological 
time and phenomenological space can be.described as particular 
forms of projections relative to spatio-temporal order. In 
1. In this connection, Minkowski has observed: "Es hat 
niemand einen Ort anders bemerkt als zu einer Zeit, eine 
Zeit anders als an einem Orte." [Minkowski 1: 432] 
"Eine Wissenschaft von der Lebenswelt ware also zunachst 
apriorische Wissenschaft der Raum-Zeitlichkeit.... [Durch] diese 
Wissenschaft] konnen jene Korrelationen thematiziert werden, 
welche Raum-Zeitlichkeit also Form der Lebenswelt ermSglichen." 
[Claesges 1: 12] (See also [Claesges 1: 36].) Husserl also 
argues: " S'il y a entre deux parties un rapport reciproque 
de fondation, leur dependance relative est hors de doute." 
[RL II.2 iii $ 16 50] 
J.C. Smuts has maintained that temporal succession 
requires spatial co-existence as a condition of serial 
ordering, while spatial co-existence requires temporal 
succession as a condition of spatial representation. [Smuts 1: 
27f, 333 
2. "...when we talk of the geo-chronornetry of Space-Time,' 
we are simply describing certain very general and abstract 
features of that whole which is the...world." [Broad 1: 
3. See pp. 121ff, I27f. 
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addition to this group of temporal or spatial projections, 
two projective misconstructions relating to general space-
time order will be briefly described. 
First, because phenomenological space-time is a 
constitutive principle of organization, in no sense can it 
be maintained that "space-time exists apart from possible 
spatio-temporal objects." Such a view of absolute "space-
time" is projective, as has been shown earlier.^ Rather, 
any given phenomenon or group of phenomena has a spatio-
temporal constitution which can be explicitly expressed. 
Such an analysis yields a description of the essential spatio-
temporal structure of the phenomenon or group of phenomena. 
Spatio-temporal structure can be elucidated only in essential 
2 
relation to possible objects of reference. 
Second, the description of the constitutive structure 
of a phenomenon or group of phenomena from the standpoint 
of a given framework cannot be universally generalized. The 
description is relative to a given framework, and can be 
considered invariant only in relation to an isomorphic system 
of frameworks.^ Thus, the representation of a phenomenon 
1. Pp. 139-191. 
2. P. 122. 
3. Similarly, translatability of a proposition is always i 
relative to systems providing adequate means for the expression 
of that proposition. It is merely factual that not all systems 
have equally adequate means of expression. 
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from the standpoint of one system, in terras of a description 
! 
made from the standpoint cf a second very differently 





Any reference to a particular establishes a 
relational system which conditions the possibility 
of that reference. When such a system is observed to 
provide the foundation for its own possibility, the system 
is said to have a relativistic constitutionThe nature 
of a system^ relativistic constitution depends upon 
the modal order(s) of its framework, the foundation for 
which it provides.^ In other words, the relativistic 
constitution of a given system provides the foundation 
for the order(s) of possibility of that system, where , 
the order(s) of possibility can be characterized in terms 
of degree of complexity of the constitutive structures 
investigated. 
Two levels of analysis of the relativistic constitution 
of phenomena may be distinguished: (i) analysis of the 
relativistic constitution of a given single phenomenon and 
(ii) analysis of the relativistic constitution of a given 
1. See p. 110. 
2. Pp. 9Sff. 
3. Pp. 102, 196. 
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totality explicitly involving a plurality of related 
phenomena. The logic of structure of a single phenomenon 
may be expressed in terms of the determinate functional 
organization of a particular-context, of either a uni-
or multi- vector sort."*" Such a functional organization 
establishes certain consistency boundary conditions.^ 
On the other hand, the logic of structure of a given . 
totality involving a plurality of related phenomena^ 
establishes consistency boundary conditions of a more 
complex sort. The logic of structure of such a totality 
involves a plurality of o-^series according to which 
possible values are related in terms of various fields 
of variability. Thus, the essential structure of a group 
of related phenomena can normally be characterized in 
relation to a more extensive and variegated range of 
possibilities than can the structure of a single phenomenon. 
Furthermore, a plurality of related phenomena may 
consist of phenomena of a modal order which is common to 
all members of the plurality, or the plurality may include 
phenomena of distinct modal orders. In the first case, 
1. Pp. 17, 30, 34, 39ff. 
2. P. 97f. 
3* See fit PP* 
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the logic of structure of the totality is said to be 
'modally homogeneous', while in the second instance, the 
totality is modally heterogeneous. 
The relativistic constitution o'f a single phenomenon 
expresses the essential foundation Jbr* a certain range of 
possibilities determined in relation to some consistency 
boundary conditions. Similarly, the relativistic 
constitution of a group of related phenomena defines 
consistency boundary conditions for several ranges of . 
possibilities, where each range is modally homogeneous. 
It is immediately evident that a projective , 
misconstruction involves a form of reference which runs 
counter to some of the essential consistency boundary 
conditions of a given context of reference. These 
boundary conditions may be thought to comprise the basis 
for relativistic self-enclosure with respect to the given . 
range(s) of possibilities. A context is relativistically 
self-enclosed only if it provides the grounds for 
completely intrinsic self-reference.^ It follows that 
these grounds are provided by the relativistic constitution 
of a single phenomenon and by that of a group of related 
phenomena. To these two sorts of relativistic constitution 
consequently correspond two forms of relativistic self-
enclosure. 
1. P. 117. 
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It should be clear that in providing the basis for 
the possibility of a context, the relativistic constitution 
of that context guarantees the possibility of reflexive 
* 1 
reference to the context from an intrinsic standpoint. 
The logic of structure of a given context determines certain 
consistency boundary conditions which reflexive references 
to the context must satisfy. t  When a reference from the 
standpoint of this context is made to a second context, 
the consistency boundary conditions of the two contexts 
must overlap sufficiently to warrant the extension of 
the coordinative structure of the initial context. In 
this case", the reference in question satisfies the relevant 
consistency boundary conditions of both contexts; otherwise, 
the reference involves the illegitimate extension of the 
coordinative structure of the initial context, in which 
case a projective misconstruction obtains. 
It has been noted that a sequence of temporally 
successive phenomena establishing the compass of a duration 
involves a pattern of order according to which a phenomenon 
given with a time-signature of relative present retentionally 
includes phenomena earlier in the sequence. If the 
constitutive structure of such a plurality is investigated, 
its logic of structure is found to determine, over the 
1* See n. 1, p. 111. 
( 
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duration in question, an increasing extension of the 
relative consistency boundary conditions of consecutive 
phenomena in that group.^ Thus, characterization of 
a group of phenomena as having a relativistically self-
p 
enclosed logic of structure is essentially time-relative. 
Now, phenomenology investigates the domain of 
possibilities. This domain is essentially open in the sense 
that the logic of structure of many objects of reference 
is transcendentOn the other hand, it has been observed 
that this domain is also essentially closed in the sense 
.that the relativistic constitution of a phenomenon and of 
one or more groups of phenomena involves relativistic 
self-enclosure. This domain of possible experience 
is spatio-temporally extended in relation to a retentional 
augmentation of phenomena, while the essential structures 
of phenomena must satisfy sets of consistency boundary 
conditions.^" 
1. See n. 1, p. 14^* 
2. This observation is examined in some detail in 
6 2.7. 
* v r 
3. Pp. 42, 173, 175. 
4. Husserl maintains: " Lfexperience...porte en 
elle.. .l^dee dTun systeme infini, ferme sur soi, d1 experiences 
possibles...." [LFLT ^ 16 $7n.] On the notion of the world 
as a bounded whole, see [Wittgenstein Is 5.61, 6.45J. 
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The phenomenological world comprehends this 
relativistically recurved domain of possibilities. In 
relation to this multiverse of possibility, a phenomenon 
or group of phenomena may exemplify in terms of its 
' logic of structure the general principle of an essentially 
open, transcendent system of possibilities, while it also 
expresses a particular form of relativistic self-enclosure."*-
The possibility of reference to phenomena is consequently 
conditioned in connection with the relativistic constitution 
and relativistic recurvature of phenomena, according to 
which, from the standpoint of phenomenology, a recapitu­
lation of the constitutive structure(s) common to antecedent 
phases of analysis is essentially possible in a relativis­
tically self-enclosed and reflexive context.2 
The world of ideal possibilities provides the 
subject-matter for theoretical research; the relativistically 
recurved domain of possibilities comprising the world for 
phenomenology constitutes the transcendental ground of 
theories taken in general.3 Phenomenology, as already noted, 
1. Compare this to the proposition that "a coordinate 
is a determinate, germinal duplication of the overall 
coordinate system. (Cf. pp. 13» 119.) 
2. See pp. llSff, 124, n. 1. 
3. Cf. p. 3. "...pour nous, le monde n'est qu*une 
unite drinvestigation theorique." [RL III § 65 Ire ed. 297] 
"The facts in logical space are the world." [Wittgenstein 
is 1.13] "We can describe the world completely by means of 
fully generalized propositions...." ^Wittgenstein Is 5.526] 
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elucidates the sense the world has relative to a given 
framework of theory. In this, it denies that meaning can 
attach to any question concerning the world taken apart 
from a possible framework.^ 
1. Thus Mach, in connection with an investigation of 
the concepts of time and space, arguesi "No one is 
warranted in extending these principles beyond the boundaries 
of experience. In fact, such an extension is meaningless.... 





The world of ideal possibilities forming the subject-
matter of phenomenology is empirically bound, i.e., the 
formal constitutive structures of a phenomenon are relative 
to a range of material possibilities.^ The specification 
of a set of constitutive structures of a phenomenon is 
valid only if its essential relativity to a given context 
of reference is preserved. When reference is made to a 
phenomenon from the standpoint of a system involving a 
lesser degree of'modal restriction2 than that proper to 
the phenomenon, the phenomenon may be characterized in 
terms of its essential ontological structure.-^ 
The constitutive structure of a phenomenon conditions 
1. See pp. 137ff« "Abstract ontological conditions... 
refer to concrete ontological situations and cannot 
substitute for them." [Feibleman 1: 140] 
2. P. 139. 
3. Traditionally, the "being" of a phenomenon or of 
a group of phenomena has sometimes been put into question 
in a manner such that relations between the actual 
phenomenon and its mere possibility (or, e.g., its "like­
lihood") can be investigated. It is clear that a study of 
this sort can be carried out not only in terms of the 
relations between 02 and £, but between OOn and 0£» etc. 
The horizon for ontology has yet to include the rich 
variety of phenomena belonging to a plurality of modal orders 
(See p. 9# and passim.) 
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the possibility of the phenomenon - in other words, the 
constitution of a phenomenon comprises the structure essential 
to that phenomenon, excepting which that phenomenon cannot be.^ 
Now, it is essential to the possibility of a phenomenon 
that its logic of structure provide a basis for identifying 
reference.^ It follows that a phenomenon cannot be unless 
it can be identifyingly referred to.3 Therefore the being of 
1. Cf. p. 135. 
2. Recall that those "structures providing for the 
possibility of particularity are the structures required for 
the possibility of identifying reference." (P. 5#J cf. also 
pp. 14ff, 134.) 
3. Leibniz argues in a similar fashion that a material 
thing does not depend upon being observed, but it does 
depend upon being possible to be observed. (Cf. [Leibniz 2b: 
149 and passim.].) 
Given the fundamental intelligibility of the world, it 
is evident that for a thing to be it is necessary that it be 
possible identifyingly to refer to it. Without the guarantee 
that identifying reference to a thing is possible, no thing 
can be in any intelligible connection with objects in the 
world. Of what is not intelligible, only nonsense can be 
said. 
Husserl refers to what can be thought not in terms of 
a "subjective incapacity to represent an object otherwise," 
but rather as exemplifying the objective impossibility that 
the object be in any other way. I mention this decisive_ 
ontological transition here because of its parallel signi­
ficance. (See [RL II J 7 21-24], [Husserl 2: I62ff]». 
[Husserl 3* 225, n. 1].) It is also to be found in the work 
of Parmenides: "It is one and the same thing which can be 
thought and which can be." [Parmenides 1: Frag. 5] Bolzano's 
definition of 'thing* is similar: " j'entends par 'chose* 
tout ce qui en general peut etre un objet de notre faculte de 
representation." [Fels 1: Vol. 9, 17] 
( 
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a given phenomenon is fundamentally conditioned by the 
manner in which the structure of the phenomenon accords with 
the restrictions prescribed by the system from the standpoint 
of which the possibility of reference to that phenomenon is 
provided. It is relative to this system that the essential 
structure of the phenomenon can be characterized as meaning­
ful and valid.^ The set of restrictions, or consistency 
boundary conditions, prescribed by this system establishes 
a general structure in terms of which the ontological 
character of a phenomenon is determined. In relation to 
a.context involving-certain consistency boundary conditions, 
it is logically impossible for a phenomenon to be given 
in terms of that context if the structure of the phenomenon 
2 does not meet those conditions. 
A set of consistency boundary conditions restricts a 
range of contextual possibilities. These conditions relate 
to what there can be, relative to a certain context of 
1. On the concepts of meaning and validity, see pp. 17, 
69ff, and passim. 
2. The view described here might be termed a ftrans-^ 
cendental phenomenological ontology'. According to this view, 
the "essential ontological structure" of a given phenomenon 
is described in terms of forms of constitutive relativity 
without which that phenomenon could not be. In conformity with 
the modal order of the logic of structure of the phenomenon, 
its' being in this sense can be elucidated in terms of its 
"formal" or its "material" character. Formal ontology and 
material ontology are therefore distinguished as two essentially 
related branches of phenomenological ontology. (See pp. 37ff» 
I39f.) 
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reference. All possible objects of reference are said to be 
"real", i.e., "have being."''' The manner in which an object 
can be characterized as real, as having being, determines the 
ontological character of that object. More will be said in 
this connection shortly. 
Because phenomenology is concerned with the conditioning 
structure of what can be an object of reference, ontology is 
inevitable: it is implied whenever reference is made. To 
investigate the ontological structure of phenomena is to 
elucidate that which is fundamental to their being, and thus 
that which underlies their possibility.^ In particular, 
the elucidation of the ontological structure of phenomena 
involves the description of various ways phenomena may be 
materially constituted, i.e., specific relations which 
certain structural elements of a given context may bear to 
each other are characterized.^ 
Thus the being of a phenomenon is conditioned in relation 
to a coordinative system; the ontological character of a 
1. A phenomenon is said to be "real" in the sense that 
it may be included under the heading "reality." Reality* is 
a general term referring to phenomena ontologically distinguished 
in a plurality of ways. 
2. On the inevitability of ontology, cf. [Feibleman 1: 
I65ffj. " Lfontologie fait corps avec la science elle-m§me 
et ne peut en etre separee." [Meyerson 1: 439J 
t 
3. In this connection the distinction may be noted in 
[Benjamin Is 63f, 66 J between the "unique content".and the 
"structural content of an occurrent." 
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phenomenon is essentially relational. Out of relation, 
being is impossible. In this sense, the being of a phenomenon 
is ontologically relative to those structures to which its 
ontological character is fundamentally bound.-1-
Now, the possibility of identifying reference to a 
phenomenon requires the preservation of certain consistency 
principles; these, in turn, are constitutive of what can 
be in relation to a given context of reference. It follows 
that phenomenological ontology is concerned to investigate 
the non-inconsistent fundamental and intrinsic structure 
of groups of phenomena.*5 In this connection, it will later 
be observed that a description of the essential ontological 
structure of a group of related phenomena is tautologous in 
1. "[BJeing is an ultimate, underived and independent 
universal. It involves a relation. This relation...includes 
in its terms an instance of being on the one hand and the 
whole of meaning on the other." [Haserot 1: 103f] "The being 
of a thing...is its implicative interrelation with the whole 
of meaning. Whatever enters such a relation has being, and 
nothing has being which does not enter such a relation." 
[Haserot 1: 101J 
Put differently, there can be no thing which does not 
disclose relationships to other things, thereby revealing 
systematic ordering of phenomena. 
2. By this token, the inconsistent and the meaningless 
do not fall within the domain of inquiry of phenomenological 
ontology as it is here described. A proposition relative to 
a context which essentially requires the self-contradiction 
or meaninglessness of that proposition is, for the purposes of 
an ontological examination of that context, irrelevant. That 
is, the actual is not fundamentally inconsistent. 
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the, sense that it derives from the very constitution of the 
phenomena in' question.^* 
The ontological character of a given phenomenon is 
essentially conditioned by the relativistic self-enclosure 
of its context of reference. The intrinsic self-referential 
capacity of a relativistically self-enclosed context provides 
the foundation for what can be given in that context. There­
fore the fundamental structure of what can be is determined 
by the essential structure of the referential content proper 
to a phenomenon.2 
Every reference entails some ontological premiss which 
describes (i) the range of objects to which reference is 
possible and (ii) the ontological character(s) of these 
objects.^ A descriptive enumeration of distinct varieties of 
1. In relation to'the reflexive character of the logic 
of structure of a given group of phenomena, the tautologous 
nature of ontological descriptions is of particular 
significance in an analysis of the concept of truth. (See 
§ 2.4») It may be noted here that "the grounding of every 
analytic proposition in the syntactic sense which is not a 
law of logic, demands an existential premise which alone 
authorizes us to apply the laws of logic to particular cases." 
[Ajdukiewicz 1: 13 J Cf. 140, n. 2. 
2. Once again, the comparative suitability of the 
phrase "the structure of what canbd'in relation to the phrase 
"the structure of what is" is decided on the basis of a 
determination of the modal order of the snabject-matter in 
question. 
3* See [Quinton 1]. 
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these ontological commitments is the task of taxonomic 
ontology. Distinctions between the ontological characters • 
of different phenomena are evidenced in terms of the specific 
ways in which their being is constituted. The ontological 
character, or, as it is sometimes termed, the Tmode of being1, 
of a given phenomenon exemplifies the particular manner 
according to which the being of that phenomenon is relative 
• 
to a certain set of consistency boundary conditions. Thus, 
the ontological character or mode of being of a phenomenon 
expresses a particular form of ontological relativity. Where 
the task of taxonomic ontology is to take note of the grounds 
for distinguishing ontological characters of phenomena, it is 
the business of descriptive ontology to elucidate these 
ontological diversifications and to clarify relationships 
between them.^ It is clear that the classificatory and 
elucidative functions of phenomenological ontology are 
closely allied. 
A given group of phenomena may have the same ontological 
character, or phenomena in the group may represent various 
ontological characters.^ Consequently, the sense in which 
1. Phenomena of a given ontological character may be 
said to comprise one in a plurality of realities. On reference 
to such a plurality of realities, see [McTaggart 1: I 
2. Accordingly, a distinction is observed between 




a phenomenon is related to other phenomena in the same 
context is different from the sense in which the ontological 
character of a phenomenon is related to the ontological . 
characters of other phenomena. 
The ontological character of a given phenomenon 
reflects the nature of the ontological commitment fundamental 
to the system providing for the possibility of reference to 
that phenomenon. A system is ontologically committed to a 
range of phenomena such that any identifying reference to 
a given phenomenon from the standpoint of that system is a 
reference to a phenomenon in the given range.^ 
However, not all references' to phenomena must involve 
specific ontological commitments. When reference is made in 
such a manner that .implies no definite ontological commitments, 
phenomena so characterized are said to have a virtual 
ontological character - that is, no specific form of ontological 
1. "Membership in an ontological field or environment 
or context is quite distinct from membership in a group or 
class of beings, though a group may share an ontological 
domain or world-region." [Schneider 1: 6] 
2. . "...l'Stre de l'etat de choses fondateur conditionne 
lfetre de lfetat de choses consequent." [RL II.2 v £ 36 288J 
"[TJhe logical commitments of ontology are none other than 
those of... scientific analysis." [Schneider 1: 15J 
3. "[WJe now" have a[nJ.. .explicit standard whereby to 
decide what ontology a given theory or form of discourse is 
committed toi a theory is committed to those and only those 
entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be 
capable of referring...". [Quine 1: 14] 
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relativity is expressed when identifying reference is made 
to phenomena of this kind. The system providing for the 
possibility of such reference is therefore said to be 
ontologicallv noncommittal.^ In the most general sense, 
phenomena characterized as having a virtual ontological 
character are neutral with respect to ontology.^ It follows 
that investigations with the greatest latitude of applica-
• 
bility are ontologically neutral, since they are accordingly 
not confined to phenomena of a certain ontological character. 
When a phenomenon is indeterminate or neutral with 
respect to concrete ontological character, identifying 
reference to the phenomenon entails an implicit acknowledgement 
that in some undefined or non-specific manner there is such 
O 
an object.- The virtual status of any phenomenon is implied 
whenever specific information about its concrete ontological 
character cannot be ascertained. 
When reference to a given phenomenon itself involves 
an ontological commitment to a spatially constituted object, 
the phenomenon is said to have an existential ontological. 
character - that is, a phenomenon is said, strictly speaking, 
1. My notion of a noncommittal ontology follows 
proposals relating to "notions" in [Godel 2], to "classes" 
in [Bernays 1J, and to "virtual classes and relations" in 
[Quine 4J. 
2. A "language of noncommittal abstraction" suggests 
itself for the investigation of such phenomena. See [Quine 
4: 15ff, 35ff, 277, 328J 
3. "[OJn ne saurait...commencer a parler de cet S, 
sans reconnaitre virtuellement par la ou'il v a un S« [RL II.2 
v J 35 2#2; his italicsj 
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t0 exist. where a definite form of ontological relativity 
essentially determines the phenomenonfs character as a 
1 
spatially extended object. 
A phenomenon, then, may be described to have a certain 
ontological character in essential relation to the context 
conditioning the possibility of identifying reference to that 
phenomenon. Phenomena homogeneous with respect to ontological 
character comprise a single "region of being" or "reality" 
relative to a plurality of ontologically interrelated regions 
or realities. Together, phenomena of various ontological 
characters may comprise an ensemble of what there is from 
the standpoint of a certain context. The ontological 
1. Since spatial phenomena may express distinct 
space-dimensional orders while their ontological characters 
may vary accordingly, a more useful and restricted sense of 
the term Existence* to designate "objective" phenomena will 
be employed in later discussions in 2*1+ and 2.6. 
This usage follows Cicero, who appears to have first 
made use of the term 1existereT in relation to ontological 
questions. He used the term to characterize objective, 
spatial beings. (Cf. [Schneider 1: 23 J * [Andrews 1: 
Ontological studies which begin with a phenomenon 
which "exists" in the unqualified sense that it is spatially 
constituted, and then widen their scope of investigation 
sometimes to phenomena of distinct ontological characters, 
have in recent times called themselves "existential". Usually 
such an ontology does not adequately differentiate between 
the distinct ontological characters of phenomena forming its 
subject-matter. For this reason, subsequent use of 'existence 
is made in the restricted Latin sense of the word. 
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character of a phenomenon represents the manner in which 
the essential structure of the phenomenon is related to a 
particular region of being.* 
Now, it has been noted that relativistic self-enclosure 
is regionally manifested.2 An investigation of this occurrence 
can be of significant interest to a phenomenological ontology. 
The form of ontological relativity expressed in terms of 
a set of consistency boundary conditions to which the being 
of a given phenomenon is relative, is constitutive of reference 
to phenomena the ontological character of which is homogeneous 
with the ontological structure of the given phenomenon. A 
region of being so characterized is such that no reference 
can be made to a phenomenon the ontological structure of 
which has the above form, while the essential relativity 
of the being of a phenomenon to its conditioning context is 
disallowed. As a result, it is evident that the relativistic 
constitution of the ontological structure of groups of 
phenomena intrinsically is prescriptive of general conditions 
according to which identifying reference to those phenomena 
1. [Linsky 1] suggests the idea that a theory of 
reality-operators might be used so that the structure of a 
proposition implicitly or explicitly expresses the region of 
being to which that proposition refers. An object to 
which reference is made in the context of a novel would be 
characterized via an "in-the-novel" operator. "I would..., 
in my own ontology, divide objects into...objects which are, 
e.g., characters of fiction, legendary figures, mythological 
figures, ...as well as abstractions, mathematical objects, 
concepts, etc." [Linsky 1: 20, 126] 
2* See p. 191, n. 1. 
I 213 
is restricted. At this point, I therefore turn to investigate 
several projective misconstructions which have their base 
in ontological considerations. 
First, consider the view that "an enduring spatial 
object must exist "behind" a series of spatial variations." T 
It has already been noted that a constant value expressed 
in spatial." variation is essentially relative to such 
variations, and reference cannot be made to that value out 
of relation to the variations."^ Since the relativity of a 
spatial object to a certain group of spatial variations is 
constitutive of that object, the ontological character of 
the object is essentially relative to the system providing for 
the possibility of identifying reference to the given group 
of spatial variations. It is consequently projective to 
represent a group of spatial variations and the spatial 
object constituted in relation to these variations as 
ontologically heterogeneous. In no sense, then, can a 
spatial object exist apart, autonomous of the variations 
which express it.2 
A second projective misconstruction which has its root 
in ontological considerations concerns the view that "there 
1. Cf. pp. 179f. 
2.• To assert the meaninglessness of a proposition with • 
apparent existential import, does not claim the meaningfulness 
of the existence or the non-existence of that to which the 
proposition would refer. The denial (or the affirmation) of 
a meaningless assertion is meaningless. 
Here, the phenomenological may be thought to t  
function as a suspension of the absurd. "[DJans l?4Tro*r\ 
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are objects outside of the domain of possible experience."*'* 
The sense of this proposition necessarily involves concepts 
the meaningfulness of which is constituted in essential 
relation to a pragmatical system. Specifically, the foun­
dation for particularity (with respect to the concept of 
object) and for the ontological character of a particular 
(with respect to an understanding of its being) is 
established by the essential structure of a coordinative 
system. The foundation for exteriority (with respect to the 
nous nous abstenons de porter un jugement sur l'existence ou . 
l'inexistence d'un monde [exterieurJ." [S. Bachelard 1: 136J 
Cf. [RL III appendice 6 5 2^3] and [RL II.2 v 6 16 204; 6 27 
247]. 
1. The transcendent nature of some objects is occasionally 
interpreted in this manner. It should be clear that my use of 
1 transcendent1 (pp. 42, 173ff, 199) is opposed to this inter­
pretation. (Cf., e.g., [RL II.1 ii § & 149]») Accordingly, 
it may be useful to add that the concept of transcendence 
I propose can, strictly, speaking, be termed a kind of 
'inter-phenomenal transcendence'. By this is understood 
that a phenomenon is regarded to be transcendent if its 
logic of structure entails an essentially open o-series. 
Since the expansion of a series must follow according to a 
given serial order pattern, the elaboration of a description of 
a "transcendent object" can never be essentially discontinuous 
with earlier characterizations of that object. In this specific 
sense, Husserl's observation seems to me appropriate: "Le fait 
Sue les objets juges sont, dans le premier cas transcendant3..., 
ans l1autre immanents..., ne determine en 1'occurence aucune 
difference essentielle." [RL III 6 2 24f; my italics]See also 
[Ideen I § 52]. 
Ambiguity with respect to the sense in which an object 
is considered to be transcendent frequently leads to an unclear 
distinction between a phenomenon and its explicit description. 
See [RL II.1 ii. <S 36 231f ], [RL II.2 v 6 2 148; 6 39 299], 
[RL III § 2 24f; appendice $ 5 283], [LFLT § 26 112], ' 
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prepositional use of Outside1) is grounded in the nature 
of spatial identifying reference. The grounds for the 
possibility of particularity, of ontological character, and 
of exteriority are constituted relative to a given context 
of reference. If this context of reference permits the 
general characterization of phenomena, its structure is 
fundamentally pragmatical."1" Thus, in the view in question, 
since concepts which are contextually relative are dissociated 
from the domain of possible experience to which they are 
essentially related, the view is projective and its explicit 
2 description, absurd. 
Several projective misconstructions which pertain to 
the coordinative structures of groups of phenomena should 
be mentioned at this point. First, a certain projection 
may occur in relation to the system from the standpoint 
of which identifying reference to a certain group of 
phenomena is possible. The view may result that the system 
1. See pp. 133f» 
2. On the absurdity of this view, cf. [Ideen 1 90] 
and [RL I § 36 130J. For an illustration of a related 
projection, see, e.g., [Ramsey 1: 32ff] and [Kleene Is 45]> 
[Godel 3: 137]. 
A distinction should be noted between the projective 
characterization of "the being of objects outside of the 
domain of possible experience" and the acknowledgment that 
some phenomena do not in fact explicitly express a pragmatical 
character. The latter "egologically unmodified" phenomena are 
treated in 9 2.6. The constitution of such phenomena is such 
that the question is left open as to whether or not they can 
have an explicit pragmatical character. 
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in question is such that all phenomena can be expressed 
in terms of that system. In other words, the relativity of 
the system to the appropriate groups)of commonly constituted 
phenomena is denied or ignored so that the.system is viewed 
to be "absolutely comprehensive." In the face of evidence 
that there are ontologically dissimilar and fundamentally 
disjoint regions, to so generalize a system that its ; 
relativity to some phenomena among others is disregarded, 
is illegitimate 
In a like manner, distinctions which can be made relative 
to one system may not be described in any absolute sense. 
• • \ 
For example, it may be possible to distinguish the physical 
from the pragmatical character of a phenomenon. However, 
the fact that such a distinction is possible with respect 
to one context can provide the basis for a projection if 
the contextually relative distinction is thought to express 
the ontological autonomy of "the physical" from "the 
pragmatical", irrespective of any context.2 
1. Granting the principle of complementarity (p. 122, 
n.2), essential dissimilarities between phenomena are not 
in principle ruled out. The position is therefore implied 
that at least some differences may prohibit their expression 
in a single coordinative system. (See also notes on Gode^s 
incompleteness theorem, pp. 125ff) 
The view that consciousness comprises a "recepticle" for 
phenomena is similarly illegitimate. This "myth of the • 
container-consciousness" is considered in y 2.6. 
2. Husserl considers the distinction between the 
psychological and the physical as stemming "effectivement 
de realites separees, tout au moins relativement independantes 
les unes des autres (et 1*independence ne signifie naturelle-
217 
Furthermore, a context which provides the basis for 
reference to a given phenomenon, as weil as for reference 
to that reference itself , may occasion a projective 
misconstruction: Reference to a given reference involves 
recourse to an embedment-system of higher order from the 
standpoint of which the phenomenon and the reference to that 
phenomenon can be described. If it is asserted that, for 
all phenomena, the exemplification of a phenomenon involves 
both the being of the phenomenon as well as the being of 
the reference to that phenomenon, a projective misconstruction 
ensues. In relation to contexts the consistency boundary 
conditions of which rule out recourse to a higher-order 
embedment-system, what the above assertion requires as a 
condition of its meaningfulness is ruled out. Unrestricted 
application of the view that the occurrence of a phenomenon 
involves both the phenomenon and reference to the phenomenon, 
leads to projective misconstruction. Conversely, from the 
standpoint of a context providing for characterization of a 
given phenomenon as well as of reference to that phenomenon, 
it is illegitimate to assert that the phenomenon is "onto-
logically prior to" the reference to that phenomenon (i.e., 
that reference to a reference to a particular depends upon 
the particular in a manner that the particular does not depend 
ment pas ici que les deux ordres de realites doivent §tre 
separes par...une difference tout a fait incomparable.)" [RL 
II.2 v {> 7 Ire ed. 34§] See also [RL III appendice 0 2-271 J. 
Whitehead finds that this distinctions lies in the fact 
that "we can think about nature without thinking about thought. 
[Whitehead 1: 3J 
1* On such "oblique reference," cf. [Frege 3].* 
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upon reference to a reference to the particular). ^  There are 
merely two distinct cases: one in which reference to a 
reference is possible, and another in which such reference 
is not possible. Neither case has any kind of "precedence"; 
the cases simply refer to two kinds of contexts. 
In the same vein, since the being of a given group of 
phenomena is essentially relative to the coordinative system 
permitting identifying reference to that group, the groupN 
of phenomena may be said to have been at a previous time 
if and only if the system in question provides the basis 
for reference to phenomena earlier in time than the given 
group. Lacking the possibility of reference to such 
evidence, the question cannot•meaningfully arise regarding 
"an earlier group of phenomena." Controversy as to whether 
the structure of phenomena is or is not the product of a 
"primordial constitutive matrix of acts"3 appears to be 
1. An illustration of the attribution of such 
ontological precedence may be had in the view that "pre-
reflexive contents are always anterior to reflexive, ones." 
See, e.g., [LFLT {> 30 269]. 
2. Husserl's view here seems to me v.ery near to 
the truth: "The arithmetical world is there...only when 
and so long as...the arithmetical standpoint [is granted]." 
[Ideen I £ 28; his italics] 
3« See 6 2.6 for a description of several projective 
misconstructions which have their root in the concept of 
act. 
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ambiguous at this point due to the absence of an accepted 
1 o 
standard for evidence which could support this claim. 
Finally, it is of interest to.note that de-projective 
phenomenology can neither be called a realism nor an 
idealism, since both realism and idealism are set aside. 
Strictly speaking, a projective misconstruction is common 
to both positions. Realism here may be said to affirm the 
"being of objects outside of the domain of possible 
experience", while idealism may be described as denying that 
there are such objects. The projection involved in either 
approach has already been described.^ The decision whether 
1. I seriously doubt that the concept of evidence can 
be made to apply in this connection. (See pp. I36ff.) One 
is reminded of Hume's questions "For what can be imagined 
more tormenting than to seek with eagerness what forever 
flees us, and seek for it in a place where it is impossible 
it can ever exist?" [Hume 1: 223] 
2. I am at present inclined to believe that the issue 
dividing the intuitionalists (Poincare, Brouwer, Weyl) and 
the logicists (Godel, Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Church, 
CarnapT - as to whether classes are "invented" or "discovered" 
is also highly ambiguous, for the same reason. 
In the interest of clarity and rigour, then, in no 
sense is it admissible, without distinct evidence to the 
contrary, to regard the structure of a phenomenon as either 
"borrowed" or "read into" the phenomenon. 
3. Cf. pp. 121, 191, 206 (n. 2), 215 (n. 2). 
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to adhere to the realist or to the idealist position 
consequently has no bearing on the clear understanding of 
t h e  t a s k  o f  d e - p r o j e c t i v e  p h e n o m e n o l o g y . i  
1. Cf. pp. 206, 215* Compare Husserlfs view that 
both realism and idealism are fundamentally absurd. [Ideen I 
19J "fNleither the thesis of realism that the external world 
is real, nor that of idealism that the external world is not 
real can be considered scientifically meaningful. This does 
not mean that, the two theses are false; rather, they have no 
meaning at all so that the question of their truth and 
falsity cannot even be posed." [Carnap 1: 334; his italics} 
Reichenbach1s functional conception of knowledge also 
eliminates the realism-idealism controversy. See [Reichenbach 
6: 269 J and [Reichenbach 1-: xxxviij. Wittgensteins view 
on the matter leads to a weakening of the distinction between 
realism and idealism through a reduction of idealism to 
realism. Thus, "solipsism, when its implications are followed 
out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of 
solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there 





• ' . -TRUTH v 
< "A t 
A phenomenological elucidation of truth has as Its 
specific task an accurate description of the constitutive 
structures which provide for the possibility of representing 
truths."1- This possibility is essentially founded upon the • 
relativity of a truth to the context in relation to which 
that which is true is represented. The logic of structure 
of this context is prescriptive of consistency conditions 
which, as noted earlier, are of two kinds - those expressed 
in.terras of rules of truth, and those expressed in terms 
of.rules of sense. It is the. purpose of this chapter to 
investigate further th<ese general consistency conditions 
in order to extend an understanding of the nature of 
truth and of sense. 
A given context, in relation to which reference can 
be mada to a truth, determines a system of what is real £Md 
possible from the standpoint of that context# It Is 
1. " Ii'explicitation phenomenologique s'orientait 
ainsi vers la determination des conditions reeles ou 
s'engendre la verite." [Tran-Duc-Thao Is 221J 
2. M[A] proposition is true provided it is a member 
of an internally consistent system of propositions and t 
provided further that this system is the system in which' 
everything real and possible,is coherently included." [Blanshard 
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in essential relation to that context.that what is true. 
relative to that context may be characterized as •;such. / 
• V 
From this-it is shown to follow that it is impossible ;to • . 
.characterize a truth in isolation,"1, 
v.-: The phenoraenological .concept of truth expresses the 
'essential: coordinative relation between what ,is described 
to be true and that by virtue;of which it is possible fqr 
it to be true. So described» truth is a semantical-concept 
which' coordinates a truth with what grounds that,truth. /. 
If reference. is made to & truth, then that by virtue of .. • 
which it is true must be possible.^ The concept'of truth, 
then, has a coordinative function in relation to the domain 
of ideal possibilities investigated by. phenomenology.3 
''• ' Now,.1-identifying reference must be possible, to/that • 
in relation to which it can'be determined whether.a given 
.  i  •  ,  •  . . .  • -  '  '  
li II.'276] Cf. also [Chisholm 1; 269]« "Truth I believe 
to be the .degree in which the character of reality is present 
within a proposition or system-of propositions...." [Bosanquet 
Is 102] ' • : • 
1. Blanshard, in connection with the so-called "coherence 
theory of truth", says "...the truth of no proposition-can be 
seen in isolation." [Blanshard 1:1274] "[A] set of propositions 
any one of which* if taken in .isolation*' would be doubtful in 
the extreme, may lend each other such support through systematic 
coherence as to render all of them virtually certain." [Blans­
hard 1:12tf 7] "[A]ucune verite n*est isolee dans, la science; 
elle s'associe avec d?autres verites pour former des -
assemblages theoriques unis par des relations de fondament a 
qonsequence." [RL I £ 42 175J 
,
: 
,2. Von Wright observes the distinction between the 
statement that if a proposition is true* it is necessarily 
. possible (not certain) and the statement that it is necessary 
that, if a proposition is true, it is possible (a tautology), • 
See [von Wright 1: 76]. . 
3* See pp. 199fi~ 
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characterization is true. 'What provides the basis for • 
such'a determination is terme;d ^evidence*That which - ~ 
can be characterized as true' is essentially relative to a 
determinate context of' reference.^ This context*provides 
the/ground of evidence by reason of which it is possible 
for a characterization to be true.^ • This ground of evidence 
"cannot of course itself be characterized as trueMor false)4", 
1. A proposition bears a claim to truth if it can 
be demonstrated true either.(i) in relation to one or more 
additional true propositions,' or (iij by virtue of its own 
structure, whatever that may be. Evidence is relied upon 
in (i), where self-evidence would be involved in (ii). 
In general® to say of something that it is self-evident 
means in part that it can be regarded as a fundamental given 
. upon which, the structure of knowledge is based. Cf. pp> 137ff» 
.224. ;  v .  ' • '  _ 
2. Cf. p. 142. ' ~ " 
.V 3« This view resembles Tarski's explanation of an 
individual true instance as meeting the following set of . . 
conditions: 
f " (T.) X is true if. and only if. £. 
". \ 
We shall call any such equivalence (with ®p* replaced by any ' 
sentence of the language to which the word 'true® refers, 
and ?Xf replaced by the name of this sentenceTlin "equivalence 
of the form (T)." ...[E]very equivalence of the, form (T) 
obtained by replacing 'pv by a particular sentence, and 'X* 
by the name of this sentence, may be considered a partial 
definition of truth, whi'ch explains wherein the truth of 
this one individual sentence consists. The general definition 
has to be, in a certain sense, a logical conjunction of all 
these definitions." [Tarski. 2: 55,3 
k* ^On falsity, see below, pp. 233f.' j ' 
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. but'provides the basis with1:,respect to which it is possible 
• for a truth (or falsity) to be represented as such."*1 .The 
relativity of ;ahat is . true to: that by virtue of which -it is 
true, is ^ constitutive of, the phenomenological concept of 
... truth.2 h • ' 
A context in relation to which a given description 
may be established as . true, oh'the basis of wholly intrinsic 
. reference, has a logic of structure which provides for a. 
self-referential expression of the relativity essential to "~ 
the concept of truth. Since the logic of structure of the 
space-time manifold permits recursive self-reference*'self- . 
evidence may be further described,, as followsi Let 
' -
abbreviate reference to the ground of evidence relative to 
whibh a characterization C of £ in a system S'"legitimates 
the. affirmation that C is true in S". Furthermore, from 
the standpoint of an embedment - system S", let ' ' stand 
for a (reflexive) reference to e', where j^'re-confirmes 
the truth of C, evidenced by e^» Now:, if both e^. and 
i  . . • •• 1 
Vv- 1. In this sense, a truth is "evident." "Quandv;.A... 
est evident,..il est...donne veritablement." [RL III p 39 156] 
On this observation-in connection with axiomatic systems, 
see.[Veblen 1]. 
- 2, VThe character of relativity*..which attaches to... 
verification...is really inevitable in the pursuit of "truth." . 
[Bosanquet. 1: 102] Cf. also [Bl an shard 1. II 277]. . 
• . '•«' •• •' • • - . • ' • . ' • • ' ' f -
' r' : . •; i• •' ' ' i'1 • 1 . ' • '' • 1 1 • • 
- I  ' . • h - - ~  1 
• V : . '• •• .'.V / . . ,:r 
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are- such that for any e£ ,£• is' evidenced, then; for any 
series , £eJ'' , ... ,, ' relative to which a characteriza­
tion, of oc is evidenced to be true, that characterization 
of <* may be said to be: f self-evident * .*• . s i' • , 
• "• At this point,'it should be clear that from''the •" 
constitutive relativity'of. truth it follows that no truth 
can, without projective misconstruction, be generalized 
iri a manner, such that" it is dissociated from' its essential . 
connection to the constitutive structure of the system or *" 
group of systems from the standpoint of which that truth 
may be evidenced. The means, then, whereby a true 
description is shown to be related to that by virtue of which 
' " 
it is.true, is termed 'verification*®2 Thus, the truth of 
a "given assertion is what its'verification establishes. 
.  .  ' 1 .  O f .  p p .  1 1 0 ,  1 1 9 ,  1 2 1 f ,  1 2 4 .  S e e  [ L F L T $  7 a  2 6 4 ] - .  
It has sometimes been thought a limitation of axiomatic 
method that it cannot establish knowledge with strict 
certainty, but rather reduces the question of such knowledge 
to a set of postulates which must be hypothesized. The logic 
of structure of a relativistically self-enclosed' system, 
however, goes beyond the axiomatic method in that the 
autoconcordant and self-referential constitutive structure of 
self-evidence provides for the possibility of characterizing 
certain fundamental "axioms" as true from the standpoint of 
the system to which they-are proper. 
2. -It should be noted that the diagnostic phase of 
de-projection involves verification in tiie sense in which it 
is described here. (See pp.'#lf£) 




Its.verification is essentially relative to the system.. . 
or group of systems from the standpoint of which>-its 
truth may; be evidenced.v ;v:,-
• An assertion for which evidence is deficient in .. 
* 
one:context can be confirmed provided that reference can 
be made to a .second context in relation to vjhich the truth 
of-the assertion can be evidenced, or provided that the: 
initial context be extended to\include the necessary basis 
for substantiating its truth. Frequently# such an "annexation" 
of evidence is rendered possible, from the standpoint of a 
context temporally subsequent to the initial deficient^ 
2  '  
context. . ' 
I . » 
The general relation that a truth bears to that by 
virtue ,of which it Is possible for it to be true, is such 
that the truth is founded upon the constitution of that' 
which serves to confirm that truth. The relativity of a 
given truth to its confirmability is' constitutive of the 
tautologo.us equivalence between that which is . asserted to 
1 
, ' • o 
be the ca,se and that which is confirmed to be the case.-' ; 
• ' • 1 * x 
' ' t ' 
1.. ;"[A] proposition...is only to be verified by the 
self-criticism of the system to which it belongs." [Bosanquet 
1: 102] •."• ' 
• 2. See fLFLT l+li- 16-731 fBosanquet Is 1023* 
/ 3. -It is appropriate to recall that a demonstration 
that a given expression is tautologous may be quite involved, 
and-must depend upon reliable,, evidence. (P»,-73») 
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In this sense, all analysis'ideally is tautologous in that 
it derives from' the very constitution of the subject-matter-
investigated. •• - -.Vv • 
The verification of a truth, then, essentially 
involves the'establishment of-this concordant relation --' 
•t ' • • 
between, a' given assertion and that by virtue of which , it . is 
possible for the assertion to:be true.- The reflexive. 
character'of this relation is fundamental to.-the constitutive 
relativity of truth; . the logic of structure of the < \ --
concordant relation essential to the confirraability of a 
truth has a relativistic constitution in that this.logic of 
structure provides the basis for recursive reflexive reference# 
I0 Gf. p. 207. On this pointy [Britton 1: 1791 and 
[Nogaro 1: 12f] may be consulted. (See pp. 122f, 206f.) 
• Closely related is Leibniz's view that every primitive '• 
•proposition consists in an identity affirming that the subject-
predicate' relation is analytic. [Leibniz 1: V 67] "[Ejvery 
true proposition attributing a predicate to a subject is 
purely analytic9 since the subject is its own nature." [Russell 
7: 167] (See also [LFLT § 79 266]. Refer to pp. 3f, 34» on 
the status of the subject-predicate relation in terms of the 
present work.) ' "[MJy object is not to explain the meaning, 
of wordstbut the nature of things." [Spinoza 1: II 17$3 
' s 
V 2. 11 L'eviderice, c*est Inexperience vecue de la • 
concordance entre la pensee et le present lui-mSme qu'elle 
pense, entre le snns actuel de I'enoncfl et l'etat de chose 
donn<5 lui-meme; et la verite, cvest lvidee de cette 
• concordance*" [RL I ^ 51 206] u[L]a verite...en tant que 
correlat d'une identification par coSncidence^ [est] une 
identite: la pleine concordance entre le vise et le don^ie 
comme tel. Cette concordance est v£cue dans 1*evidence» en 
tant que lrevidence est la realisation actuelle de ^identi­
fication adequate." [RL III £ 39 151] j 
V . \ •' • - ' .•'' 1 ' - > v .  
''>3* ;See 0 1.6. 
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It follows from the relativity, of verification to a given 
context of reference that, in'the most general sense, 
confirmation of truth has the' character of self-evidence.^" 
The possibility that an assertion can be verified implies 
strictly that such concordance can be established in 
2 fconnection with ,the confirmation of the assertion. .; , 
- Thus, to pose the question whether a given description 
of ,what is the case is true, is to suppose that reference 
from the standpoint of the system permitting reference- ~ 
to the description in question may validly be made to a. 
set of confirmatory or disconfirmatory possibilities. .The 
meaningfulness of inquiry into the possible truth of an 
i 
assertion.is dependent upon the possibility of reference 
to-conditions upon which rests the verifiability or 
f a l s i f l a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  a s s e r t i o n . 4 •  
1. The autoconcordant nature of self-evidence refers, 
strictly speaking, to that type of context relative to which 
verification requires no "annexation" of evidence to 
supplement its given structure. (See p. 226.) 
2. The relativistic constitution of truth therefore 
provides the basis for non-projective characterisations of 
truth as involving an "adaequation." In this connection, see 
[RL III £ 33 150], [LFLT...£ 19 92; § 54 193; § 76 260; appendice 
9 4 431]» [S. Bachelard 1: 74]» On the projective misconstruc­
tion excluded here, see below, pp. 232f. 
3. "In the strictly logical sense, to pose a question 
is to give a statement together with the task of deciding 
whether this statement or its negation is true." [Carnap 1: 
290] Cf. also [Carnap 1: 325]. "Denn Zweifel kann nur 
bestehen, wo eine Frage besteht; eine Frage nur, wo eine 
Antwort besteht, und diese nur, wo etwas gesagt werden kann." 
[Wittgenstein 1; 6.51] 
I take this opportunity to note that the above account 
provides the foundation for "an operational concept of truth," 
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'
: It is in relation to such conditions that it has been 
observed that the ontological 'character of a given phenomenon 
is determined.•*" The truth of a given assertion is evidenced 
in relation to a phenomenon or group of phenomena the ; 
ontological character(s) of which may be specific or 
virtual. 'It follows that a^truth is necessarily verifiable 
relative to a certain range of phenomena. Conditions of 
possibility of the truth of a given description are 
constitutive of the ontological structure of phenomena which 
can evidence the truth of that description. In other words* 
the possibility of confirming a given assertion entails that 
reference be possible to a range of phenomena of !a-certain 
» • • 
2 • 
ontological character. 
• Now,'-a phenomenon to which reference is made" by a 
i  i  • 
plurality of true assertions is termed 'objective' if some 
of these assertions are made from the standpoint of 
distinctly constituted contexts,' and provided further that 
each assertion can be confirmed true on a basis wholly 
since!.e.g., an explication of the notion of "possible 
operation" in the latter view must eventually lead to a 
description of the constitutive relativity of truth. In this 
connection, see [Bridsman 4: 25J, [Bridgman 2: 44j» [LFLT 9 73 
250J, [Ricoeur 1: 43 ]» and [Ideen II 45J. 
. . 1. P. 204 and passim. 
2. "Truth is the logical aspect of the system of 
implicative relations integrating things, and being is the 
ontological aspect.... But these two aspects, i.e. logical 
and ontological, cannot...be separated. For every instance 
of being there is a. true proposition and for every true 
proposition there is an instance of being. It is impossible 
to disjoin the two." [Haserot 1: 101] . 
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intrinsic to the context to-which that assertion is proper. 
Each context, in other words,' intrinsically evidences the 
truth of the assertion(s) made from that standpoint. -Strictly 
speaking,, the plurality of true assertions refer-:to .a group 
of phenomena which, in relation to an embedment-system 
of higher:order, may be represented as variations.of a 
single objective phenomenon the constitution of which is 
essentially, relative to such variations. Objectivity. ' 
therefore, is constituted in terms of one or more systems --
of correlated truths established on different grounds in 
a. variety of ways."'" The objective world is constituted 
. relative to the domain of objectively determinable, possibili-V 
2 ' 
•ties. • . ; • 
'. Confirmability of an assertion, however, is-not 
always relative to objectively determinable possibilities#• 
Diverse forms of relativity may characterize the relation 
. 1. On the nature of such, "correlations," see $ 2.5. 
It may be observed that a particular truth is objective -
to the degree that this truth can be evidenced from a 
variety of distinctly constituted standpoints. The degree • 
of objectivity which a truth commands is directly related to 
the number of different ways in which that truth can be 
evidenced. 
Accordingly (cf. pp. 210f),.a phenomenon is said to 
exist in the strict sense if and only if (i) reference to 
that phenomenon itself involves (or can be expressed in terms 
of) an ontological commitment to a spatial object and (ii) 
the. phenomenon is objectively constituted. 
2. "[Lje monde n*est rien d*autre que l'unite objective 
totale qui correspond au systeme ideal de toutes les Veritas 
empiriques et en est inseparable." [RL I 6 36 1313 See :also 
[Ricoeur 3: 463. - t . 
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between what is described to be and that by virtue of which 
it'is possible for the description to be evidenced. In one 
sense these foms of relativity express distinct coordinati.ve 
relations^according to which it is possible for a value 
o t h e r  t h a n  " t r u t h "  ( o r  " f a l s i t y " )  t o  b e  c o n f i r m e d  i n  a : '  
particular instance.*1 In another, sense a plurality o£ 
such values is closely allied to diversity in the ontolo-
gical structure of phenomena. Conditions of-possibility, 
of a. pluri-valent assessment of a given characterization 
are constitutive of the ontological structure of phenomena 
• i n • ' i 
which can evidence such a plurality of values. In relation 
to several contexts differently constituted with respect 
• i 
to values•subject to confirmations it is clear that it is 
possible that there may be no single truth in relation to 
"a phenomenon" to which reference is made from the given 
standpoints. 
Rules of truth of a given context express the manner 
in which the logic of structure of that context functions 
1. Such values have recently become the object of 
serious and purely formal study under the general heading 
of "many-valued" or "pluri-valent" logics. (See, e.g.* 
[Reichenbach 7J, [Rosser 1J, [Lewis and Langford 1], [Kneebone 
) Phenomenological research, however, has largely been 
dominated by bi-valent restrictions. 
."Dire qu'une proposition est 'decidable', c^est dire 
qu'on peut decider de sa verite ou^de sa faussete. Mais quand 
on affirme que tout jugement est decidable, on se confie en 
r^alite a une presupposition idealisante." [S. Bachelard 1: 
1991 Cf. also [LFLT § 15 79J. 
2. Phenomenological ontology encounters a potentially 
significant field of research in connection with the pluri-
valent contextual relativity of some phenomena. This claim 
is set aside for development elsewhere. 
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I . *• 
to regulate according to rule 'possible values admissible 
with respect to possible modes of Intrinsic contextual 
confirmation. Rules of truth are prescriptive of the •' 
•range \Of possible values which'may be confirmed without 
incompatibility. It may be noted that "standards of non-
incompatible confirmation" are essentially relative to the 
nature of.coordinative relations regulating the confirmability 
of a given characterization relative to a certain range of 
possible values.^" 
These coordinative relations* then, are constitutive 
• • . ' V 
of the connection betv/een a characterization of what is and 
that,by virtue of which it is possible to evidence, that 
characterization. This relation must,, as already noted, 
be one of concordance if it.is to be possible for the 
characterization to be evidenced in any way* Now the truth, 
falsity, or whatever other value, or modality, which is evidenced 
to be determinative of the characterization, is confirmed 
relative to a phenomenon or group of phenomena of a certain 
ontological structure. Since this structure is essentially 
conditioned relative to the system providing for the 
possibility of reference -to that phenomenon or group of 
phenomena, it is necessarily,projective to regard the 
1. The nature of these coordinative relations varies 
according to whether the logic of structure of a given context 
is bi-valent, tri-valent, n-valent, etc. Standards of non-
incompatibility roughly may be regarded to exclude meaningless 
formulations in the sense of being, in Husserl^ view, "contre-
^8." (Cf. [RL II.2 iv § 12 120ffJ, [LFLT t} 22 99; $ 15 79; 
9 90 2973# [S. Bachelard 1: -571») See below, p. 236. 
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confirmability of a given characterization to depend upon 
• "evidence outside of the domain of possible experience."^-
That by virtue of which a given characterization can be 
.evidenced cannot without absurdity be dissociated from the 
relativity of the characterization to a'determinate'context 
of reference. • '• \ v • 
' T h e  f a l s i t y  o f  a  g i v e n  d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  c o n f i r m e d  i n  
relation to evidence serving to disconfirm alternate 
modalities.^ The truth of an assertion which is confirmed 
relative to certain phenomena in a given context, cannot 
be disconfirmed.^ The concordant relation of those 
phenomena to the assertion is sometimes rendered subordinate# 
i . • 
however8 to one or more relations between the assertion and 
other phenomena to which reference'is possible either 
1. See pp. 213ff., 
2. See p. 223. 
. . The view that truth (or any modality) involves an 
adaequation referring "beyond the domain of possible experience" 
is projective in the same manner. It is clear, moreover, that • 
the concordant character of verification is rendered impossible, 
by such a notion of adaequation. 
3. A system providing for complementary correlations may 
be such- that the falsity -of a given characterization is 
evidenced relative to a certain phenomenon or group of phenomena 
while the truth of that characterization is evidenced relativo 
to a differently constituted phenomenon or group of phenomena. 
(The same is true of whatever modalities may bo complementary ' 
in any given system.) E.g., recent quantum studies of the 
nature of light appear to require a recognition of complemen- / 
tarity in this sense. This contention will be investigated 
elsewhere. 
4. Husserl's argument rins: "ce qui est vecu.. .comme vrai.. 
lie peut pas etre faux. Or, c'est la le r&3ultat de la conne-
xit£ essentielle et generale qui existe entre experience vraie 
et v«Srite." [RL I § 51 207] , . 
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/ *• V 
from the standpoint of a second context or from that of 
the initial context. Such a "subordination" clearly does 
not falsify the truth of the assertion initially'confirmedJ 
the "subordination" can legitimately represent only an 
acknowledgment that the truth of the initial assertion.rdoes 
not extend to inconsonant phenomena. • •••'" 
: \ An assertion, on the other hand, which refers to an 
essentially open class of phenomena is susceptible only to 
disconfixmation, since an exhaustive characterization of the-
ciass is impossible. 
• In the present conception of truth and of evidence, 
the.following principle is understood: unless evidence to 
j 
the contrary is possible0 a phenomenon may not be described 
to' involve a particular structure. In the absence of . 
provision for possible reference to such a structure, an 
attribution of that structure to a given phenomenon is 
protectively invalid. This principle will be/termed the 
•principle of non-applicability1. 
: < Error frequently may be described to eventuate when 
$ description from a particular standpoint includes one or 
N (  1  •  
1. Reference is not made here to objects the constitution 
of which is such as reliably to assure the possibility of 
evidencing a certain character which any object in the 
class must of necessity express. 
On the impossibility of exhaustive characterization of 
an open class, see [Bridgman 2: 73* . 
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more assertions for which evidence is deficient with respect 
to that context of reference.^ If the possibility of -
reference to that which can'evidence the assertion(s) is 
ruled out in relation to the logic of structure of the 
context, then the principle of non-applicability has not 
been followed, and a projective misconstruction with 
respect to those assertions ensues. On the other hand, 
• • ' . J  T .• 
if-the principle of non-applicability has been followed* 
then reference to that which can 
evidence the assertion(s) in question can be made. Error, 
strictly speaking, is constituted in es seatial relation 
to two or more temporally successive contaxts such that 
(i) one or more characterizations asserted to be verifiable 
from the standpoint of one context are disconfirmed from 
i • ' • 
the standpoint of a temporally subsequent context and (ii) 
the principle of non-applicability is followed. 
Now, rules of sense are generally constitutive of 
relations connecting an object of refererwe O'with another 
object 0' which serves to denote reference to the former. 
The object 0' is here said to be the "seise" of object 0.^ 
At the same time, identifying reference tar a given object 
• 1. 'See above, p. 226. 
2. Rules of sense therefore express a generalization of, 
the so-called ,Fidot-Fido principle, according to which all 
significant expressions are proper names, and what they are 
the names of are what the expressions sigiify. [Ryle 1} 
Cf. also [Beth 1: 73]. . _ 
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is possible only if that reference does not conflict with 
those consistency conditions without which the object , • 
cannot be given in that context of reference. A reference 
which does not incur inconsistency is termed 'valid*• 
Only a reference which is valid may have sense; that is, 
no reference which is invalid, involving in its essential 
structure the exclusion of the possibility of references 
can have sense in the above meaning.-'* When conditions 
of valid reference are disregarded, it is impossible to 
e s t a b l i s h  t h o s e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h o u t  w h i c h  r e f e r e n c e  i s .  • -
senseless.^. 
Thus the foundations of sense require the consistency 
i  . . .  
of systems; rules of sense legislate against inconsistent 
structures. The constitution of a context from the stand­
point of which references can have sense, in principle must 
exclude absurd reference of the sort which conflict^ with . 
the very conditions of reference. 
It, is important to observe that the foundations of 
sense and of truth are closely allied. On the one hand, 
1. "FLla morphologie pure des significations [presuppose] 
la theorie pure de la validite... ."TRL II.2 iv Intro 86; his 
italicsJ One is reminded of Frege*s somewhat different but 
related view that names must have sense (SinnJ to have reference 
(Bedeutung). [Frege 2], [Frege 33* 
2. In Husser^s view, "non-sens." (For references, cf. 
p. 232, n. 1; [RL II.2 iv § 10 112ff].) 
VfLlois de signification...regissent la sphere des 
complexions de significations et...ont pour fonction de 
separer en elle sens et non-sens." [RL II.2 iv Intro 87] Cf. 
[RL III § 63 232].  
3. Thus, the absurd character of projective misconstruc­
tions entails that they are meaningless, i.e., devoid of sense. 
(See pp. 79ff») 
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the possibility of verification of th$ truth of a given 
assertion is of necessity relative to a context guaranteeing 
that valid reference can be made to a set of confirmatory 
or disconfirmatory possibilities. Without this guarantee 
vested in the rules of sense of the context, verification is 
impossible. On the other hand# the possibility, of evidencing 
that a given reference has a sense is essential to the- . 





• . CAUSALITY 
' A phenomenological comprehension of causality is 
eissentially linked to an elucidation of the conditioning 
structure of temporally persistent phenomena or of 
phenomena involving change with respect to time. An . 
investigation of causality proceeds# in other words, in 
terms of a clarification of the constitutive structures 
of continuity and change.^ 
• u. 
In the most basic sense, causal connection is 
expressed relative to (i) a continuous sequence of at 
least two temporally successive contexts, in relation to 
which (ii) a given value is common, or overlaps, neighboring 
o 
contexts. It has been noted that time-order is determined 
in relation to a successor-function restricted to a range 
of values similar to one anothers* If a temporal 
1. On continuity, see above, p. 126. On change, 
see pp. I62ff. 
2. "Time order, the order of earlier and later, is 
reducible to causal order." [Reichenbach 3b: 303] "[T]ime 
order represents the prototype of causal propagation and 
thus...space-time [is2 the schema of causal connection." 
[Reichenbach 4* 113 J For a discussion of the causal theory, 
of time, and an attempt to axiomatize such a view, see 
[Mehlberg 1J. - . 
3. P. 146. ' -
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succession of contexts which bear such similarity.-relations 
s i 
to.one another are such that a definite phenomenon is'given 
, \ 
in a succession of related phases, then the constitutive 
structure'of that succession of contexts provides- for •• > 
self-^identity, or genidentity, of the given phenomenon: ; 
over a duration.^ Insofar-asi': neighboring contexts in>that 
succession are structured as in (i) and (ii) above, ; 
i , ' 
genidentically related phases may be said to have a, 
i 
"causal character" in the given sense# i 
' single phenomenon may be said'to change wiih respect 
to' one or <more .values in relation to distinct and successive 
variations constitutive of that phenomenon. In relation 
to two successive variations in a non-discontinuous temporal 
* ! 
sequence,''the earlier variation may be termed a * cause* of 
' 2 
a change in value expressed by•the later variation.'1 > 
However, determination of the terras of a causal relationship 
is arbitrarily restricted to the limiting case of the • 
smallest continuously structured neighborhood within which 
a change between an earlier and a later phase may be evi­
denced from the standpoint of a given context.3 
1. See p. 35* 
2. Usually certain general data concerning the fre­
quency of;a given pattern of persistence or change determine 
in large measure the nature of the connection considered to 
hold between successive variations or between phenomena, 
generally. This significant factor will be discussed shortly# 
' 3» Russell observes that there is considerable ambiguity 
in determining the "terras of a causal relationship." He 
remarks that a limited view of the cause can be held, and the 
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V.v;,vDn-the other hand, two phenomena are causally related 
only;, if they are temporally successive and are similar'. ••• 
V 
by virtue*of an overlap with respect to some value(s), -
and, by implication,., are non-discontinuously related."*",, , 
A causal relation is,said to connect two phenomena, rather 
. . . . . .  ^  ^  
2 1 than two variations of a single phenomenon, provided that 
distinct o-series are constitutive of the terms of that 
relation:. In other,words, reference to the terms of a...,, 
causal relation is such that they do not have common y' 
determinants of reference.^ It follows that in order for 
two distinct phenomena to be, causally related, it must ... 
be-possible to refer to the temporally later phenomenon 
in a manner not entailing reference to the earlier phenomenon 
I 
But if the earlier phenomenon a.s not succeeded by the later 
entire state of the universe a few moments later can be taken 
as the effect, or, inversely, the cause may be taken as the 
entire state of the univerp^, and the effect as a limited, 
event a few moments later. Cf. [Russell 3s HJ* 
1. For convenience it is recalled that zonal 
discontinuity obtains whenever an element, although included • 
in a zonal series, does not overlap its neighboring zones. 
(P. 123.) , j s • > 
2. See p. n> 1, and p. $6, n. 1. 
3. It has been noted (p. 146) that a uni-contextual 
particular is unified in a manner such that two references' 
have common determinants of reference. 
4* Otherwise, the "two,phenomena" would have common 
determinants of reference. 
"It is.. .meaningless to say that A is the cause of B 
unless we can experience systems in which A does not occur." 
[Bridgman 4: 90J This case is considered in greater detail -
later. " < 
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phenomenon, a causal connection cannot of course link.the 
phenomena tin question.It is invalid to describe a given 
phenomenon, as an "effect" from the standpoint ofVa context 
* 
which does'not provide for possible reference•to temporally 
p v 
earlier phenomena** • ' 1 \ 
V 
Strictly speaking, then,'causality consists in a' 'v' 
certain form of functional"dependence expressing the • 
T 
functional determination of a phenomenon or group of 
temporally,simultaneous or successive phenomena in relatipn 
to a given temporally earlier phenomenon or group of 
temporally simultaneous or successive phenomena. It is 
the specifically causal character of a relation between 
temporally successive phenomena which determines a later 
phenomenon or group of phenomena as a function of an 
i 
earlier phenomenon or group of phenomena.^ ' 
• ; " 1* Eo is an effect of E1? if J ,f (a) is temporally later than and 
' (b) a small variation in E-j_ is correlated 
with a small variation in E2# while 
the reverse does not obtain. 
See [Reichenbach 45 136J. • , 
2. The illegitimate nature of such a' description is 
considered at greater leng&h below. 
3» On the notion of parameter and functional relations 
see pp. 35ff. ' ~ 
"Causality means nothing but a functional dependency 
of a certain sort. We must emphasize this because time 
and again the opinion is advanced that# aside from the , 
functional dependency between two events, there iaust be a 
"real" relation or "essential relation", namely, such that 
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' The possibility of describing such functional .. ;-t 
\ 
dependence between given phenomena is essentially, relative 
, s. 
to the system from the standpoint of which it is possible 
to evidence the persistence of certain structures, in 
relation to. change with respect, to others. The system-; • 
• \ 
permitting reference to a given group, of temporally . r/: 
successive phenomena provides for the characterization: of 
a cei*tainvphenomenon as changing or as persisting, in 
relation to distinct and successive phases* The possibility 
of reference to any causal determinants of,a phenomenon 
or' grovip pf phenomena is consequently guaranteed. provided. 
the first event "produces", "generates"> or "bring3 about", 
the second. It is strange that the opinion is still held# 
even by physicists and epistemologists» that science.®.1 
must not rest content with an investigation of those 
functional dependencies? but that it should, ascertain,.. 
above all# the "real causes"." [Carnap 1: 264] The same 
formulation is given in [Russell.3 s 14f]« • . 1 •< 
Husserl's view is closely related: "Soit: 
' z®1, ... £)V g2(*2# 0 2 ,  ... t), ' 
. Gn(o<n# /3nt ... t) . i 
|i concreta quelconques.... Si nous concevons maintenant 
les symboles o(^t ... $ ^2' •** * GOmme'.des variables,. 
la loi causale consiste avant tout alors dans le fait qu*une 
variation libre n?est pas possible, mais que, par une val'eur 
quelconque, mais d£termin£e'de t, par exemple^tq, et par les 
valeurs correspondantes des. variables, c*est-a-aire , 
oCj# 01, ... ••• > les valeurs de ces variables 
sont determinees de faeon.univoque pour chacun des moments 
suivants." [RL II.2 iii £ 12 Ire ed. 330f] 
Somewhat later, Russell gave a similar account of a 
causally determined system [Russell 3s 1&3*• "A system is 
said to be "deterministic" when, given certain data, e^, eg, 
• ••en, at times t^, t2, ... , tn respectively, concerning this 
system, if is the state of the system at any time t, there 
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that comparative reference to,its relative phenomenological 
1 ^ past; is also provided. 
A functional relation between any two phenomena 
* s \ 
expresses ,Tthem as terms of a relation"in which the terms 
are essentially determined according to rule. If a 
phenomenon P sometimes but not always, precedes a second 
phenomenon P'p but whenever P,' P' invariably follows, then 
a causal relation between P and P' is tesniaed * asymmetrical * • 
On'the other hand, if in any given instance reference to 
P' also involves reference to P, where P is temporally 
earlier than P', then P and P' symmetrically are 'functions 
ofv'one another. '' . ' ' • • ' \? 'V'v 
' Now, the characterization of a causal relation as 
"asymmetrical" rests upon (a)'a criterion fop determination t 
of the relevant terms of the relation and (b) the convention 
that: a context of greater number of temporal OTseries is 
is a functional relation of the form 
E^. * f(e^, t^, &29 ^2* 9 en*'fcn* "&)•••• 
[T]he events e-i , e?, ... » e_ X shall call "determinants" of 
the system." 
1. "We do not have a simple event A causally connected 
with a simple event B, but the whole background of the' 
system in which the events occur is included in the concept 
[of causality], and is a vital part of it. If the system, 
including its past history, were different, the nature of the 
relation between A and B might change entirely. The causality 
concept is therefore a relative one, in that it involves the 
whole system in which the events take place." [Bridgman 4: $3] 
;2. .See p. 241, n. 1. '' 
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said to come after one of a lesser number.*'* -. Both, (a) and 
(b) are in a certain sense essential to the possibility 
of characterizing the persistence or' change of phenomena 
with respect to time. . Reference, to a relation of, . . ,. , 
functional dependence' requires that the terms of the ; 
relation be distinguishable; .the particular -relation, of .• 
functional dependence evidenced in the structure of ... • 
causally ordered phenomena is#-as noted, constituted 
relative to a given sequence of temporally successive 
pheiiomena differentiated on the basis of those phenomena 
iri'the. sequence which are relatively earlier or later .than 
certain others. ' Thus, in relation to a context from the 
standpoint of which it ..cair be evidenced that a phenomenon 
P.',.'(or a variation of P') does not always temporally 
follow't a second phenomenon P (or a variation in P), a 
2 
causal relation between P and P'is asymmetrical. Unless 
it- is. possible to. evidence; P' in the absence of P, it, is , 
incorrect to describe : a given causal relation to be , . 
. . t 
"asymmetrical". In such a case, the principle of non-
t 
applicability requires that the terms of, the causal relation 
. . . • . •; n., * " 
be described to be symmetrical. 
1. Due to the arbitrary nature of (a) (see p. 239, 
3) and the conventional character of (b) (see p. 14#» n. 1), 
asymmetrical causality has sometimes been rejected as 
illusory. Cf., e.g., [Russell 3: 11J.. My reason.for 
declining complete agreement is made clear in the text. 
2. On the asymmetry of irreversible time sequences, 
aee [Reichenbach k* I36ffj» [Roichenbach 1: 163* 
•:.l * *) .• 'V. « I : .1 > 
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• With;respect to asymmetrical causal relations* data 
concerning the uniformity of correlation^* of the, terras 
s. 
of a-given causal relation may.provide a basis for 
inductive generalization, in connection with either a •,. 
relative phenomenological past or a relative phenoraenological 
2 future. ;0n the other hand# so long as a determination 
of the terras of a causal relation is restricted to the.. 
* ' 
smallest continuously;structured neighborhood within ; . 
which a change between an earlier and. a later phase may be 
evidenced from the standpoint of a given context, data 
concerning the uniformity of. correlation of the terms of 
a given asymmetrical causal relation may provide a basis 
for inductive generalization only in connection with a 
relative phenomenological future.^ It should be noted that 
the possibility of evidencing a given causal relation with 
respect to either a relative phenomenological past or a 
1. The functional relation which may obtain between 
a given value and a second specific value has been termed 
a 'correlation1• (P. 37» n;l.) > 
2. On the arbitrary nature of limiting application of 
induutive generalization to the relative phenomenological 
future, cf. p. 143, n. 1. 
[T]he future "determines" the past in exactly the 
same sense in which the past "detomoines** the future. The 
word *determine', here, has a purely logical significance: 
a certain number of variables "determine" another variable 
if that other variable is a function of them." [Russell 3» 
15, 21J 
3. "[AJn event in the setting of maay repetitions does 
have certain regularities which allow us to attain a certain 
measure of success with predictions of a certain sort." 
[Bridgman 2s 1013 
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relative phenomenologiaal future is essentially.relative 
to phenomena which, in relation to the terras of that given 
causal relation, have a common. constitution.-*• 
A given phenomenon for which no functional dependency 
N r 
relation of a causal nature can.be evidenced is termed an 
'uncaused phenomenon1. A phenomenon which is included in; 
a sequence of temporally successive phenomena, is uncaused 
provided that it is discontinuous with phenomena adjoining 
it.*1 It should be emphasized that the possibility of 
describing a phenomenon as being either "caused" or 
"uncaused" is essentially restricted to a context; permitting 
reference to temporally successive phenomena in terms of 
which the phenomenon in. question is represented. ,Some 
phenomena overlap with respect to some value(s), but are 
not temporally successive; the constitution of some \ 
phenomena makes no provision for reference to a relative 
phenomenological past or^ . for reference to a relative> 
phenomenological future; some, phenomena are given in 
relation to relative past contexts or in relation to a 
certain valence-structure. Of these, only in relation to 
1. Wittgenstein arguesJ "Auf keine Weise kanh aus 
dem Bestehen irgend einer Sachlage auf das Bestehen einer 
von ihr ganzlich verschiedenen Sachlage geschlossen werden." 
[Wittgenstein 1; 5.135J 
2. See p« 24O, n. 1* 
3* The logically exclusive usage of 'or1 is intended. 
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the latter can questions regarding causality meaningfully 
be posed# Those phenomena included in a given non-
\ 
discontinuous sequence of temporally successive phenomena 
may be causally determined; those phenomena.the,inclusion 
of .which .in a sequence of temporally successive phenomena 
is discontinuous in character, are not causally determined 
. It follows that while reference is possible.to 
causally or to non-causally determined phenomena provided 
the above conditions are met, a characterization of 
phenomena in general as the "effect of a prior cause" is 
necessarily projective. Moreover, if such a "prior cause" 
is viewed as "being outside,of the domain of possible 
experience"8 the projective misconstruction is still more 
confused* The constitutive structures of causality, of 
evidence, of being, of temporal succession, of spatial 
order, are, as has previously been observed, in various 
ways essentially relative to given phenomena or groups 
of phenomena to which identifying reference is possible. 
The view . that phenomena in general are the "effect of 
an earlier cause outside of the domain of possible 
experience" in effect is contrary to the relativistic 
constitution of spatial order (with respect to an "outside"), 
of temporal order (with reppect to what is "earlier"), of 
1. "[W]e shall only believe in causal sequences where 
we find them, without any presumption that they always are 
to be found." [Russell.3: 13] 
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being, evidence, and causality (in relation to the 
'v 
assertion that "it is evident that there is, or wa^, 
such a cause" )•**" 
In the broadest sense, causal order is evidenced in 
terms of reference to established correlations. A 
description of causal relations as essentially determined 
relative to given correlations between phenomena is neutral 
with respect to the above projective misconstruction. 
Two phenomena are uniformly correlated in relation to a 
plurality of instances evidencing that correlation. 
Uniformly correlated phenomena are such as to permit 
reference to at least one phenomenon of the correlated 
pair as a function of the other phenomenon. Provided 
that one member of the pair uniformly comes before the 
other (as evidenced in the given plurality of instances), 
1. Refer to the respective chapters involved., 
It is clear, for the same reason, on the other hand, 
that neither can it be said that the domain of possible 
experience is "uncaused". 
2. "It seems to me that the broadest and least 
restrictive base that can be imagined for the attack on 
the problem of understanding nature is correlation 
between parts. For the broadest attack, we must set up 
no thesis as to what sort of correlations we will accept 
as significant, but any universally observed correlation 
must be given potential significance." [Bridgman 6: 352] 
See also [Bridgman 4; 373* 
On the significance of correlations in this connection, 
cf. [RL II.l x 6 2 30f], [RL III 8 43 l39]t [CM 6 39It 
[Buchanan Is  33 j .  [C.I .  Lewis  1 :  129ff] ,  [Goodman 2 :  97,  
153]. 
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then the two phenomena are specifically correlated with 
i . 
respect, to the order of their temporal succession. Further 
more, if £he correlation in question is characterized 
in relatipn to a plurality of instances evidenced from 
a variety of distinctly constituted standpoints® then 
the correlation is said to be ob.iectivelv determined.^ 
It is clear that established correlations between 
phenomena provide no ground for the view that, in addition 
to functional dependency between phenomena, one member of 
a correlated pair "compels" or "necessitates" the other. 
Rather, reference to the frequency of uniformly correlated 
phenomena .provides the ground of evidence by virtue of 
which a relation of functional dependency between, those 
phenomena can be asserted to hold. Strictly speaking, then 
correlations have a purely descriptive (not "explanatory") 
use. Inasmuch as phenomena are evidenced to be correlated, 
a description of that correlation cannot be disconfirmed.^ 
1. See p. 230* 
2. See p. 241, n. 3# and discussion of the notion 
o f . " a g e n c y "  i n  9  2 . 7 .  
"Dynamic science revels in such phantacies, but here 
again the analyst can show how parametric order [involves}, 
purely formal relations between definite parts of observed 
wholes.... [I]t is only the animism usually attributed to 
savages that is more content with occult forces than 
correlations of the concrete." [Buchanan 1: 91] 
3« See p. 233* "[A]ny correlation is adopted to be 
an absolutely final element of explanation, and can never 
be superseded by the discovery of new experimental facts.•• 
[Bridgman 4: 4&] 
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It is of interest to note at this point two 
, illustrations of correlations between phenomena. Phenomena 
. \ ' 
expressing a particular sense may be investigated in terras 
of the correlation established between that phenomenon 
1 and that which, as its sense, it signifies. Relations of 
signification between a phenomenon and that which it 
. signifies constitute a noteworthy form of correlation.^ 
Second, since phenomena in general comprise possible 
objects of reference relative to a pragmatical context, 
reference to phenomena is conditioned relative to the 
possibility of correlating certain "attentional characters" 
with a given phenomenon.2 Certain correlations may be 
evidenced, for example, between some spatial phenomena. 
1. Similarly, studies of the concept of "linguistic 
sign" orient themselves with respect to the possible correla­
tion between "signifie" and "signifiant". Cf., e.g., 
[Saussure 1: 99ff» 144ff]» [Levi-Strau3s 1: 105ff], 
[Martinet 1: 15ff], [Britton 1: 29ff]. 
"Sont alors caracterises pour nous deux domaines 
paralleles se correspondant l*un l'autre, l'un etant le 
domaine d'expressions possibles du langage (domaine du 
discours), 1*autre etant le domaine de sens possibles, 
d*opinions exprimables dans la mesure du possible. Ces 
deux domaines, en s'entremelant d'une maniere intentionnelle 
et en formant ainsi unitd,..donnent le domaine, a double 
face, du discours actuel et concret, du discours rempli 
par le sens." [LFLT $ 3 36] 
i 2. See pp. 133f• 
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and phenomena expressing an explicit pragmatical character.^* 
It is the purpose of the following chapter to elucidate 
the.constitutive structures of the latter category of 
phenomena. 
1. See p. 133> n. 2. 
Such correlations have been observed in relations 
between "physical" and "affective" phenomena. For example, 
on the "liaison psychophysique inductive avec les corporeitds 
physiques appartenant au raonde", cf. [LFLT § 99 337]» on 
the correlation of a phenomenon with various affects3 cf. 
[RL II.2 v. 6 15 194-199], [C.I. Lewis Is U3» 321f]» [Carnap 
1: 200f]. Husserl describes certain related^correlations -
©•S*» "pas de qualite tactile sans spatialite." He remarks 
in a note? "II est frappant qu'on nJait jamais essaye 
de fonder sur ces correlations...une definition positive 
des "phenomenes physiques".." [RL III appendice 9 i2 274] 
See also [Ricoeur 3i 49]. 
The following description given by Carnap is based 
upon evidence of such correlations: "There is a certain 
visual thing B which fulfills the conditions listed below. 
These conditions and even an appropriate part of them form 
a constructional definite description of it; this visual 
thing is c,ailed my body. 
[For example8] ...world lines of B or connected areas 
of them are correlated with the qualities (or classes of 
qualities)' of a certain sense class in such a way'thatp upon 
contact with the world line of another visual thing or of 
another part of B, another quality, called a tactile quality, 
occurs simultaneously in the experience in question; the 
so-constructed sense class is called the tactile sense.... 
In a similar way# certain motions of B are correlated 
with the qualities of another sense class;' the sense class 
so described is called kinesthetic sense.'1 [Carnap 1. 199f; 
supplementary references,given there] j 
Section 2.6 
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
CONSTITUTION OF THE EGOLOGICAL 
2$2 
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION OF.THE ECOLOGICAL * 
The domain of possible experience investigated by 
« 
phenomenology is essentially pragmatical - i.e»9 phenomena j 
are objects of possible.reference in a pragmatical I 
context. Reference' to a given phenomenon is conditioned 
relative to the possibility of correlating certain j 
"attentional characters" with that phenomenon^ It is in | 
relation to the pragmatical structure of phenomena that an | 
investigation of the constitution ox the "ego" cuiii be 
i 
carried out. 
A pragmatically structured phenomenon may be relatively 
transitory or persistent. A certain pragmatical character 
may itself be temporally persistent or transitory in relatior 
to a given sequence of temporally successive phenomena. 
' i 
1. ' See pp. 133fa 250f. j , 
2. No distinction is observed in the text between 
.the terms 'ego', sself's 8person\ * subject*. 
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That pragmatical character may accompany a temporally 
persistent phenomenon or a group of phenomena temporally 
ordered in various ways* On the other hand, various 
pragmatical characters may simultaneously*' or at different 
times, accompany a single phenomenon*"*" 
Pragmatically structured phenomena are termed 
1 egologically modified phenomena*. The egologlcal modification 
of a given phenomenon expresses the particular manner in. 
which that phenomenon is pragmatically structured.' A group 
of egologically modified phenomena may include phenomena 
which are "remembered"a "anticipated", "imagined", "doubted", 
"believed", etc.^ • 
Together* egologically modified phenomena are 
included in a definite region the essential structure of which 
can be investigated phenomenologically* This region is tb-.t 
proper to affective phenomena, to'the/"psychological"* Ar 
elucidation of the constitutive structure of phenomena of 
this region is the task of phencmer.ological psychology - in 
particularj here, of phenomenological egology. 
It should be clear from the fact that egologically 
modified phenomena are said to comprise a general phenomeno-
1. Cf. [RL 11*2 v £ 32 267]. ' 
2. Cf. p. 152, and ("LFLT o 16 50? o 39 147; 6 44 170; t  
& 50 1&3; £ &9 292; appondice I p 9 4013* 
Pragmatically structured phenomena are such .by virtue : 
of correlation with any egological' modification (s) in a ' 
gamut of affects e.g* 9 with anxiety, hatred, frustration, . 
bewilderment, melancholy, exhaustion, boredom; envy, greed,: 
pride, lust, shame; humility," compassion, love, ecstasy, j 
contentment; nobility, edification, sublimeness* 1 
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logical regionj that some9 and possibly most, phenomena 
are not correlated with specific cgological modifications."1" 
Such phenomena are "egologically neutral" <>2 Egologically : 
neutral phenomena0 -however9 still are objects of.possible 
reference in a pragmatical context; egologically neutral 
•phenomena are essentially subject to egological modification. 
In this sensea egologically neutral phenomena are said 
to be "dispositional" • 
The ereolordoal region is determined (i) relative to 
egologically modified phenomena to'which, reference is 
possible from the standpoint of any given context and (ii) 
as a function of the dispositional pbssibilities' which 
phenomena in that context may express® I shall hereafter 
refrain from using the term *the egov in connection either 
with egologically modified phenomena or with dispositional 
possibilities^ for .the following reasons^. In the light 
1. "[A] l?occasio:i des ccntcnus se' orssentcnt pour ' 
eux-mOmes; cvest-a*-dire en dehors des vecus intentionnels." 
[RL II.-2 v £ 31 Ire edo 360j 
2o It is important to emphasize that egologically 
neutral phenomena are not-; on that account alone5 objective. 
See pp. 229f and belows po 266® 
5lote should be made that egologically neutral_ phenomena 
do not have the character 3 in Kusserl?s sense a of ;Jneutrality-
modification"3 since the correlates of all cloxic modifications 
remain - albeit in a modified way - in the "neutralised". 
Cf. [Ideen I ^ 109-112]. • " 
3. In this case5 "la representation du moi j>eut bien 
etre "en . disi^onibilioo"." [RL II.2 v 6 12 17o'f] Ricoeur 
describes Husseri5s view in terms of "consciousness a.s an 
"I can"." [Ricoeur 3: Lll Cf. also [LFLT £ 330]. [Carna? 
Is § 65J3 [C-oodman 2: 1C6]. Kant's familiar account may be 
recalled: "Das "ich denke" muss alle Koine Vorstellungen 
be'gleiten konnen." [Kant 2; B 131] 
4. Other reasons will be made clear shortly. 
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that discontinuities occur with respect to some sequences 
of temporally successive phenomena0 it can be erroneous 
naively to require that., for any plurality of egologically 
modified phenomena <> either (a) there is a common "pole" 
which all share which is called "the ego* , or (b) there 
is a single and genidentical "ego" v;hich is the unity 
of the interrelations between*all phenomena in the given 
plurality. .Neither of these conditions^can .always be 
satisfied in the face of possible discontinuities; I 
therefore will make use of the less presumptive notion of 
"egological region". 
The egological region is constituted;) then,•relative 
to egologically modified phenomena ana dispositional ; 
i 
possibilities® In relation to a group of non-discontinuous ; 
temporally successive egologically modified phenomena, the : 
pragmatical structure of the group of phenomena can be 
expressed parametrically such that the various egological 
i 
modifications are described in terms of a certain identity ; 
condition.^ Similarly constituted:egologically modified j 
1. Natorpj for examples has suggested the notion of j 
"[l]e moi9 en tant quvil est ie centra rin reference1. (See [RL II.2 v o £ 159ff; $ 12 176].} Husserl? in [Ideen ijj, 
admits much the same view. (Cf. [Ricoeur 3z 106f].) 
2. For example9 in [RL II.2 v 6 4 1533* See also 
[Ricoeur 3s 22]. 
Carnap has defined 7the self* as "a class of autopsycho-
logical states." [Carnap Is 205] ^y objection to this view 
is given below. . ; 
•3. See pp. 35ff• j 
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phenomena may be described in terms of the same parameter,, 
No assumption is made* as already noted5 to the effect that j 
all phenomena can be correctly characterized with respect j 
1 I 
to the same parameter. j I I 
Phenomena the egological constitution of which can ; 
be described in terms of the same parameter are said to be 
"egologically homogeneous"® An egologically homogeneous 
plurality of -phenomena may satisfy either condition (a) 
or condition (b) above. Egologically modified phenomena 
the description of which requires reference to different 
parameters are egologically heterogeneouso The egological 
region includes both egologically homogeneous and egologically 
heterogeneous phenomena. 
A certain group of egologically homogeneous phenomena 
may.be given over different durations$ or they may be 
given over a single duration5 or the phenomena in question 
may. have the same time-signatures ana be simultaneous v;ith 
one another,^ Phenomonological egology is grounded • -
in essential structures of phenomenological time. 
1. A related assumption is^made in [PJL II.2 v o 12 Ire ed 
35233 v;here "[Ijs moi.,4est e::ige a la maniore d'une loi 
par la particularity specifique et causale des vecus." 
2. Thus3 the structure of egologically homogeneous 
phenomena is constitutive of an "ego*"J in the sense of n. 1 
or n. 2S p. 255o 
On Husserlffs general concept of {,egoj;j cf®5 &*g» 9  
[Ricoeur 3: 30fs 107]0 [P«L Ho2 v § l* Ire ed. 344f-]» 
• 3* Ifl the sense that an ;iego;; is constituted relative 
to a given plurality of egologically homogeneous phenomena. 
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A specific phenomenon (or group of phenomena) may be 
given either as egologically modified? or as ecologically 
neutral. A certain set of egological modifications may 
be correlated v/ith the dispositional character of that 
phenomenon'.in an egologically neutral context. This 
correlation may be evidenced in relation to a plurality 
of instances evidencing an asymmetrical correlation between 
a definite set of egological modifications and the given 
phenomenon. The relation here is asymmetrical provided all 
egological modifications of the given set exclusively 
modify the phenomenon in question^ v/hile some instances 
of that phenomenon are egologically neutral. The correlation 
so established between a specific phenomenon and a 
certain egological modification is not, howevers causal 
in nature: neither member of the correlated pair 
uniformly "comes before" the other.^ An egologically 
modified phenomenon is not such that the relevant egological 
modification has a time-signature different from that of 
the phenomenon. 
In this connections an important correlation has been 
noted in the relation between certain egological modification 
and a complex of interrelated phenomena constitutive of 
the following observation by Husserl is pertinent here: 
" L' epo se constitue pour lui-ner.:e en quelque sorte dans 
1*unite d'une histoire." [MC 64] 
• 1. See p. 240 and passim. Cf. [RL II62 v 6 15 195] 
on the absurdity of regarding intentional connections as 
causal. On' intentionality„ see below, pp. 262f. 
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"the body".'*' The establishment of this correlation 
provides the basis for regarding the bodys an object of 
possible reference relative to "phenomena of that complex, 
as ontologically distinguished among spatial objects. 
Distinguished in this manner-, the body provides a relatively 
persistent singularity with respect to which comparative 
2 3 
reference to other material bodies .is possible. 
It is clear that only from the standpoint of an 
embedment-system of higher orderp can reference be made 
to an egologically modified phenomenon so as to permit 
the discrimination^- of a specific cgological modification 
with respect to tho phenomenon which .it modifies# ar with 
which the modification is correlated®^. It should be 
emphasized that the distinguishability of a specific 
egological modification# or attentional character# in relation 
to the phenomenon so modified-, is essentially relative to a 
1. See p. 251» and [Carnap 1; 206f]. 
• 2; Cf. pp. l&v2ffj> and passim. 
3. "This body serves as a 'reference pole for all 
physical" bodies."' [Ricoeur 3s 1211 See also [CM V~97]3 
Ricoeur 3s 64# 136]% [ideen II iii 2. Kap.]# [Ricoeur-3: 
3# 75]. 
4. On the constitutive structure of a system providing 
for reference to differences# see pp. 5±££<> 
5* This distinction is implicit in the separation 
evidenced between "the physical" and ;,the psychological". 
Cf. especially [Brcntano 1: I 127ff]* £RL II.2 v & 45 324], 
[RL III appendice 273 J• 
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context the logic of structure of which provide.<3 for 
recourse to a higher-order embedment-system.-*- In relation 
to a context which does not provide for reference from. 
the- standpoint of such an embedment-system, a phenomenon 
i ; 
and the attentional character modifying it cannot be ... 
I : 1 O • distinguished. i 
i 
A context the logic of structure of which' does not 
provide for recourse to a higher-order embedment-system is 
said to comprise a ."pre-reflexive standpoint", in contrast 
to a "reflexive standpoint", in relation to which such 
an embedment-system is established.-^ The former is said 
to be "pre-reflexive" since it frequently is possible to 
evidence a correlation between two given phenomena} where 
one phenomenon temporally precedes the other.and is either 
egologically modified or neutral, while the second is 
egologically modified from a reflexive standpoint. This . 
correlation, however, is non-uniform, inasmuch as cither 
phenomenon in question may be given in contexts without the 
other.*. The distinction here between the two phenomena 
1. It follows that it is projective to represent an 
attentional character autonomously of such a context. 
2. Husser^s argument is related here: "II nvy a pas 
deux choses (nous faison abstraction de certains cas excep-
tionnels) qui soient presontes dans le vecu, nous r.e vivons 
pas l'objet et, a cote de lui0 le vecu inter.tionnel, qui se 
rapporte a lui, mais c?est une soule^chose qui est presents9 
le vecu intcntionnel5 aont le caractere descripti-f cssentiel 
est precisement 1*intention relative a l'objet*"^[RL Ii.2 v 
£ 11 174fJ ,:Un objet ou un dtat de choses desire., qui ne 
serait pas conjointcnent represente dans et avee ce desir, non 
settlement n'existe pas en fait., mais est encore absolument 
inconcevable." [RL II.2 v £ 23 234] 
3. See p. 21&, n. 1. 
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is a simple expression of the difference, as it v/ore} between 
phenomena and their explicit' description."*" 
From a reflexive standpoint9 then, it is possible for 
the purposes of descriptive analysis to differentiate ' 
between a given phenomenon and an attentional character 
which may modify that phenomenon. It is emphasized9 once 
again# that such a distinction is essentially relative to 
that reflexive.standpoint. It is therefore projective to 
"carry over" the results of a reflexive analysis of 
2 phenomena to pre-reflexively constituted phenomena. 
It is possible for phenomenology0 however9 to 
investigate the relation which can be evidenced from a 
reflexive standpoint between a specific phenomenon and 
a certain attentional character modifying it. No 
assumption is to be made in advance that an figological 
modification in fact is to be evidenced from a reflexive 
standpoint with respect to every phenomenon to which 
identifying reference is possible from that standpoint.. 
The effect of such an assumption would be to exclude 
egologically neutral -phenomena from possible inclusion in 
a reflexively constituted context. 
1. See p. 214s n* 1. 
2. See p. 193s n. 1. 
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I shall call the view that every phenomenon is 
egologically modified "the spectator theory". In this 
view, egological modification, or "consciousness"s is' a 
universal characteristic of phenomena. In particular 
this view has the following implications? With respect.. 
to reflexively constituted phenomena!, the spectator 
theory requires that in fact 'every phenomenon to which 
T 
identifying reference is possible from a reflexive 
standpoint evidences an attentional character. This is 
simply erroneous."1" With respect to pre-reflexively 
constituted phenomena, the spectator theory maintains 
that for any pre-reflexive phenomenon there is. a relation 
which holds between a component of the phenomenon,' 
"consciousness", and that phenomenon itself. This involves 
either (a) a mistaken characterization of reflexively 
constituted phenomena as "pre-reflexive", or (b) a projective 
application of erroneous results of reflexive analysis to 
a framework in which those results have no possible sense. 
A given phenomenon in an egologically homogeneous 
group of phenomena is such that an egological modification 
of that phenomenon is functionally related to the egological 
modifications of other phenomena of that group. Such a 
1. On the factual error involved in this assumption, 
see [Russell 5: 231-252]. 
"It is merely a formulation of our grammatical habits 
that there must always be something that thinks when there 
is thinking and that there :.;ust always bo a door when there 
is a deed." [Carnap 1: 105] .. 
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functional relation sometimes is called "intentional". 
Relative to a reflexive standpoint, a characterization of 
egological phenomena as intentionally related is 
unobjectionable so long as the notion of intentionality is 
2 free from the defects of the spectator theory# 
1. "[Tlhe intentional relation holds generally between 
experience and an order of experiencess if the following t.;o 
conditions are fulfilledJ firsts the experiences must 
belong to this order; second, this order must be one of 
those constructional forms in which real-typical objects are 
constructed.. 
The relation between an element and a relational 
structure of a certain sort in which it has a place is one 
of the most important relations of the applied theory of 
relations. The intention relation is nothing but a sub­
class of this relationj namely the relation between- an 
experience (or constituent of an experience) and an order 
which has a real-typical structure.. Actually^ there is no 
objection if,such a relation is formulated as "reference to 
something outside itself'*^ as long as it is made clear ! 
that the expression "outside" means that the intentional 
object is not identical with the experience or, more precisely, 
that the exoerlence stand r, in a more comprehensive context•51 
[Carnap Is 261; my italics.] "[Ijf one says- that it lies -
in the Essence of an experience to- refer intentionally to 
somethings ...then it must be replied that...this holds cuite 
generally; it is essential to each object that it belongs to 
certain order contexts...." [Carnap Is 2$33 Cf«. [Goodman 2: 
93ffJ. 
2. Ruscoll's argument against such a defective notion 
of intentionality appears to me unobjectionable.. (It should 
be remarked that Carnap (in the preceding note) accepted 
Russell's conclusion here.) I give here the pertinent 
passages of that arguments "The view...expressed [in 
[Brentano 1: IJ ], that relation to an object is an 
ultimate irreducible characteristic of mGiital phenomena, is 
one which I shall be concerned to combat*,,.. 
The first criticism r have to make is that <... [Brentanof si 
concept here of] act seems unnecessary and .fictitious. The 
occurrence of the content of a thought constitutes the 
occurrence of the thought. Empirically, I cannot-discover 
anything corresponding to the supposed a®t; and theoretically 
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In this connection, it should be pointed out that 
the notion of "identifying reference" in no sense 
expresses a relation between a pragmatical structure and 
a phenomenon. A characterisation of the latter relation 
is somewhat in the order of an "oblique reference"«, 
requiring a higher-order embedment-system.from the 
standpoint of which the egological modification and the 
phenomenon modified can be described.1 An identifying' 
reference to a given phenomenon expresses.) as already 
2 
noted t the coordinative determination constitutive of that 
I cannot see that it is indispensable. 
It is supposed that thoughts cannot just come and go, 
but need a person to think then. Now} of course it is 
true that thoughts can be collected into bundles5 so that 
one bundle is my thoughts5 another is your thoughtss and a 
third is the thoughts of Mr. Jones. But I think the person 
is not an ingredient in the single thought; he is rather 
constituted by relations of the thoughts to each other and 
to the body.... This is simply on the ground that...the 
act in thinking is not empirically'discoverable} or logically 
deducible from what we can observe." [Russell 5J 15-18j See 
particularly [James 1: 1-3^]. 
Similarlyj> Cavailles argues! "Le terms de conscience 
ne comporte pas d'univocite d*application - pas plus que la 
chose5 d7unite isolable. II i^'y a pas une conscience^ 
generatrice de ses produits^ ou simplement immanente a eux, 
mais elle est chaque fois dans l'inrnediat de I'ideej perdue 
en elle et se perdant avec elle et no se liant avec d"autres 
consciences (ce qu'on serait tente d?a??eler a'autres 
moments de la conscience) que par les liens internes ces 
idees auxquelles celles-ci appartiennent." [Cavailles lJ 7&J 
1. See p. 217. 
2. See pp. lOff and passim. ' 
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phenomenon. Identifying reference therefore is not a j 
i : 
form of intentional reference. From a reflexive standpoint,! 
identifying reference is such that a given phenomenon may be 
re-identified over a duration. (It may be recalled that j 
i 
the re-identification of a phenomenon is essentially \ 
relative to a context providing for comparative reference I l 
between temporally successive phenomena.From a pre-
reflexive standpoint, since there is no provision for • 
reference from the standpoint of an embedment-system of 
higher order, no sense can be given to the view that 
pre-reflexively constituted phenomena can be re-identified 
from a purely pre-reflexive standpoint. " . j' -
Although a pre-reflexive context provides no basis 
for re-identifications such a context may of course be 
investigated from a reflexive standpoint. However, reference 
to a "pre-reflexive"context" from a reflexive standpoint 
can only be understood to involve, s5.mulatione •» a "pre-
reflexive context".^ From a reflexive standpoint it is 
possible to analyze a context which, as it were, does not 
itself establish a basis for re-identification of the 
1* Cf. pp. 153ff and passim. 
2. It may be recalled that the possibility of reference 
to differences and the possibility of reference to continuities 
share a common foundation, it follows (see £ 1.3) that from 1 
a purely pre-reflexive standpoint, objects cannot be charac­
terized as "the same". 
3* Perhaps only "artistic involvement" permits wholly 
intrinsic representation of the essential' structure of pre- j 
reflexive phenomena. I am forced, however, to defer this j 
question in the present context. i 
phenomena expressed in that context. Tho logic of structure 
of phenomenology, prototypical of reflexive investigation, 
guarantees the re-identiflability of particulars, generally. 
Now, it has been noted that (1) phenomena belonging 
to ontologically disjoint regions"1" may be egologically 
heterogeneous. The occurrence of discontinuities may be 
such as to prohibit description of a plurality of 
egologically- modified phenomena in terms of a single. 
O 
parameter. (2) Not all phenomena are egologically 
modified: some phenomena are egologically neutral. (3) An 
established correlation between a certain egological 
modification and a given phenomenon- -may express a functional 
relation between that egological modification and other j 
egological modifications in a single egologically homogeneous 
group of phenomena. In no sense is this functional relation • 
t 
such that phenomena in the egologically homogeneous group ' ! 
somehow bear a relation, of "inclusion" or "containment" j 
i 
with respect either to the egological modifications or to 
the parameter describing them. For these three reasons, 
the- common view referred to earlier as "the myth of the 
container-consciousness" is rejected. According to this 
1 .  C f .  p .  2 1 6 .  
2 .  C f .  p p .  2 5 5 f f .  •  •  
3. See p. 216, n. 1. For the same reason., a description 
of phenomenology as basically "autopsychological" is to be 
avoided. In this connection, see [Carnap Is 102], [LFLT o 96 
320], [CM 26ff], [Ricoeur 3: 92n., 107]. 
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viev;, the pragmatical structure of phenomena is described 
in analogy to a "recepticle"*, in which phenomena in 
general are determinedo 
Solipsism, as a repudiation that "there are objects 
outside of consciousness1*, is often a variation of the 
myth of the container-consciousness# VJhen solipsism takes 
the form of a denial that "there are objects outside of 
the domain of possible experienced the viev; is projective.*^* 
Either variety of solipsism can therefore be immediately 
rejected. 
It should be noted at this point that a plurality ' 
of true assertions may-refer to variations constitutive 
of an egologically modified phenomenon# If some of these 
assertions are made from the standpoint of distinctly 
constituted contexts, ana if each assertion can be 
confirmed true on a basis v;holly intrinsic to the.context 
to which that assertion is proper-,' then the phenomenon 
to which reference is made by those assertions is objective. 
It follows that a description of egological structures may 
be objectively grounded.^ The egological region is 
consequently open to objective phenomenological investigation 
1. See pp. 2l3ff. 
On solipsism here, cf. [Carnap 1: 101-109* 2S2J, [LFLT 
§ 102 359]j [S. Bachalard 1: 241], [Bridgman 2: 152. 
2 .  C f .  p p .  2 2 9 f .  
3. The reason for the strict injunction (p. 134f) 
against any association of the notions of phenomena and 
e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  s u b j e c t i v i t y ,  e t c . ,  
should by nov; be clear. 
4. I-Iusserl observes- that "les problemes psychiques en 
general, devaient avoir essantiellernont le mems sens et 
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The egological is constituted as a determinate 
spatio-temporal region the structure of which is 
relativistically self-enclosed.As such, a given phenomenon 
is subject to indefinite reflexive egological iteration -
i . e . ,  p h e n o m e n a  i n  a  r e f l e x i v e  s e q u e n c e  m a y  b e  e g o l o g i c a l l y  
2  y 
modified. Thu s ,  e . g . ,  a reflexively constituted context 
3 
may itself be examined in terms of its egological structure. 
devaient etre traites selon les memes methories que les 
problemes.de la nature phvsioue.... [L]es £roblernes 
psychiques sont des problernes de la realite. .. ." [LFLT 
6 36 284] Cf. also [LFLT £ 42 151J and [S. Bachelard Is 
132]. 
It is therefore partly in terms of such an objective 
phenomenological analysis of the egological region that the 
constitution of the "world" can be elucidated.. (See pp. 
199ff, 203, ri. 3.) It should be clear why the notion of 
an "intersub.iective world" is to be avoided here. (On the 
" i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e  - w o r l d " 9  o r  " w o r l d  o f  p e r s o n s " - ,  c f .  
[LFLT 6 96 321; {> 99 337], [S. Bachelard 1: 24Iff], [MC 97 
a n d  p a s s i m . ] ,  [ R i c o e u r  3 :  1 2 7 ,  1 2 9 ,  1 3 1 f ] »  [ S t r a w s o n  1 :  I j ,  
[Carnap Is 223ff].) 
1. It is of interest to note Husserl?s^view; "[L]a 
conscience considerce dans sa "purete" doit etre tenue pour 
u n  s v s t e m e  d " e t r o  f e r a e  s u r  s o i f l  p o u r  u n  s y s t e m e  d 8 e t r e  
absolu dans lequel rien ne peut penetror et c'/aqucl rien 
ne peut echapper, qui n*a pas de dehors d*ordre spatial ou 
temporel, qui ne peut se loger dans aucun systeme spatio-
temporal, qui.ne peut subir la causalite d'auciiae chose* 
ni exercer de'causalite sur aucune chose." [Idees I o 49 
I65f] • 
2. On indefinite reflexive iteration, see p. 116. 
Cf. [PCIT II Supp. XII 173]. 
3« "Self-consciousness" exemplifies such a structure. 
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The egological comprises a significant region for 
phenomenological inquiry. A description of the constitutive 
structures of this region brings to light a difficult 
complex of problems» a few of the major dimensions of 
which have been characterized. Several viev/sconcerning. 
egological structure which have been described here and 
found to be inadmissible are fundamental to the notion of 
v 





The notion of "activity" is often involved in a 
description of that by virtue- of which an effect is related 
to a cause. As already noted, a relation of functional 
dependency holds between two phenomena provided they are 
uniformly correlated in a plurality of instances; if one ; 
i 
member of the correlated pair uniformly precedes the other, ; 
the phenomena are said to be causally related.^' Now, the 
establishment of correlations between sets of certain 
egologically modified phenomena and sets of temporally 
subsequent egologically modified or egologically neutral 
phenomena may provide the basis for an elucidation of the • 
concept of activity. 
2 ' According to the spectator theory, every phenomenon 
is egologically modified. A correlation between a specific 
egologically modified phenomenon and a temporally later 
1. "Any really inward belonging together of the 
sequent terms, if discovered, would be accepted as 
what the word cause was meant to stand for." [James 2: II 6713 
. . » 
2. Pp. 26lf. 
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phenomenon may be characterized, in this view, as 
evidencing "an act producing, generating, creating, or 
bringing about a certain effect". Established correlations 
between phenomena, however, can evidence no such "productive 
act", and exhibit no more than a relation of functional. 
dependency.^ By extension, the spectator theory of 
activity describes the occurrence of any given phenomenon 
o 
as "the result of a prior act". Such an extension is • 
projective in nature, as previously observed.^ The notion 
of activity according to the spectator theory therefore is 
of no use for present purposes^"; the notion of activity 
is consequently described purely in teras of pragmatical 
1. See p. 249• 
2. Essentially the same view can &e traced through 
the 'works of Herodotus, Hippocrates# Tharcydides, the pre-
Socratics, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, etc. Newton's First 
Law emerges from this tradition. (Cf. ([Newton 1: Axioms; 
Def. VIII; Bk. Ill, Rule IJ and [Newton 2: Bk. Ill, IJ.) 
It may be mentioned in passing that controversy in legal 
reasoning concerning "motives* and "responsibility" often • 
involves such an extension of the spectator theory. 
3. See pp. 247# 261. 
The problem of "freedom versus determinism" posed in 
the above manner is projective, by the same token. 
4. It is of interest to note that the notion of 
"faculty" in the spectator theory is subject to similar 
objections. The notion of "faculty" may be described as 
the dispositional and causal "pole" common to "acts" of a 
certain kind. It follows (in this viewD that with each 
class of "acts" (defined in terms of one or a group of 
egological modifications which uniformly overlap a range of 
phenomena) can be correlated a "faculty® the "exercise", of 
which'"causes" the individual "acts".-belonging to that 
class. "Faculty", in this sense, has scmetimes been termed 
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correlations which can be evidenced from' any given 
j ' 
standpoint. | 
A related misconstruction occurs relative;to 
i 
descriptions of those contexts which do not themselves 
provide for reference from the standpoint of higher- ; 
order embedment-systems. This case has been characterized 
a3 involving referonce from a reflexive standpoint to 
a "pre-reflexive context".2 In the spectator theory, the 
"pre-reflexive context" may be characterized as essentially 
"changed" or "perturbed", where such "perturbation" is 
viewed as "caused by the adoption of a reflexive standpoint" 
or as "the effect of the act-character of reflection".^ 
Moreover, the "pre-reflexive context" may sometimes be 
characterized in terms of "its ontological structure prior 
to inclusion in a reflexive context".^* 
"agency" 
Cf., e.g., [RL II.1 ii 6 9 152f; V <S 13 132: v £ 21 
(appendice) 229; v $ 30 262}', [RL III 8 36.143; 9 51 195.], I 
[LG 173, 163], [LFLT 6 5 33; 6 11 57* 64; 6 42 155; f100 | 
351fJ, CS. Bachelard 1s 132], [PCIT II Supp. IX 1593- | 
. 1. ,Cf. pp. 259ff. ! 
2. P. 264. _ 
3. For example, "dans le passage de 17accomplissement 
naif des actes a 17attitude reflexive, c7est-a-dire a 
17accomplissement des actes qui relevent de cette attitude, 
les premieres se modifient necessairement." [RL II.1 3 Intro 
133 In particular, see[Ideen I $ 79]» 
4. "[N]ous appelons nature l7unite de l7experience 
universelle et nous disons <ju7elle er>t et qu7en <oi elle a 
telle et telle particularite et qu7eile e-st ce qu'elle est 
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Now, the possibility of evidencing a change is 
essentially relative to a context in relation to which 
reference from the standpoint of a higher-order embedment-
system is provided: the notion of change.is consequently 
relative to reflexively constituted contexts. In addition 
to its essential relation to a reflexive context, the 
possibility of evidencing change with respect to some 
value requires comparative reference to temporally ' 
successive contexts. It is clear that a projective 
misconstruction results if a change is asserted to obtain 
with respect.to a context which does not provide for 
reference from the- standpoint of an embedment-system of 
higher order. In other words, it is strictly absurd to 
assert that identifying reference to. a certain phenomenon J 
relative to a reflexive context can be correlated v/ith 
I 
a "change".in the structure of a given phenomenon. The 
possibility of evidencing a change is relative to the j 
very system which, in the spectator theory, "effects that 
j 
change". The same holds true with respect to the possibility 
of evidencing a causal correlation between two phenomena. 
f 
It follows it is projective to assert that reference 
ou qufelle est cocrnie elle est avpnt notre acte de 
.iugement." [LFLT £ 42(g) 161] . 
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from a reflexive standpoint to a "pre-reflexive context" 
i' 
"effects a perturbation in the "pre-reflexive context" 
In very much the same way, the notion that the 
constitutive structure of a system is the result of a 
"productive act" is to be set aside for the purposes 
of de-projective phenomenology. Since the possibility 
of evidencing such an "act" is essentially relative to 
a context establishing a certain constitutive structure, 
the above notion excludes the possibility that 
identifying reference can be made to the "active 
constitution" of the structure of the given context, which 
the notion of such a "productive act".seeks to explain. 
The notion of activity, then, can more effectively 
be described in' terms of an established correlation 
between a certain group of dispositional possibilities 
and/or egological modifications and a given group of 
phenomena. A correlation may be evidenced between an 
egologically neutral or egologically modified phenomenon -
with respect to which, for example, a "volitional component" 
is expressed3 - and a temporally subsequent phenomenon or 
1. For the view that Husserl makes iuse of a notion 
of "active constitution" in this sense, s?ee Jacques Derrida's 
introduction in [LG 23, 25]. Cf. also [L-FLT 6 71 245; 9 96 
319]* A less objectionable reading of Hmsserl on this point 
is argued in [S. Bachelard Is 188, 236, 2383 and [Ricoeur 3s 
9, 27J. See [LFLT £ 99 336fJ. 
2. This argument is treated in greater detail above, 
pp. 184-187• See also p. 262, n. 2. 
3. It is sufficient here to note tlhat the "volitional" 
may be described as a specific function ©f the egological. 
Cf., e.g., [Carnap Is 139, 202, 206fJ. 
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group of phenomena. A plurality of instances relative 
to which this correlation can be confirmed to be uniform 
i 
provides the ground of evidence for the establishment 
of a certain functional relation which holds between the 
given instances. When such a uniform correlation is 
confirmed, the earlier phenomenon, if 'egologically 
modified, is said to have an •"actrcharacter"; if 
». ! t ! 
egologically neutral, the phenomenon has a "dispositional 
! •' ! 
act-character". ' I 
! 
It should be noted at this point that since the concept 
of identifying reference in no sense expresses a relation 
between a pragmatical structure and a phenomenon,^* an 
identifying reference cannot have an act-character. Thus, 
a phrase such as fto make an identifying reference* involves 
purely grammatical conventions.^ Similarly, de-projection 
« 
in no sense can be considered to "bring about" or "cause" 
a "change" in a projective formulation by means of a 
"procedure actively initiated". De-projection is rather 
an expression of a schema according to which a given context 
has a constitution that is not projective. Strictly 
speaking, then, any intimation that de-projection consists | 
in a "step-by-step process" reflects those same grammatical j 
3 forms above which are potentially misleading. 
1. See pp. 263f. -
2. Cf t. p. 261, n. 1. 
3* I can do no better than to direct attention here 
to Wittgenstein1s insightful remark at the conclusion of his 
Tractatus: "Meine Satze erlautern dadurch, dass sie der, 
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The constitutive structure of a given group of 
'phenomena may be studied on a basis purely intrinsic to 
the context providing for reference to that structure, 
or on a comparative basis3 with respect to the structure 
of phenomena extrinsic to the context in question. 
Analyses of the former kind are said to comprise a form 
of phenomenological investigation which I term 1 statics1; 
analyses with respect to extrinsic relations between' 
phenomena compose, in contrast, the branch of inquiry 
termed 1 dynamics1. Static phenomenology includes 
dynamical considerations as a proper subdivision, in part 
because"*" a sufficiently comprehensive context provides 
an effective basis for dynamical studies of relations 
between phenomena comprehended in certain sub-groups. 
Relative strictly to those sub-groups, relations between 
phenomena in those groups are "extrinsic". 
The foundation necessary for the possibility of 
reflexive reference is provided by the constitutive-
i :  o 
structure of an intrinsically determined system- Dynamical 
! . i 
welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn 
er durch sie - auf ihnen - uber sie hinausgesti'egen ist. 
(Er muss sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf 
ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) 
Er muss diese Satze uberwinden,, dann sieht er die 
Welt richtig." [Wittgenstein 1: 6.54] 
i 
1. Additional reasons are made clear shortly. 
2. Pp. 9&££, lllff, 119ff» 124, 190. i ... 
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structures are therefore grounded by statics. 
Phenomena in general are intrinsically determined, 
since any given group of phenomena comprises an 
intrinsically determined system.A certain context 
from the standpoint of which the temporal structure of 
a sequence of temporally successive phenomena can be 
characterized, provides for comparative reference to 
" the time-signatures of those phenomena# That context may 
itself be characterized with respect to its temporal 
structure relative to other contexts. The latter form 
of characterization is dynamical, and is possible relative' 
to a more comprehensive context from the standpoint of 
which extrinsic relations between the' various contexts 
can be evidenced. .The explicit ground relative to 
which it is possible to evidence certain given structures 
2 
expresses the static constitution of those structures. 
1. P. 191. 
A formal analogue may be found in Hilbeirt's idea of 
a "complete formalization" of a deductive system, which 
conceals nothing and which consists only of what is 
explicitly put into the formalization. [Nagel 1: 26ff] 
This resembles Bridgman's view concerning the possibility 
of building into a formalized system sufficient 
?ualifications that a text ceases to be necessary. (See Bridgman 2: 69] and [Bridgman 4: 633.) See, however, p. 
124, n. 1. 
2. Husserl distinguishes between "constitution 
statique" and "constitution apriorique genetique", between 
"le rapport statique" and "le rapport dynamique", between 
"static phenomenology" and "genetic phenomenology". (Cf. 
[LFLT £ 9& 334]» [S. Bachelard 1: 221], [EL III 9 & 4^ff]» 
.[CM 76f].) I do not, however, follow his usage of these 
terms. 
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Thus, a context relative to which the temporal 
structure of a group of phenomena can be evidenced 
provides for a dynamical form of description. A purely 
intrinsic expression of the essential structure of that 
context does not itself permit reference to "the 
time-signature" of the context. It follows that the 
static constitution of a context can provide the basis 
for dynamical considerations, but in no sense is 
reference coherently possible to "the temporal structure 
of the given context, per se".^ Such reference is possible 
without projective misconstruction only relative to a 
more comprehensive statically constituted context which 
provides for a dynamical description of extrinsic 
relations between the first context and one or more other 
contexts. 
1. In this connection, it is of interest to 
take note of a somewhat similar observation by N. Goodman: 
"Strangely enough it turns out not that time is more 
fluid than (say; space, but rather that time is more • 
static.-... [CJhange is a concomitant variation in time 
and some other respect. Since time is always one of 
the variant factors of change, we speak of change in 
whatever is the other variant factor in the given case. 
Thus although there is no change that does not involve 
time, there is no change in time." [Goodman 2: 300f] 
(See pp. l63f.) 
"I think our error [concerning the concept of time] 
is nourished by a nebulous underlying notion of the self 
as something that flits through time carrying its specious 
present along with it.... [VJJhether [the self].••is or 
is not like a thing, event, or quality - or whatever else 
it may be or be like - and however many are the times it 
lights upon, the statement that it'lights upon or-occupies 
or is at different times at different times will still 
be absurd." [Goodman 2: 302j ("See pp. 25>f.) 
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It should be clear that the notion of a "more 
comprehensive context" is time-relative. Of two 
contexts, one is "more comprehensive" in this sense 
provided it includes the other retentionally."*" Thus# 
the valence-structure of a given context in relation to 
which that context may subsequently be re-identified 
with respect to a more comprehensive context, may be 
described as essentially relative to a retentional • 
2 
augmentation of phenomena. 
The static constitution of activity is consequently 
described wholly in the intrinsic terms of established 
correlations between groups of egolo'gically modified 
and egologically neutral phenomena. In relation to a 
statically constituted context, pragmatical structures 
are readily evidenced purely with respect to specific 





1. Recall that "the essential re-identifiability 
of a context implies the possibility that a context 
given \tfith a time-signature of the relative phenomenological 
past can be included in a context with a time-signature 
of the relative phenomenological present*" (Pp. 153» 157*) 
i 
2. See p. 199. ; 
It is relative to the possibility of evidencing a 
retentional augmentation of phenomena that phenomenology 
may describe the "expansion of experience". Cf« [S. 
Bachelard 1: 99] 
In this connection, the static constitution of 
the notion of "history" will be elucidated elsewhere. 
(For a "genetic" view of "history", cf. [LG 176ff]«) 
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phenomenology.1 
Statics, then, is a form of investigation of 
phenomena the essential structure of which is explicitly 
disclosed* In this sense, de-projection provides a 
schema for characterizing the static constitution of a 
given group of phenomena. De-projective phenomenology 
supplies a foundation for the pure description of the 
statically explicit. Statics provides the essential 
foundation for what, dynamically considered, may be 
2 implicit. The static constitution of a given context 
is that context's structure de-projectively identified.' 
It follows that the logic of structure of any 
statically constituted context is relativistically 
self-enclosed: the static constitution of a given 
context provides the grounds for completely intrinsic 
self-reference.^ Thus, statics investigates the foundations 
1. Cf. p. 249, and [Ricoeur 3; 112]. 
Phenomenology in this sense is, in the last analysis* 
an inquiry into the formal "metric" of phenomenological 
space-time. (See p. Ill, and $ 1.6 passim.) • 
2. Thus, once agains "to analyze is to explicate the 
implicit." [Ricoeur 3: 99] (Cf. p. 7&») 
3. See pp. 197ff» and passim. 
A statically constituted context may be characterised 
as "independent" in the following sense: "[D]ans son 
essence concevable idealement, ...[un] contenu est indepen--
dant [si son] essence nTexige par elle-meme, done a priori, 
aucune autre essence qui soit entrelacee..avec elle." [EL 
II.2 iii 6 5 l&J Cf. also [Husserl 2: 162], [Husserl 3], 
[EL II.2 iii £ 8 25; § 17 51; (N.d.T.) 371; passim.]. 
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relative to which a theory about the general nature of 
theories, or a science of the general nature of sciences, 
is possible 
Static phenomenological analyses are not themselves 
temporally determined, although any given subject-matter 
has a temporal structure. In this sense, analyses 
of relativistic constitution are not provisional.^ 
Strictly speaking, de-projective formulations are 
effectively tenseless.^" 
Phenomenology, a science which sets the task for 
! ; ' 
itself to study the general nature of all science, seeks 
i ' 
to elucidate the constitutive structures of a multiverse 
of possibility. Its proper subject-matter is without 
i I 
limits, subtle in its variety and varied in its subtleties. 
Its ultimate function is an elucidation of "the fabric 
; 
. 1  
of this vision", of the structure of experiencep of the , . 
5 i i 
significance and dimensions of life. | 
1.- Cf. pp. 113ff. 
2. See pp. I63f, 276, and [Goodman 2: 236]. 
3. See pp. 121ff, 226ff, 233, 249. 1 
4. In Leibniz*s sense of the term, de-projective 
phenomenology is essentially "philosophia perermis". 
5. "The world and life are one." [Wittgenstein 1: 5.621] 
"[These] things above all distinguish this "sacred city" 
from our own culture today: indifference to...progress [ana] 
...a lack of history. The[se]...conceptions go together and 
are rooted in a conception of man and of life entirely 
2B1 
This unbounded domain of possibilities - open to 
! 
novelty yet peculiarly self-enclosed constitutes the 
world for phenomenology. 
different from ours. . 
It is a difference between a peaceful} timeless 
life lived in the stability of a continually renewed 
present, and a dynamic, aggre^ive life aimed at the 
future." [Merton 1: 76] 
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mentioned elsewhere in this study. Because this work 
is intended as an introduction, to a field of research, 
and as such would attempt to provide certain general 
'guidelines for investigations in that field, references 
are supplied when possible to works which can be consulted 
with profit in a particular connection. It is not my 
intention, even were it a practical possibility, to offer 
a comprehensive review of pertinent sources. 
Explanation of Reference Style 
The references have a uniform typographical structure, 
but the manner of referring to particular works varies in 
certain respects* The Explanation of Reference Style 
describes the form used in the construction of references, 
with a comment on the variations. 
The expressions enclosed in brackets are the 
abbreviations under which the various works are cited in 
the text. Where several editions are indicated, references-
are made to those preceded by a bracketed expression. 
For convenience, frequently cited works by Husserl (s.v.) 
are abbreviated according to title. All others are designated 
by the name(s) of the author(s), followed by an Arabic numeral. 
The two examples below illustrate the typographical 
pattern of references to works listed in the bibliography; 
and the headings above the examples call attention to the 
elements commonly present in the construction of references. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Author's Name Reference Numeral Author's Page 
(or abbreviation Divisions Sections 
of title) 
[ Carnap 1: 8 179 2BB-290 ] 
[ PCIT 0 1 13 ] 
2#3 
(1) Author's Name: 
With the exception of frequently cited works by Husserl, 
the author's name is the first element of the bracketed 
expression. Author's names are often given in shortened 
form. 
(2) Reference Numeral; 
' ' i 
An Arabic numeral follows the author's name, with the 
exception of works by Husserl, noted above. When two or 
more works by the same author are cited in the same 
connection, two or more Arabic numerals follow the author's 
name, separated by commas. A'oolon [:] separates the reference 
numeral(s) from the author's divisions listed. 
(3). Author's Divisions: 
'Author's divisions' refers to subdivisions of a 
work, e.g., as a book, part, chapter, section, paragraph. 
Such divisions may represent the work of an editor or , 
translator of the work. Most frequently cited author's, 
divisions refer to sections of a work, and are prefaced by 
a single section symbol [ § J, or two successive section 
symbols if two or more sections are cited. Inclusion of 
author's divisions in a reference often permits the reader 
to locate the citation in editions other than those used 
here, where pagination may vary. 
(4) Page Sections: 
Page sections give the page numbers of the passage 
cited. If the passage extends for a single page beyond the 
page number given, a single 'f' is suffixed to the page 
number. If a passage is longer than two consecutive pages, 
'ff' is suffixed to the page number. 'Passim' is used in 
the notes and terminological index to signify that the 
work or passage referred to discusses the topic under which 
it is cited, intermittently rather than continuously. 
Often several author's divisions, accompanied by the 
relevant page numbers, are given in connection with a single 
work. Distinct author's divisions are separated by the ' 
semicolon [;J. 
The system of giving notes at the bottom of the page, 
rather than in a separate section, was preferred because it 
seemed more convenient for the reader. The method of 
numbering footnotes by means of Arabic numbers beginning with 
*1' on. each page, was chosen to avoid the inconvenience 
both of successively larger numbers, and of a plethora of 
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unwieldy symbols. 
X have attempted to include in the bibliography the 
date(s) of the original printings. Whenever possible, the 
publisher and place of publication are given for the 
original editions. References are made to translations of 
works not readily available in the original language. For 
brevity, reprint editions are usually not listed. 
The following abbreviations are used in this work: 
Aufl. Auflage(n) Kap. 
" augm. augmented (augmen- ms., mss. 
te-e) n. 
Bd., no. 
Bde. Band, Bande orig. 
Bk. Book(s) par. 
Ch. Chapter(s) pseud, 
cf. confer (i.e., pub. 
compare) rev. 
def., sect.,£ 
df. definition(s) ser. 
div. division(s) supp. 
e.g. exempli gratia s.v. 
(for example) 
Eng. English trad., 
et. al. et alii (and trans, 
others) u. 
t fasc. fascicle(s) v. 
' Fr. French vol. 
Ger. German 
hrsg. herausgegeben 
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TERMINOLOGICAL INDEX 
The following index gives an inventory of key expressions 
used in this work, lists the pages on which those expressions 
occur, and draws attention to the pages on which a given 
expression is defined or clarified. It has been my aim to 
include all the occurrences of important terms, omitting 
only those occurrences which do not explicitly exemplify or 
clarify the meaning intended. Terms of principal significance 
are underlined. Pages on which a given expression is defined 
or clarified are prefixed by an asterisk [*J. 
Cross-references have been utilized to point out 
connections between ideas. The catchword is indicated in 
cross-references and in subordinate entries by the tilde [~], 
e.g., Foundation, ~al elucidation: foundational elucidation. 
If the catchword is divided by a virgule [/J, the expression 
preceding the virgule is indicated by the tilde, e.g., 
Dimensional/analysis, "order: dimensional order. When 's.v.1 
follows an entry, cross-reference is made to the heading 
under which the entry occurs, or, when it is not ambiguous, 
to the term immediately preceding the 's.v.'. 
Abbreviations 284 
Abstraction xxiin, 4ln, 47 
Absurdity ixn, xii,- 17, 69f, 71, 74, 76n, 79, #7, 215, 220n, 
233, 236n, 257, 277n 
Suspension of ~ (s.v. Phenomenological reduction; 213n 
Activity (s.v. Egological) 145, *26&ff 
Constituting ~ 166, l$5ff, 273, 27# 
Act (s.v. Egological) 21$, 262n, 263n, *270ff 
"-character (s.v. Egological modification) 274 
Adaequatio(n) (s.v. Concordance) xiin, 22&1, 233n 
Adjacent-membership 39, *50ff, 105 
Affective modifications (s.v. Egological modifications) 251n 
Agency (s.v. Activity) 249n, 271n 
Ambiguity x, xii, 2&n, 214n, 219 
Analysis *73, *279ff 
Analytic relation (s.v. Tautology) 34f, 120n, 207n, 227n 
Artistic involvement 264n 
Ascription (s.v. Identifying reference) 
Attentional characters (s.v. Egological modifications) 133£» 
250, 252, 25Sff 
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Autoconcordance (s.y. Self-evidence) *121f, 225, 22&i 





~ of definiteness *140n 
~atic formulation #0n, &Ln, 23&n 
"atic method H4n, 225 
~atic systems 224n^ 
incompleteness of "*atic systems (s.v. Incompleteness) 
Beingjs.v. Ontology) 247f 
^ of consciousness xiv 
~ of external things xiv 
~ of phenomena 202n, 203 
Belief ii 
Betweenness (s.v. Adjacent-membership) 52n 
Body *251n, *253f, 263n 
Calculus of individuals (Goodman) 173n 
Cause *23fiff, 269, 274 
Causal/order *23#ff, 257 
^perturbation 271f 
"relation, determination of limits of 239ff 
asymmetrical^/* 243ff 
symmetrical *" 243ff 
Causality 144, *23&ff, 267n 
as a relation of functional dependency *241ff, 269 
Change iii, *l62ff, 17&i, 238ff, *271ff 
Coherence theory of truth (s.v.) 
Coherency (s.v. Consistency) *72f 
Coincidence 11, 39, 227n 
Complementaritv (s.v. Principle of "*) 104, 233n. 
and quantum mechanics 233n 
Completeness 49ff, #&, 104, *124ff, 17&i 
Relativity of ~ 130n 
Complete equation *86f 
Concept viiin _ 
Primitive ~s viif 
Concordance (s.v. Autoconcordance, Coincidence) 227ff 
Confirmation (s.v. Verification) *225ff 
Consciousness (s.v. Egological) xiv, xxii, 136, I66n, 261, 
263n, 266 
Myth of the container-" (s.v. Solipsism, Idealism, 
Realism) 2l6n, *265ff 
Object of ~ 134 
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Consistency (s.v. Possibility) xii, *72f, 97, *ll3ff»-221n 
boundary conditions *97f, l§6f, 204, 212, 217, 221, 
236 
Circulatiry of proofs of ~ 73n 
Constitution (s.v. Conditions of possibility) ix, xiii, xxiii, 
2, 11, 17, 22f, 43, 60, *135, 141, 176 
Formal " xixf, 5, 33n, *139f, 146, 204n 
Material ~ 33n, *139f» 202, 204n 
Relativistic ~ 6, 90f, 109n, *110, 123, 132, *195ff, 
227ff, 237, 247, 250, passim 
Spatio-temporal " *104ff, 130, 146, passim 
Static ** (s.v. Static) 
"al system 10, 12n 
Constitutive of 14, 24, 44, 47, 56ff 
" structure xiv, xix, xxiii, xxvi, xxixf, 39, 93, 
193» 230, passim 
Constraint(s) xiii^ 
Catalogue of " xii 
Constructional system 140f 
Context xxxii, 6, 29, *30, 34, 33ff, 46, 49, 51 , 61, 6f>f, 
63, 72* 94, 105, 119, 192, 207, 215, 233, 276 
Meta-" 66 
Multi-particular ~ *35ff, 59f, 71, 143, 196 
Particular-" 31f, 33, 42, 55, 59f, 96, 110, 117, 143, 
146, l67f, 196, 240n 
Contingency (s.v* Material constitution) 5? *45^, 53, *133f 
C o n t i n u i t y  * 4 9 f f ,  5 3 ,  1 0 4 ,  1 2 7 f ,  1 3 1 ,  2 } 8 f f  
Contradiction *64ff, 71, 76, 79, 101, 114n, 206 
Conviction iii, xi 
Coordinate *6, 3, *12, 19ff, 46, 51n, 54» 70, 75, 94f, 105. 
240 
" family 7, *30, *33, 42ff, 50ff, 60f, 66, 69, 151 
"-signature *39n, 57 
~ structure 29, 193 
" sub-systems *l3ff, 23n, 37, 4lff, 60, 66 
~ system *6f, 9ff, 23n,'29, 37, 41, 56f, 70, 119, 205, 
214, 213 
"-transformation 17 
" zones *5!3ff, 123, 170, 173, 175, 2^0n 
Cartesian " system 14, 17, 20 
Polar ~ system 17 -
Coordination 2f, 7, 69, 71f, 32ff, 136 
Correlation 73, 119, 133f, 147, *243ff, 257, 265, 272, 273 
^and definition In 
~and objectivity 
"as a functional relation 37n, 270ff 
Non-uniform " 259 
Objectively determined " (s.v. Objective) *249 
Possible ~ *94ff 
Uniformity of " *245ff, 269, 274 
Counter-intuitive xvii 
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Covariance *31, *103, 133, 163, 166, 172f 
Criteria xiin, xviii 
of meaning xxi 
of truth Ts.v.) 69 
Criticism xv 
Decidability xii, 126n, 173n, 231n 
Definite *97 
Definition *ln^ 41# 73, 223 
Implicit 2 
De-pro.iection 6ff, *19f, 23, *63ff# 39, 132, *274# *279 
as scientific 24 
Phases of °* *3lff, 136n, 225n, *274, 230 
De - pro ,i e c t i v e/law 74 
rule 74» 83f 
Description xi, 2 J + f ,  23n, 53, 31, 39ff» 206, 214» *249 
Complete *57ff# 93, 133 




Differentiability 7, 40f, *50ff, 53, 61 
Dimensional/analysis *35ff, I42n 
~ly homogeneous plurality *176f 
"ly heterogeneous plurality *177f 
Forms of " order *103n, 17off, 191n 
Dimensionology 115n 
Discontinuities (s.v. Continuity) 265 
Dispositional (s.v. Egological) *254ff# 270n, 273f 
Dissociation 47» 139# 215« 225# 233 
Determinant of reference (s.v. Coordinate) 
Dynamic 23ln 
^ science 249n 
" universe xiv 
Dynamics *275ff 
Economy (s.v. Principle of minimum assumption) 
Effect (s.v. Cause) 
Ego (s.v. Egological) 144# *252ff, 277n 
Metaphysical theory of the " 144# 277n 
Ecological/modification *252ff, 273# 273 
^region *254ff# 263 
"ly homogeneous *256ff, 265 
"ly heterogeneous *256ff, 265 
~ly neutral (s.v. Egologically unmodified) *254ff# 265 
"ly unmodified phenomena *215n, 273 
Egology *253ff 
Spectator theory of *26lff, 269ff 
Embedment *lllff, 123f, 143, 155# 159ff# 171# 177# 130, I39f# (  
217, 224# 230,. 253f, 263, 271ff 
" in a higher order dimensional system llln 
Empirical 43n, 57# 64# 141n, 202 
foundation (s.v.) 
~ nature of de-proiection 24. *92. *140 
objects xixf 
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Epistemology *viiff, xviiin 
Epistemologically neutral xxiii 
fundamental 4 
gnrovh (s.v. Phenomenological reduction) *136, 213n 
Equipollent *65f, 65 
Equisignificance *65f, 65 
Equivalence (s.v. Identity-relation) 67, 226 
Erleb (Carnap) 150n 
Error ix, xii, xv# xvii, 16, 22, 64, 90, 159, *234^, 255* 
261, 277 
Evidence xi, 73, HO, 141n, 216, 2l6f, *223ff, 244ff» 259, 
272, 276ff 
Self-" (s.v. Auto-justification, Autoconcordance) 110, 
121f, *223n. 224ff 
Existence (s.v. Ontology) 
Experience vii, xi, xviii, xxvf, lOn, 63, 129n, 134» 14ln, 
I42n, l66f, 199n, 201n, 227n, 233n, 240n, 262n, 
266n, 271n, 276n, 230 
Domain of possible xvi, xxx, *134, *141, 156, *199, 
214, 215n, 219, 233, 247, 252, 265 
Possible ~_xxiv. 191 
Theory of."" xxvf, xxx_ 
Unitary structure of ~ xxv 
Experiment xxiv 
Explication as elimination (Quine) I37n 
Explicit. 2Lf. *29, 43, 47, 66. *77ff. 94, 102, 105. 111, 
146, 151, 153, 276, 279' 
~ controversy xxvii 
Exteriority, foundation of 214f 
Extrinsic xxi, 275, 277 
Faculty (s.v. Activity) 270n 
Fallibility (s.v. Principle of ~) 
Falsity x, 100, 223f 
"and tautology (s.v.) 63f 
•'Falsifiability 226ff 
Conditions of *" *100ff 
Non-falsifiable proposition *101 
Family resemblance (s.v. Coordinate zones) 55n 
Field (s.v. Region) 
Formal 
mathematical disciplines xxx 
mathesis *viif 
** structure xix, xxiii 
Complete "ization 114n, 276 
""ization of relativistically recurved system 
276 
Foundation (s«,v. Constitution) v, ix, xiii, 32, 34» 57, 69, 
96, 102ff, 195, 275 
" of science xxv 
"al elucidation iv, lOOn, *135> 221 




~ of reference *9ff 
"work xxxii, 66, 77, 193» 201, 261 
Formal ~ 9n 
Fringes (s.v. Margins of indeterminacy) 12S 
Function xxxii, 7» 32, 34n, 35ff, 44» 50, 56ff, 62, 116, 
241n, 248 
~al analysis *4#f 
~al character 3 
~al limits 
"*al marker *35, 53£» 56 
~al organization 32, 34, 95» 120 
~al property (s.v. Context, Particular context) *45ff» 
52, 60 ' 
~al relation (s.v. Correlation) S5ff, *109, 265 
**al variable 36 
Continuous ~ (s.v. Continuity) 
Individualization of a " *36f, 44» 4^ff, 60f 
Essential ~ 36, *45, 4& 
Successor-" *10;5ff, I67ff, l3Sf, 23$ 
Uhi-contextual 34n 
Future (relative phenomenological ~) 143» *154ff» 245f» 2&Ln 
Generalized analysis (Gukhman) *13#f 
Genidentity (s.v. Self-identity) 
Germinal duplication *13, 119n, 200n 
Given *91f, *140f, 156f, 223n 
GSdel's proof (s.v. Incompleteness) 
Hermetic xxvii 
Heterogeneity l6n 
History 22, 243n, 257n, *27&i, 230n 
Hyperbolically self-defeating (s.v. Self-referential 
Inconsistency) 4 
Idealism 219f 
Identifying reference 5» *10ff, 26, 32, 34ff» 5&» 66, &7, 94, 
9Sf, 105, 109, 119, l&Lff, 139, 203, 212, *263ff 
*272ff 
Identification 3, 11, 141n, 147» 227n, 279 
schema 41 
Re-" 11, 150ff, 190, 264, 273 _ 
Temporal character of ~ 151 
Identity (s.v. Principle of ~) 14n, 32, 42n 
2 conditions *40f, 172, 255 
"-relation 66 
Self-"* 33. 35, *59, 95, 110, 239 
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Implicit 14, 22, *77ff, 155, 279 
limits 50, 5#, 6l 
~ predication *79 
reference 17, 31 
Incompatibility *71ff, 232 
Incompleteness xxviii 1 
theorem *125ff, 2l6n 
Inconsistency (s.v. Sense, rules of) #4, 206n, 236 
Self-referential 79n, *91n, *lllff 
Indefinite (s.v. Indeterminate) 
~ reflexive iteration *116, 267 
Formalization of ~ order 126 
Variables of ~ order *114ff, 127n 
As a basis for mathematics (s.v.) 114n 
Indeterminate 27, 49, 171, 173, 179, 190 
~ set 26n 
Indeterminacy 104, 150, 17& 
Spatial ~ 171, 17^ 
Temporal ~ 150ff 
Individualization (s.v. Functional ~) 
Inductive generalization I4&1, *245, 251n 
Insight xv, xviii 
Instantaneous configuration (Whitehead) 150n . _ 
Instantiation (s.v. Function, individualization of a ~) 
Intelligibility 203n 
Intentionalitv xxiii, 250n, 254n, 257n, 259n. *262ff 
Intersubjective world (s.v. Objective, World) 
Intrinsic 37, 47, 197f, 206, 212, 224, 230, 264n, 266, 275ff 
"ally determined system *lllff, 190ff, *275^f 
Invariance S7f, *177f, 193 
Irreversible time sequences (Reichenbach) 244n 
Isomorphism 2f, *77f, 119, 193 
Iteration (s.v. Indefinite **) 131n, 267 
Justification (s.v. Auto-justification) xxi, 4, *65, 72ff 
Knowledge xvi 
Limitations of ~ xv, xxx 
Provisional ~ (s.v. Relativism) xxv 
Reliable ~ xxv 
I 
Language xxi, *4f» 73n, 74n» 227n, 250n 
~ and equipollence (s.v.) 66 
of noncommittal abstraction (Quine) 210n 
i 315 
Language (contM) 
~ of volumes 20ff 
~ with unlimited means of expression 112n 
Categories of ~ xvii 
Formalizable ~ *114ff, 129n 
Levels of ~ 5, *112ff 
Natural 4f 
Law, universal oB 
Legal reasoning 270n 
Life (s•v• World) 2g0n 
Linguistic sign (s.v. Correlation) 250n 
Literary style xvii 
Logic 3 
~ of structure *lff, 23, 44, 70ff, 37, 93. 93, 104ff» 
127, 13^f, 167, 190, 196ff, 221, 279 
Homogeneous "" *67f, 147, 159 
^ Heterogeneous ~ *67f» 147, 149 
~al necessity xviii, 63ff 
~al particulars (s.v. Particulars) 
~al requirements xxiii 
~al rule (s.v. Rule) *65, 63 
~al space 13n, 123n 
~al system viin _ 
Conventional nature of *"al laws *65, 63 " 
De-projjective r  124n 
Modal (s*v» Modal) 
Margins of indeteraiinacv *2#, 179 
Material bodies 130ff, 203n, 253 
Mathematics iv, xxi, xxiv, 110, 112 
Matter (s.v. Material bodies) l32ff 
Maximal model (Hilbert) 90n 
Meaning xxin, 9, 15ff, 66, 69ff, 201, 204, 206n, .214, 217f, 
220n, 247 
and tautology (s.v.) 64ff 
"less 22, 71f, 76, 30, 34, 37, 126n, 201n, 206n, 213n, 
232n, 236, 240 
Measurement, problem of 177n 
Memory l60n 
Meta-languages H4n 
Comparative "* 43n 
Meta-mathematics (s.v.^Mathematics) 114n, 126n 
Mathesis (s.v. Formal "") 
Methoc3|( s) ii, xi, 16 
of philosophy xxiv 
"* of projection (Wittgenstein) 74n 
Axiomatic ~_(s.v. Axiomatic) 
Empathetic ~ xvii 
Unitary v ~ . 
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Methodology xii, xvii, xxiii, xxviiiff, 1, 4» 25 
unitary iif ,jLx. ;  
De-projective ~ (s.v. De-projection) 
Phenomenological ~ (s.v. Phenomenology) 
Mind xiv, l85ff 
Minimum assumption (s.v. Principle of ~) 
Modal 
~ chain lOOff ' 
~ convergence sequence ('Siv. n-valent ~ foundation) *118 
logic (s.v.) 124n 
~ order *98ff, 136, 195f. 202n, 207n 
organization ll8f, 202 
~ rules lOln 
~ value 107, 176 
~ly homogeneous system *197 
~ly heterogeneous system *197 
Multiple ~ities *100n, 232f 
n-valent foundation *99ff, 124n 




Nested sequence (s»v» Modal foundation) *99ns 101, 111, 118 
Neutrality-modification (Husserl) 254n 
Nonsense xii 
Novelty iii, 281 
Oblique reference 217n, 263n 
Ob.iect(s) (s.v. Particulars, Material bodies) iiif, ix, xix, 
xxiiif, *3, 10, lln, 18, 24, 28n, 39n, 78n, 116n 
140, 172n, *173ff, l85ff, 193, 207, 210f, *212n, 
214, 234n, 235, 258, 262n, 266 
~ of reference 34n, 41f» 171f» 193> 205, 252 
series (s.v. o-series) 
Class of ~^10, 24 
Empirical ~ (s.v. Empirical) 
Objective 3. 203n, 211n, *229ff, 254n, 266 
Ob.iectivitv 129n, 134, *229ff 
Occam's razor (s.v. Principle of minimum assumption) 89f 
Ontology *202ff 
Descriptive ~ 208 
Formal ~ 204n 
Inevitability of ~ 205 
Material ~ 204n 
317 
Ontology (cont'd) ^ 
Phenomenological ~ (s.v. Ontology) 
Taxonomic ~ 20# 
Transcendental phenomenological ~ *204n 
Virtual ~ *209ff 
character *205ff, 229 
^ commitment * 208ff, 230 
premiss 207 
legion 143, 145, *2llff, 216, 265 
relativity (s.v.) *20Sff 
~ structure *202ff, 231, 267, 271 
~ly homogeneous contexts (s.v.) *203n, 212 
~ly heterogeneous contexts (siV.) *208n 
~ly neutral (s.v. Virtual ontology) *210, 229 
~ly noncommittal system *210 
Existential ~ character *210ff, 230n 
Operation *#4, 122 
~al account of truth (s.v.) 22Sn 
~alism 123n 
o-series *39ff, $7 ,  105ff, 122, 151ff, 159, l66ff, 175n, 
17-9ff« 196, 214n, 240, 243 £ 
parametric *40 
Open ~ (s.v. Transcendent) 
Recursive nature of ~ 10$, 11$ 
Temporal nature of ~ 106f- *147ff 
Overlap (s.v. Coordinate zones) 53, 54n, 67, 175n, 
233, 240, 246, 270n 
0 
Parameter xxxii, 40f, 53, 56n, 70n, 129n, 172, 1S9, 191» 
241n, 265 
~ic order 249n, 255 
Analysis of ~ 81n 
Order of ** 41 
Particulars 5, 7, 13ff, 27ff, *34ff, 76ff, 93f, 105ff, 
122ff, *132ff, 147ff, 1S9, 195, 217f 
""-context (s.v. Context) 
Particularity *50ff, 60f, 203, 214 
Parts (s.v. Whole/part relations) 
Past (relative phenomenological ~) 143, *153ff, 243, 245 
Person (s.v. Egological) 252n 
Perspective variation (Husserl) (s.v. Spatial variation) 152n 
172 
Perturbation (s.v. Cause) 271 
Phenomenology *130f, *l35ff, *200ff, 260, 265, 26Sff 
as a science of maximum theoretic generality (s.v. 
System of ...) 146 
Be-pro.iective ~ *l36ff. 141n, 219f, 273, 230f 
313 
Phenomenology (contTd)^ 
Pure descriptive ~ (s.v. Statics) passim 
Phenomenological 
~ constitution (s.v. Constitution) 
~ egology (s.v. Egological) 253 
~ ontology (s.v.) 
~ psychiatry xxx 
~ psychology 253 
~ reduction *136, 213n 
~ space (s.v.) 
space-time (s.v.) 
~ statics (s.v.) *275ff 
time (s^v.) 
Relative ~ past (s.v. Past) 
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